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1 I N T R O D U C T I O N A N D R E S E A R C H Q U E S T I O N S 
1.1 Introduction 
In popular opinion, love conquers all divisions in society. When confronted with Mr. or Miss. 
Right, people become socially blind and start to act irrationally. They fall in love with blue eyes 
or blond hair and not with social standing or big money. In our contemporary societies with 
their ideals of romantic love, marriage selection seems socially chaotic and a sheer matter of 
personal taste. 
Nothing is more off the mark than this romantic view of marriage. However irrational men 
and women can be during early stages of love, when long-lived bonds between people in 
society are considered the love market does not appear to be socially blind. As many studies of 
mate selection have demonstrated, people select their mates quite systematically. In the 
Netherlands during the twentieth century, for example, husband's average age at first marriage 
has consistently been two years greater than the average age of wives (Central Bureau for 
Statistics: CBS 1990). Other, strong examples of systematic mate selection behavior are that in 
the United States in the year 1970, 99% of black males married a black female despite a large 
surplus of white females (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1970), and that in pre-Nazi Berlin (1931) 
83% of the Jewish females married a Jewish male (Ultee and Luijkx 1995). Apparently, there 
are clear patterns in what intuitively may seem chaotic. The most prominent pattern observed 
in mate selection is that likes marry likes more often than dislikes. In the research literature this 
phenomenon is termed 'homogamy', or 'endogamy'. The opposite phenomenon, marriage 
among people who have different social positions, is dubbed 'heterogamy' or 'exogamy'. 
Similarities between husbands and wives have attracted attention of numerous sciences. 
Social psychologists have been interested in the degree to which persons of similar or 
dissimilar character traits are attracted to each other (cf. the theory of 'complementary needs', 
Winch 1958). Social biologists have been interested in assortative mating with respect to IQ 
and educational attainment because these phenomena provide insight into the genetic 
reproduction of intelligence in human species (Buss 1989). Within sociology, questions about 
homogamy have also received considerable attention. Since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, sociologists have observed strong similarities between marriage partners with respect 
to such traits as class of social origin (Berent 1954), education (Benini 1898), occupation 
(Centers 1949), religion (Burgess and Wallin 1943), and ethnicity (Drachsler 1921). 
Foremost, the interest of sociologists in questions about homogamy has been displayed by 
researchers of social stratification. These researchers contend that the degree of homogamy 
with respect to status characteristics - for example, social origin, education, and occupation -, 
provides a measure of the openness of a society's stratification system (Berent 1954). A high 
degree of what I refer to as status homogamy indicates rigid barriers among status groups and 
a closed stratification system: when high marries high and low marries low, there are few 
opportunities for lower status persons to improve their status via marriage and higher status 
persons will not often face downward mobility. Weak status homogamy, on the other hand, 
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indicates frequent interaction among persons of different social standing and points to a 
stratification system that is much more open to upward or downward moves: higher status 
persons may marry lower status persons, which would create both upward and downward 
mobility on the stratification ladder. As with more frequently addressed questions about 
intergenerational social mobility, questions about status homogamy can be regarded as an 
alternative way to gain insight into the openness of a society's stratification system. 
In this study I take up the lead of stratification analysts and study patterns and trends in 
status homogamy. I have three aims. My first aim is to compare parameters of status 
homogamy of so-called 'single trait models' with parameters of status homogamy of so-called 
'dual trait models'. In (bivariate) single trait models spouses' similarity with respect to one 
particular trait is estimated. Educational homogamy, for example, is assessed by computing the 
zero-order association between spouses' educational levels. In (multivariate) dual trait models 
two forms of status homogamy are estimated simultaneously, taking into account the 
associations between the two status characteristics of spouses. For example, educational 
homogamy is computed as the association between spouses' educational levels net of the 
tendency of persons to match on social origin (homogamy of social origin) and the 
interrelations between education and social origin. The net weight of educational homogamy 
which is produced by this dual trait analysis, is an 'unbiased' estimate. It indicates a preference 
for educational similarity independent of spouses' preferences for similar class origins. 
Once the traditional single trait parameters of status homogamy are compared to the newer 
dual trait parameters, it may appear that the dual trait measures are substantially smaller than 
the single trait measures. That is, single trait analyses may overestimate people's degree of 
status homogamy. A strong example of such a difference in the strength of single and dual trait 
parameters is that an initially observed positive association between spouses' educational levels 
disappears once in dual trait analysis spouses' social origins are taken into account. In that 
instance, the observed single trait measure of educational homogamy is entirely spurious: it is a 
'by-producf (Blau and Duncan 1967: 358) of homogamy of social origin and the positive 
associations between spouses' social origins and educational attainment. Stated simply: people 
with similar educations may have entered wedlock not because they preferred educational 
similarity, but because they preferred similarity with respect to their class of social origin and 
because social origin happened to coincide with educational attainment. 
A comparison of single and dual trait measures of status homogamy may further show that 
trends in status homogamy obtained from single trait analyses are distorted. In particular, such 
a comparison can demonstrate that the observed world-wide decrease in educational 
homogamy - as obtained with single trait models (Ultee and Luijkx 1990) - is biased. The 
decrease in educational homogamy may in dual trait analyses appear to be spurious and entirely 
due to a diminished preference for similar social class origin. In fact, once this other and related 
marriage tendency is taken into account, people's tendency of educational homogamy may also 
increase instead of decrease. Such a finding would run counter to the initially observed world-
wide decrease in the single trait measure of educational homogamy. In addition, a new finding 
of increased similarity between spouses' educational levels would challenge traditional theses 
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on developments in educational homogamy in modem societies. It would contradict the 
general finding and thesis from stratification research that societal openness increases in 
industrial societies (Lipset and Bendix 1959). Furthermore, upward educational homogamy 
would not be in line with ideas from sociology of the family that romantic love thrives in 
modem societies (Goode 1964, Shorter 1976). However, an increase in the net tendency of 
persons to match on similar educational levels would confirm rival stratification theories that 
postulate a shift from social origin to education as the most important status factor by which 
marriage candidates select each other. In short: a comparison of single and dual trait 
parameters of status homogamy can not only give better insight into the strength of various 
forms of status homogamy, but can also provide a better test of existing hypotheses on 
marriage selection and status homogamy. 
My second aim is to account for patterns of status homogamy. So far, only parameters of 
status homogamy from single trait models have been accounted for. The main explanatory 
factors that were used were the level of industrialization and the type of political regime. Ultee 
and Luijkx (1990) found in single trait analysis that higher industrialization and social 
democracy diminishes educational homogamy. I test whether these conclusions also hold in 
dual trait analyses, or whether industrialization and social-democracy make for more 
educational homogamy as alternative stratification hypotheses would point to. As a sub-aim, I 
also extend existing explanations of status homogamy by addressing more precisely the 
mechanisms by which industrialization and left politics influence status homogamy. I contend 
that industrialization and a nation's politics encompass several underlying processes that may 
each affect the degree and form of status homogamy in a unique and sometimes opposite way. 
My third aim is to study educational homogamy in combination with another status factor 
by which people can select each other as a mate: the degree to which spouses match on a 
similar cultural life style, in particular with respect to participation in the high arts and the type 
of school one was enrolled in. The study of this third form of status homogamy is important 
because with the further shift from industrial to post-industrial societies, education may not 
remain the prime status factor in mate selection. Diplomas have suffered from inflation, which 
makes educational homogamy a less successful strategy for social distinction. In addition, 
people have gained more leisure time. The increased leisure time may have raised the 
importance of a cultural life style in daily life. Prospective spouses may nowadays pay 
increasing attention to marrying someone with similar preferences in the high arts or to 
marrying someone who was enrolled in the same type of school. Such an increased attention to 
high culture in mate selection will lead to a shift from educational homogamy to cultural 
homogamy as the main form of status homogamy. My third research aim is to test such a shift. 
To formulate my aims and research questions in greater detail, I review the history of 
studies on status homogamy (paragraph 1.2). This review provides more insight into the drift 
of research in an extensive field of studies and sketches the background of my research 
questions. The third paragraph (paragraph 1.3) argues these questions and provides a 
systematic synopsis of the chapters in this book. 
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1.2 Previous Studies on Status Homogamy 
In reviewing the literature, I discuss studies on educational homogamy, homogamy of social 
origin and cultural homogamy. In the previous section, these forms of homogamy have been 
termed status homogamy. Like recent studies on intergenerational occupational mobility 
(Ganzeboom, Treiman and Ultee 1991) and on class-voting (Nieuwbeerta 1995), I distinguish 
three generations of studies on status homogamy and also consider a new development. The 
grouping of generations is superficially based on the statistical techniques that were employed 
to model homogamy. A closer examination of the literature shows that the statistical models 
allowed each successive generation to address new research questions. The three generations 
therefore center around different questions too. In the sequel I discuss the respective statistical 
models, the research questions and data collection methods of the three generations and 
summarize its main findings. I have to note that the review of studies on status homogamy is 
by no means exhaustive, but concentrates on a few leading studies. 
1.2.1 First Generation 
The first generation of research on status homogamy encompasses a wide range of studies of 
which the earliest appeared at the tum of the twentieth century (Benini 1898, 1901, Marvin 
1918) and of which in the seventies examples were still being published (Rockwell 1976). The 
main characteristic of these first generation studies was that descriptive questions on status 
homogamy were addressed with simple, single trait models of status homogamy. One assessed 
homogamy for several status characteristics separately, and compared the different forms of 
status homogamy among distinct countries and time periods. The logic for their cross-national 
and cross-temporal comparisons of status homogamy was the assertion that status homogamy 
is, next to social mobility, "one of the tests of the openness of a society's social structure" 
(Berent 1954: 321). Just as a high degree of intergenerational occupational mobility indicates 
weak social distances among different status groups, a high degree of intermarriage between 
people of these groups indicates an open stratification system. Questions on status homogamy 
and on (intergenerational) social mobility were two of a kind. 
To answer their descriptive questions, researchers of the first generation used techniques of 
crosstabulation. Educational homogamy, for example, was computed by cross-classifying 
spouses' educational levels (uniformly coded among husbands and wives) in a 'square' 
marriage table. The cells in this table indicate the frequency of marriages between men and 
women of certain educational groups. Of special interest were the cells on the main diagonal of 
the marriage table since these cells indicate homogamous combinations in which husbands and 
wives have attained equal educational level. From the relative frequency of these diagonal cells, 
a measure of educational homogamy was computed. This measure was later also termed 
'absolute (educational) homogamy' because it refers to the total percentage of homogamous 
marriages in a certain time and place. 
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Many researchers of the first generation realized, however, that their crosstabulation methods 
were not optimal. A high percentage of spouses in the cells outside the main diagonal does not 
merely reflect a liking for the dissimilar. After all, it may have been caused by differences in the 
marginal frequencies of males and females in a marriage table. The relatively low participation 
of women in higher education, for example, created few opportunities for highly educated men 
to marry homogamously and ample opportunities for lower-educated women to 'marry up' in 
status. This differential availability of equally educated men and women on the marriage market 
'forced' the percentage of homogamy to be less than in a situation of equal educational 
distributions. The percentages of homogamy or heterogamy may therefore not indicate status 
barriers and preferences for similarity ('relative homogamy'), but may reflect differentia] 
availability of men and women on marriage markets. 
Since Benini's (1898) early study on status homogamy, various 'measures of attraction' 
were developed to take into account the problem of forced homogamy. The measures tried to 
adjust for differential availability in marriage tables by making use of simple statistical ideas. 
Among them, one idea was to compute from the observed marginal frequencies in the marriage 
table the expected frequency of marriages between persons with a certain level of education. 
When compared to the observed marriage frequencies, it could be assessed what percentage of 
absolute homogamy was forced by differences in the supply of marriageable men and women, 
and what percentage of absolute homogamy reflects a true desire for status similarity. 
However, as research of later generations has shown, the adjusted measures still did not take 
the marginal frequencies in a marriage table into account properly (Featherman and Hauser 
1978). The expected frequencies and the effects of group size were computed under the 
assumption of a model of statistical independence, but very often such a model does not fit the 
data. In fact, spouses' characteristics almost always show a positive association. This makes a 
simple adjustment for marginal frequencies dangerous: the marginal frequencies may 
themselves be influenced by the association in the marriage table. Findings from the first 
generation of research on status homogamy - whether obtained with simple crosstabulation 
techniques or with adjusted measures - are therefore potentially biased. 
The data collection methods of the first generation researchers were also elementary. Many 
studies used non-representative data sets in which the sample was confined to engaged 
persons, to a specific age-group, or to a single village or city. Furthermore, first generation 
studies often used local classification schemes for spouses' occupations and educations. This 
limited cross-national comparison of status homogamy severely. When cross-national 
comparisons were attempted, occupational and educational scales had to be collapsed into a 
few categories. This artificially influenced the percentages of absolute homogamy and created 
additional problems such as a loss of valuable information and skewed distributions of traits. 
Hall's comparison of homogamy of social origin in England and Wales with the United States 
(Hall 1954), for example, only cross-classified three classes of fathers' and father-in-laws' 
occupations: non-manual, skilled manual, and semi- and unskilled manual. Although for each 
country separately much more information on fathers' occupations was available, classification 
problems limited cross-national comparison of status homogamy. 
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Despite the methodological limitations sketched above, first generation studies have 
consistently demonstrated a high degree of status homogamy. Studies for the United States 
showed rates of absolute homogamy to be quite high: the percentage of homogamy of social 
origin lies between 36% to 49%, while the percentage of educational homogamy varies 
between 40% to 66% (cf. Kalmijn 1991a). Somewhat higher percentages of status homogamy 
were found in England and Wales: Berent (1954) showed that 45% of all couples married 
within their class of social origin, and that 72% of all couples married within their level of 
education. In the Netherlands the percentage of educational homogamy was 67% in 1959 and 
45% in 1991 (Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits 1995), while the degree of homogamy of social 
origin was 38% in the year 1954, and 35% in the year 1972 (Van Tulder 1972). In 
Scandinavian countries, occupational homogamy varied between 26% in Sweden and 55% in 
Norway in the year 1972 (Pöntinen 1980: computed from published tables). Research on 
homogamy with respect to cultural preferences was less frequent. Burgess and Wallin (1943) 
reported that 59% of engaged couples in the Chicago metropolitan gave identical answers to a 
question about leisure-time preferences ('stay at home; be on go most time; be on go all the 
time'), and that 60% gave identical answers to a question whether play or dance was preferred. 
In sum, findings of the first generation of research on status homogamy indicate high 
marriage frequencies between persons alike in status. Since this holds throughout time and 
place, even when gender-differences in the availability of potential mates are high, preferences 
for status similarity are likely to be strong. Exactly how strong this tendency is and whether 
preferences for status similarity vary in time or between status characteristics are questions that 
could only be answered well by later generations. 
1.2.2 Second Generation 
In 1967, Blau and Duncan's not-so-known chapter on marriage of their well-known book The 
American Occupational Structure marked the second generation of research on status 
homogamy (Blau and Duncan 1967, see also Warren 1966). Blau and Duncan came up with 
three related innovations. First, they set new standards for data collection with the coding of 
occupations into the categories of the US Census three-digit occupational classification scheme 
and with the use of large, national samples. This created possibilities for detailed comparative 
analysis. Second, Blau and Duncan (see also Duncan 1961) introduced a new continuous 
occupational scale, the SEI scale, which tapped the major resources of individuals in the 
process of stratification. Third and most importantly, Blau and Duncan (see also Duncan and 
Hodge 1963) introduced 'indirect effect models' that allowed for the decomposition of simple, 
zero-order associations into direct and indirect effects, and that allowed for a test of the degree 
to which zero-order correlations are causal effects or spurious by-products. The former 
indirect effect models have been applied successfully in research on status attainment. For the 
first time, scholars of social stratification could answer questions about the net influence of 
education and family background on occupational status, and about the degree to which the 
transfer of status from fathers to sons is mediated by the education of the son. 
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The by-product models proved successful in research on status homogamy. Blau and Duncan 
used these models to test the hypothesis that the zero-order correlation among spouses' social 
origins is a by-product of educational homogamy and the associations between social origin 
and education. They showed for the United States that the zero-order association between 
spouses' social origins - which was 0.30 - dropped to 0.20 once spouses' educations were 
taken into account. In other words, one third of the zero-order association between spouses' 
social origins was a spurious by-product and could be attributed to its association with another 
trait. From this findings Blau and Duncan concluded that "mate assortment occurs primarily 
with respect to education, and that assortment with respect to social origin plays only a 
secondary role, though one that is by no means insignificant" (Blau and Duncan 1967: 358). 
Introduction of the by-product models was a great improvement in research on status 
homogamy. The models made it possible to answer questions about the net weights of various 
factors in mate selection, and also enabled scholars to answer the question to what degree 
single trait measures of status homogamy overestimate the tendency for status similarity. In 
spite of this progress, Blau and Duncan's study also had some shortcomings. The most serious 
shortcoming was that they did not rally exploit the potential of their by-product models. While 
they estimated to what extent homogamy of social origin is a by-product of educational 
homogamy, they did not estimate the reverse relation. Blau and Duncan's analyses may 
therefore have overestimated the role of education in mate selection. Another shortcoming of 
Blau and Duncan's study was that, while they compared zero-order association both for 
homogamy of social origin and education among birth cohorts, they did not compare their 
trend findings with that of partial correlation analysis. Although Blau and Duncan published the 
appropriate data, they missed a chance to comment on differences in the trends from bivariate 
and multivariate models. My own computations on Blau and Duncan's data make it clear that 
the trend in homogamy of social origin is not affected once spouses' educational levels are 
taken into account. 
Blau and Duncan's study also left questions of the first generation unsolved. Their analyses 
was confined to birth cohorts in the United States and cross-national differences were not 
estimated. In addition, Blau and Duncan did not come up with a solution of the problem of 
'forced homogamy'. They both used older first generation methods (percentages) and (partial) 
correlation methods, but neither of these methods offered a full solution. Although correlation 
models are an improvement upon the simple crosstabulation techniques of the first generation, 
they only take marginal distributions of a marriage table into account in as far they are 
represented by the mean and standard deviation of both spouses' traits. That is, correlations do 
not control for the size of each category of a variable separately. In the case of extremely 
skewed marginal distributions, correlation measures produce biased and imprecise estimates of 
association. The association measures of the second generation were still suboptimal. 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings, Blau and Duncan's study meant a great leap forward for 
research on status homogamy. Both research questions and statistical models for homogamy 
showed considerable progress and a new standard was set. Unfortunately, however, Blau and 
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Duncan's lead was not taken up in research on status homogamy. Studies of the first 
generation continued to appear after Blau and Duncan's innovative study. 
1.2.3 Third Generation 
In the late seventies, research on social stratification received a new impulse and a third 
generation of studies on homogamy took off. As for the second generation, the impulse was a 
methodological one. Loglinear models were introduced into research of social stratification 
(Hauser 1978). These models made it possible to take the effects of marginal frequencies fully 
into account and to disentangle structural (forced mobility or heterogamy) from relative 
processes of social stratification. Furthermore, loglinear models allowed researchers of social 
stratification to use multiple parameters for the characterization of the association in a cross-
classification table and enabled scholars to test more complex hypotheses. These hypotheses 
postulate, for example, that status boundaries are not equal among social groups but vary in 
strength (cf. Hout 1983). 
Research on (status) homogamy also benefited from the introduction of loglinear models 
into sociology. For the first time ever, questions about relative homogamy could be answered 
adequately. Marginal frequencies no longer distorted the estimated association in a marriage 
table because these frequencies were taken into account explicitly, and because models of 
association could be specified that went beyond a simple model of independence. Loglinear 
models also made possible more specific questions about homogamy. The association in a 
marriage table could be characterized by more than one parameter. Excessive inmarriage of 
farmers' offspring could, for example, be modeled over and above a single parameter 
characterizing the association in a marriage table. This was an improvement upon the 
correlation models of Blau and Duncan (1967) that used only one association parameter to 
model homogamy in a marriage table. 
Because of the parallels with loglinear analyses of intergenerational social mobility, 
questions on relative status homogamy were again linked to the openness of a society's 
stratification system. Trend studies and cross-national comparisons - earlier central in the first 
generation - reappeared, but now with loglinear techniques. Hout (1982) first used loglinear 
models to assess trends in occupational homogamy for two-eamer couples in the United 
States. Sixma and Ultee (1984) applied the models to educational homogamy in the 
Netherlands using data on existing marriages in 1959, 1971 and 1977, and Jones (1987) 
applied loglinear analyses to assess trends in educational homogamy for Australia. 
While the third generations studies outlined above analyzed data for single countries, Ultee 
and Luijkx (1990) study on educational homogamy used data from marriage tables of 23 
industrial countries for different years in one large-scale analysis. Their study had three 
important contributions to research on status homogamy. First, Ultee and Luijkx took up the 
research questions of the first generation and studied cross-national and cross-temporal 
differences in status homogamy anew, but now with more appropriate loglinear models. 
Second, Ultee and Luijkx introduced a new question into research on status homogamy. They 
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were interested in the extent to which cross-national differences in status homogamy can be 
accounted for by macro-societal factors such as the level of economic development 
(industrialization) and the type of political regime. This question had earlier been addressed in 
research on intergenerational social mobility (Grusky and Hauser 1984). Third, Ultee and 
Luijkx explicitly linked educational homogamy to the extent of intergenerational social mobility 
in these countries. This enabled them to test Lipset and Bendix' (1959) first generation 
hypothesis which postulates that intergenerational social mobility and educational heterogamy 
are correlated phenomena that increase in industrial countries during the twentieth century. 
Ultee and Luijkx' study produced four important for research on status homogamy: (a) 
educational homogamy - both in absolute and relative terms - varies substantially among 
countries and time periods, (b) after World War II both absolute and relative educational 
homogamy showed a general decrease in industrial countries, (c) industrialization makes for 
less educational homogamy, and (d) rates of relative social mobility and relative educational 
intermarriage correlate positively. Taken together, these findings underline Lipset and Bendix' 
thesis of a general trend towards increased openness in industrial societies. Recently, Ultee and 
Luijkx' findings were substantiated by a study of educational homogamy in 65 non-industrial 
and industrial countries during the seventies (Smits and Ultee 1996). In this study it was found 
that while educational homogamy reached its high in societies that had about 50% of their 
labour force in agriculture, educational homogamy declined for countries that had more than 
50% of people employed in farming. Apparently, with the early transition from agrarian to 
industrial societies educational homogamy increased, but at later stages of industrializaton 
educational homogamy diminished. 
Valued because of their research questions and methods, third generation studies 
substantially improved upon studies of the first and second generation. Absolute and relative 
homogamy were distinguished well, patterns of relative status homogamy could explicitly be 
accounted for, and data collection methods were more standardized. Moreover, there was a 
willingness to follow classifications devised by others, whether OECD for education or ILO for 
occupation. Compared to studies of the second generation that applied multivariate designs for 
status homogamy, however, the research field narrowed. Third generation researchers studied 
several factors in mate selection, but did not do so simultaneously. This limited the 
understanding of the net weights of education, social origin and other status factors in mate 
selection. Furthermore, it could not be assessed to what degree the observed trends and cross-
national differences in the single trait measures of (educational) homogamy are by-products of 
other forms of homogamy. Third generation studies left some important questions in research 
on status homogamy unsolved. 
1.2.4 A New Development: Dual Trait Analysis 
At the end of the eighties and in the beginning of the nineties, studies on status homogamy 
appeared that combined the virtues of the second generation - multivariate analysis - with the 
virtues of the third generation - loglinear models. 
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A first application of loglinear models to multiple spousal traits was Ultee, Dessens and 
Jansen's (1988) study on (un-)employment homogamy in Canada, the Netherlands and the 
United Sates during the eighties. One of their questions was to what extent the association 
between the employment statuses of spouses is a by-product of their educational levels and the 
relation between one's educational level and employment status. To answer this question, the 
researchers constructed a marriage table cross-classifying both husband's and wife's 
employment status and their educational levels. Ultee, Dessens and Jansen's loglinear analyses 
for the multi-way contingency table demonstrated a tendency for (un)employment homogamy 
net of educational homogamy. However, since only fit statistics and not parameter estimates 
were investigated, the degree to which (un)employment homogamy is a by-product of 
educational homogamy was not assessed. Moreover, Ultee, Dessens and Jansen's analysis of 
'double (unemployment' differs from other research of status homogamy in that 
(un)employment homogamy is a trait that may due to assortative mating, but also to processes 
that have occurred after marriage. 
In the nineties, Kalmijn (1991a, 1991b, 1993, 1994a) set a new standard for research on 
status homogamy by applying loglinear models to several - but always two - status 
characteristics of spouses. In his first dual trait study, Kalmijn (1991a) analyzed homogamy of 
social origin and education in the United States between 1962 and 1973. His loglinear analyses 
of the multi-way marriage tables showed homogamy of social origin to be generally weaker 
than educational homogamy. In terms of odds-ratios: "crossing the manual/non-manual line 
decreases marriage frequencies by 19%, while crossing the college/high school or some 
college/college graduate boundary decreases marriage frequency by 70%" (Kalmijn 1991a: 
514, 515). This finding supports Blau and Duncan's (1967) second generation finding that 
education is a more important factor in mate selection than social origin. Another finding was 
that between 1962 and 1973, homogamy of social origin became weaker, while the importance 
of educational homogamy increased. The latter increase was also observed by Ultee and Luijkx 
single trait analysis of data for the United States (Ultee and Luijkx 1990). However, Ultee and 
Luijkx did not find a significant trend, whereas Kalmijn did. 
In later analyses, Kalmijn applied the loglinear dual trait models to educational and religious 
homogamy (Kalmijn 1991b), to educational and ethnic homogamy (Kalmijn 1993), and to 
assortative mating by cultural and economic status of occupations in the United States (1994). 
Soon other researchers followed Kalmijn's lead. In the Netherlands, Hendrickx (1994) applied 
dual trait models to educational and religious homogamy. In Italy, Schizzerotto, Saviori and 
Barbagli (1994) applied these models to educational and occupational homogamy, and in 
Taiwan Tsai analyzed homogamy of social origin and education (Tsai 1993) and homogamy of 
education and ethnicity (Tsai 1994). In general, these dual trait studies underline Kalmijn's 
(1991a) conclusions on the strength of education in mate selection: (a) in modem industrial 
societies education is a more important factor in mate selection than origin characteristics, and 
(b) after world War II the strength of educational homogamy vis-a-vis homogamy for origin 
characteristics increased in industrial countries. 
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Table 1.1 summarizes the developments in research of status homogamy. In general, studies on 
status homogamy have shown substantial progress. Due to methodological innovations, studies 
of status homogamy have shifted from questions on absolute homogamy to questions on 
relative, homogamy, and from separate analysis of spouses' traits to simultaneous analysis of 
these traits. 
1.3 Research Questions 
My review of studies on status homogamy has shown substantial improvement in research of 
status homogamy. Nevertheless, some questions have remained unsolved. The most important 
omission in research of status homogamy is that while dual trait models for education and 
social origin (or another variable) were conducted, single trait analyses of the same traits were 
forgotten. Complicated models for homogamy were estimated without explicitly testing to 
what extent these more complicated models yielded other conclusions. Such a comparison may 
be important, however. It can show that findings from single trait analyses are spurious by-
products, and that trend findings are distorted. In the sequel I illustrate in more detail how 
these differences between single and dual trait analyses can occur and why a test of spurious 
by-product is particularly important for research of status homogamy. 
To start with, a comparison of results from single and dual trait analyses is not merely a 
statistical, technical exercise but tries to solve a particular empirical difficulty for a specific 
theory. The difficulty pertains to a contradiction between observed findings on the one hand, 
and predictions from theories on educational homogamy on the other hand. The observed 
finding from single trait analyses is that in industrial societies during the twentieth century 
educational homogamy decreased. According to at least some theories, however, I would not 
have expected so. On the contrary, there are good reasons to expect an increase instead of the 
observed decrease. First, since on labor markets education has become a more important 
determinant for occupational success, I expect partners to increasingly pay attention to 
educational credentials (cf. modernization theory: Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Hanmondsworth 
1960). Second, as women have been catching up economically and educationally with men, I 
expect men to also consider economically attractive and highly educated wives for marriage 
(Oppenheimer 1988): partner selection will become more symmetric while increasing the 
chances of educational homogamy. Finally, as people are enrolled in school longer, the chances 
of friendships to develop into marriage increase (Mare 1991). 
The anomaly between findings and theory can be solved by comparing results from single 
and dual trait models. The observed decrease in the single trait parameter for educational 
homogamy may appear to be a by-product after dual trait analyses. Once spouses' social 
origins are controlled, preferences for educational homogamy may have remained stable or 
these preferences may shown a slight increase. If so, results of dual trait analyses would 
contradict the thesis of generally increasing societal openness and would confirm predictions 
that point to a greater role of education in labor and marriage markets. 
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Table 1 1 Characteristics of studies on status homogamy 
Chapter I 
First generation 
(1900 1980) 
Second generation 
(1966/1967) 
QUESTIONS To what extent does absolute status 
homogamy change over time9 
To what extent do countries differ in absolute 
status homogamy9 
To what extent is homogamy of social origin г 
by-product of educational homogamy7 
To what extent does educational homogamy 
change over time7 
HYPOTHESES Industrialization diminishes educational 
homogamy just as it lowers social mobility 
Homogamy of social origin is a by-product of 
educational homogamy 
DATA Limited number of countries, short period United States, long period 
MEASUREMENT OF 
EDUCATION AND 
SOCIAL ORIGIN 
TECHNIQUES 
Discrete, few categories, local codings 
Crosstabulations percentages and adjusted 
percentages 
Continuous, many categories, international 
scale (SEI) 
Crosstabulations, zero-order and partial 
correlations 
EXAMPLES 
о ь STUDIES 
Benini (1898), Burgess and Walhn (1943), 
Rockwell (1976) 
Blau and Duncan (1967), Warren (1966) 
To see why dual trait analysis can lead to other trend findings than single trait analysis, assume 
two models for educational homogamy one model in which only the association between 
spouses' educational levels is modeled (Model 1, Figure 1 1), and another model that assumes 
educational homogamy taking into account its interrelations with spouses' social origins 
(Model 2, Figure 1 1 ) Now, if in Model 1 a positive zero-order association exists - that is, 
partners mate within similar or near-similar levels of education -, Model 2 can show that this 
positive zero-order association is attributable to any combination of four different types of 
associations (a) the association between spouses' social origins (association a), (b) the 
association between husband's father's occupation and husband's education and the 
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Table 1.1 (Continued) 
Third generation 
(1980-1990) 
Dual Trail Models 
(1990-...) 
This study 
(1996) 
To what extent does relative status 
homogamy change over time? 
To what extent do countries differ in 
relative status homogamy7 
To what extent can patterns of 
relative status homogamy be 
explained by industrialization and 
political regime? 
To what extent do relative status 
heterogamy and intergenerational 
social mobility correlate? 
Industrialization diminishes 
educational homogamy just as it 
lowers social mobility; 
Social-democracy and state-socialism 
make for less educational homogamy 
Many industrial and pre-industrial 
societies, long period 
Discrete, few categories, international 
scales (EGP) 
Crosstabulaüons, loglinear models for 
single traits 
To what extent did the net weights of 
homogamy of social origin and 
education change? 
Industrialization makes educational 
homogamy stronger than homogamy 
of social origin 
Limited number of countries, long 
period 
Discrete, few categories, international 
scales 
Crosstabulations, loglmear models for 
dual traits 
To what extent did the weights of 
homogamy of social origin, education 
and culture change? 
To what extent do countries differ in 
the net weights of homogamy of 
social origin and education? 
To what are single trait parameters 
by-products? 
To what extent can the single and 
dual Irait parameters be explained by 
industrialization, political regime, and 
processes that underlie these factors? 
Industrialization makes educational 
homogamy stronger than homogamy 
of social origin; 
Trend in single trait measure of 
educational homogamy is a by-
product 
Loglinear analyses, few countries, 
long period; 
Correlation analyses, many countries, 
long period 
Discrete, few categories; 
Continuous, international scales 
(ISEI) 
Crosstabulations, loglmear models for 
single, dual traits; 
(Partial) correlations for single and 
dual traits 
Hout (1982), Jones (1987), Ultee and Kalmijn (1991a), Hendrickx (1994) Chapters 2 to 6 
Luijkx (1990) 
Note: The form of this table is derived from Nieuwbeerta (1995) 
association between wife's father's occupation and wife's education (associations b), (c) the 
association between husband's father's occupation and wife's education and the association 
between wife's father's occupation and husband's education (associations c), and finally (d) the 
net association between spouses' educations (association d). If I further assume that in the dual 
trait model of Figure 1.1 (Model 2) the relations between education and social origin 
(associations b and c) are positive - which they likely are -, it follows that a positive match on 
social origin (association a) produces a positive zero-order association between spouses' 
educations, even if the (partial) tendency to marry homogamously with respect to education 
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(association d) is absent. That is, partners can marry educationally homogamous without 
having preferences to do so. 
When cohorts are compared, the single and dual trait model in Figure 1.1 can also show 
different findings regarding trends in educational homogamy. Suppose, for example, that the 
zero-order association between spouses' educations declined in strength - a finding that was 
earlier observed for many industrial countries (Ultee and Luijkx 1990): in that case the dual 
trait model can demonstrate that the decrease is spurious and due to each of the following 
Model 1. Single trait model 
Husband's education Wife's education 
Model 2. Dual trait model 
Husband's social 
origin 
Λ 
В 
Husband's education 
Wife's social 
origin 
В 
V 
Wife's education 
Figure 1.1 Single and dual trait model for educational homogamy 
alternative explanations (and their various combinations): (a) the preference for similarity on 
social origin (association a) has become less important in mate selection, (b) the degree to 
which social background influences educational attainment (association b) has diminished over 
time, (c) the degree to which social background influences spouse's educational attainment 
(association c) has diminished, and (d) the preference for educational similarity (net association 
d) has become less important in mate selection. Since alternative explanations (a), (b) and (c) 
are equally plausible, the declining associations between spouses' social origins and between 
spouses' social origins and spouses' educations may a priori have produced a decrease in the 
single trait parameter for educational homogamy. That is, educational homogamy may have 
decreased just because spouses' social origins became less important in mate selection. Net of 
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spouses' social origins, however, the association between spouses' educations (association d) 
may have remained stable. Likewise, the dual trait parameter for educational homogamy may 
have shown an increase, provided this increase did not offset the expected decrease in the 
single trait parameter for educational homogamy. 
In the by-product explanation lies the solution of the aforementioned anomaly between 
research findings and theory: the observed world-wide decrease in the single trait measure of 
educational homogamy may not reflect a decreased tendency to match homogamously on 
educational level, but a decreased tendency to match homogamously on social origin. Net of 
spouses' social origins, preferences for educational homogamy may have remained stable or 
have shown a slight increase. If this by-product explanation holds, the thesis of increasing 
openness and the idea of romantic love - theses that were initially confirmed by single trait 
analysis - would have to be rejected: in our contemporary societies marriage markets may have 
become more open with respect to social origin, but net of this process educational homogamy 
is likely to have remained stable or to have shown a slight increase. On the other hand, theories 
that point to a relatively stronger role of educational homogamy vis-a-vis homogamy of social 
origin - theories that were initially rejected by findings of single trait analysis -, would have to 
be confirmed. These theories hold that with the shift from agrarian to industrial societies 
education replaces social origin as the main status factor by which people select each other as 
mates. 
1.3.1 The By-Product Explanation: Origin and Education 
A comparison of parameters for status homogamy from single and dual trait analyses makes 
three aims in this study possible. My first aim is to assess the tenability of the by-product 
explanation. According to this explanation, the observed world-wide decrease in the single trait 
measure of educational homogamy conceals stable or even upward preferences for educational 
similarity. In Chapter 2 to 4 of this study I test this by-product explanation. The first general 
research question for these chapters is: 
(1) To what extent are single trait parameters of homogamy of social origin and 
education by-products of each other, and to what extent do dual trait models lead to 
other trends and cross-national differences in these types of status homogamy than 
single trait models? 
In Chapter 2 the first research question is answered using data for a single country: Hungary 
in the period 1930-1970. The chapter can be regarded as a first test of the by-product 
explanation. Hungary is of particular interest because it underwent strong political changes that 
may have affected mate selection to a considerable extent. If anywhere, in Hungary marriage 
selection must have changed. Another reason to choose Hungary is that for this country large 
household surveys exist which enable me to test the dual trait models with loglinear techniques. 
It is to be noted that Ultee and Luijkx' (1990) loglinear analyses of Hungarian spouses 
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between 1960 and 1980 did not provide evidence for a significant upward or downward trend 
in the single trait measure of educational homogamy My findings are potentially different since 
I use other data that do contain measures of spouses' social origins, different loglinear models 
(scaled association models), and another research design (comparison of marriage cohorts 
instead of existing marriages; see also Chapter 7). 
In Chapter 3 I use data from the Netherlands in the period 1947-1992 to determine the 
degree to which dual trait models lead to other conclusions on (trends in) homogamy of social 
origin and education than single trait models. I choose the Netherlands because previous third 
generation studies (Ultee and Luijkx 1990, Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits 1995) have 
consistently shown a significant decrease in the single trait measures of educational homogamy. 
Since such a decrease was not observed for Hungary, it makes the Netherlands an interesting 
case to study. Does a trend towards decreasing educational homogamy in this country appear 
to be stable or upward after dual trait analysis? I must note that in contrast to the loglinear 
analyses for Hungary in Chapter 2, I make use of (residual) correlation models to estimate 
single and dual trait parameters for homogamy of social origin and education. This is necessary 
since the Dutch data set I use is much smaller in size than the Hungarian data set. 
In Chapter 4 I estimate by-product models with data from 15 industrial countries of the 
twentieth century. Among the countries are industrialized countries of the West, and countries 
that were formerly ruled by a communist party. The analyses in Chapter 4 make a reassessment 
of the claim of generally increasing societal openness possible. A straightforward reanalysis of 
Ultee and Luijkx (1990) large-scale single trait study on educational homogamy in 23 industrial 
countries cannot be undertaken since most of the data Ultee and Luijkx used do not contain 
information on spouses' social origins. Comparison of my results with Ultee and Luijkx' 
findings is therefore limited. I do, however, repeat their single trait method to measure 
educational homogamy, and compare the results of these single trait analyses with results of 
dual trait analyses. This comparison can show that the earlier observed world-wide trend 
towards decreasing educational homogamy is due to other factors than a declining desire to 
marry someone who has attained a similar level of education. 
1.3.2 Explaining Patterns of Status Homogamy 
My study's second aim is to explain the single and dual trait parameters for status homogamy 
that I observe in my analyses. In single trait analyses, patterns of status homogamy have 
explicitly been related to macro-factors. Ultee and Luijkx (1990) found that stronger 
industrialization and a longer period of social-democracy diminish the single trait measure of 
educational homogamy. Since by now a large-scale comparison of dual trait parameters has not 
been undertaken, it is not clear to what extent dual trait parameters may be accounted for by 
industrialization and the type of political regime. In Chapter 4 I fill this gap. I test how and to 
what extent the dual trait parameters for homogamy of social origin and education can be 
explained by macro-factors as the level of industrialization (number of telephones) and the type 
of political regime (social-democracy, state-socialism or other), and also test to what extent the 
Introduction and Research Questions 17 
effects of these factors differ among single and dual trait analyses. In doing so, I both improve 
upon Ultee and Luijkx' world-wide comparison of single trait measures of educational 
homogamy, and upon dual trait studies for separate countries that have appeared so far. The 
second general research question I address therefore is: 
(2) To what extent can cross-national and historical variations in homogamy of social 
origin and education be accounted for by traditional indicators of industrialization 
and political regime such as the number of telephones, the duration of state-socialism 
and the duration of social-democracy, and to what extent do effects of these 
traditional indicators differ among single and dual trait models for status homogamy? 
According to a frequently used interpretation of Lipset and Bendix' (1959) hypothesis of 
increasing openness, industrialization would make for more status heterogamy just as it makes 
for more intergenerational social mobility. In explaining single and dual trait parameters for 
status homogamy, I go beyond such a simple application of notions from mobility research. 
Both in the analysis of marriage patterns in the Netherlands (Chapter 3) as in the international 
comparison (Chapter 4), I provide a more refined explanation as to why industrialization, 
social-democracy and state-socialism can affect these patterns. I do so by employing an 
'individual-level framework'. In this framework the matching of partners is not seen as an 
abstract macro-process that accompanies other macro-processes such as trends in social 
mobility, but it is seen as a complex outcome of decisions based on individual preferences, 
social pressure and marriage market constraints (cf. Kalmijn 1991a). 
By using more refined indicators for industrialization and politics, I show that these macro-
factors do not relate to status homogamy in a simple way, but often in a complicated way. The 
greater role of education for selection in labor markets that accompanied industrialization, for 
example, may have increased educational homogamy by shifting preferences of marriage 
candidates towards educational homogamy, but urbanization - another concomitant of 
industrialization - may have decreased this tendency by lowering the chances of meeting 
educationally homogamous people. An individual-level framework combined with assumptions 
about the effects of macro-factors can provide more precise insight into what makes status 
homogamy high in some periods and places and low in others. 
In the analysis of trends in status homogamy in the Netherlands (Chapter 3), I use the 
individual-level framework to derive predictions on trends in homogamy of social origin and 
education. Indirectly, the findings of this chapter give insight into the applied theory and 
assumptions. In my international comparison of patterns of status homogamy (Chapter 4), the 
assumptions are tested more directly. To account for the effects of industrialization and 
political regime on status homogamy, I review the influence of five more specific indicators of 
industrialization and politics: (a) the shift from 'ascription' to 'achievement' based allocation 
mechanisms within labor markets, (b) urbanization, (c) educational expansion, (d) decreased 
gender-inequality, and (e) selection of students for further education at a late age. These more 
refined indicators of industrialization and politics may show more clearly than the previously 
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used indicators - the number of telephones for industrialization and the years of social-
democracy and state-socialism for politics - how industrialization and politics influence the 
matching of individuals on marriage markets. Each of the five more refined macro-factors may 
through 'individual-level' factors that influence the matching of spouses - preferences, social 
pressure and opportunities to meet -, have a unique effect on status homogamy. Furthermore, 
the more refined indicators can demonstrate that a zero correlation between industrialization 
and politics on the one hand and measures of homogamy on the other hand, can be attributed 
to countervailing effects of the different industrialization processes. For example, the shift 
away from ascriptive values to achievement values within labor markets may have increased 
educational homogamy, but the process of urbanization may have had the opposite effect. In 
sum, the third general research question of my study is: 
(3) To what extent can cross-national and historical variations in homogamy of social 
origin and education be accounted for by more specific indicators of industrialization 
and political regime - such as the shift from 'ascription' to 'achievement' values 
within labor markets, urbanization, educational expansion, decreased gender-
inequality, and selection of students for secondary education at a late age -, and to 
what extent do these more specific factors fare better than traditional indicators of 
industrialization and political regime? 
1.3.3 Compensatory Strategies: Education and High Culture 
With the shift from agrarian to industrial societies in which parents have presumably lost a 
great deal of their potential and motivation to influence marital decisions of their offspring, it is 
plausible to argue that education replaces social origin as the dominant factor by which status 
likes choose each other. With the shift from industrial to post-industrial societies in which a 
great proportion of (lower-status) people take part in higher education and in which 
educational credentials have suffered from inflation, a further increase in the strength of 
educational homogamy is questionable. 
According to my interpretation of Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies (1979), 
educational homogamy is likely to have decreased in recent years. Due to the increased 
participation of lower status groups in higher education, the benefits of marriage within one's 
educational bracket diminished. Higher status groups can no longer successfully distinguish 
themselves by educational homogamy. Instead, other strategies of social distinction may be 
used. One of these strategies is that higher status groups distinguish themselves by a cultural 
life style, notably participation in the high arts. If such a cultural strategy prevails among the 
upper strata, mate selection may also change in its nature. Similarity in cultural preferences 
may become more important and it may replace educational homogamy as the strongest form 
of status homogamy. 
For the recently married, De Singly (1993, cf. De Singly 1987) also predicts that cultural 
homogamy replaces educational homogamy, but he does so quite differently from Bourdieu's 
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theory of compensatory strategies. De Singly holds that in modem societies cultural behavior 
becomes more important not because of an intended or unintended strategy of social 
reproduction, but because people have gained more leisure time. Under this condition, 
marriages are not contracted to ward off want but people marry firstly because of similar 
leisure time preferences. Educational homogamy, in De Singly's view, is just a by-product of 
cultural similarity. 
My study's third aim is to test the predictions that point to a weaker role of education and 
a stronger role of cultural life style in mate selection of contemporary societies. For this 
purpose, I investigate the role of education in partner selection once more, but now by using 
spouses' cultural life style as the second trait in dual trait models. Generally, the fourth and 
fifth general research question that guide my analyses are: 
(4) To what extent do partners - net of their education - match on a similar cultural life 
style in the Netherlands after World War II? 
(5) To what extent did the net weights of educational and cultural homogamy change in 
the Netherlands after World War II? 
In Chapter 5 of my study I answer these questions by comparing the strength of educational 
homogamy and homogamy with respect to participation in high culture in the Netherlands 
during the 1948-1992 period. I choose participation in the high arts as an indicator of cultural 
life style since one of the most elaborated theories on the way elites distinguish themselves -
Bourdieu's work on 'economic anc 'cultural capital' (see also below) - pertains to activities in 
high culture. In addition, good measurement procedures exist for current participation in the 
high arts (see also Ganzeboom 1984), while not much work has been done on cultural 
activities that distinguish, for example, lower from middle classes. An earlier direct assessment 
of the role of cultural participation in mate selection has not been done for the Netherlands, nor 
for other countries. 
In Chapter 61 test the net weight of educational level and cultural life style in a second and 
new manner. I examine the role of level and type of education for partner selection of the 
Dutch educational elite. I distinguish five groups of disciplines of university educated persons: 
(a) humanities, (b) social sciences, (c) applied and natural sciences, (d) economic-legal 
sciences, and (e) medicine. The educational elite is chosen as an example because 
differentiation according to type of schooling is much stronger here than at lower levels and is 
also believed to be of greater importance in later life. Examination of the degree to which the 
university educated marry within each of these disciplines rather than across disciplines, shows 
anew how a cultural life style guides mate selection. Because one's type of education is 
probably more structurally embedded in a person's cultural life style than participation in the 
high arts (Chapter 5), my investigation of homogamy of type and level of education may also 
be more telling than the analyses in Chapter 5. In this respect, a test of predictions from 
Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies is important. I investigate whether cultural life 
style - as indicated by one's type of education - replaces one's level of education as most 
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important status factor in mate selection. In particular, I test Bourdieu's suggestion of the 
existence of a cultural (humanities, social sciences) and economic elite (applied and natural 
sciences, economic-legal sciences, medical sciences). These elites are believed to prefer 
marriage within rather than across their group, and to prefer a university educated person 
above a lower educated person for marriage. 
The conclusions of my study are addressed in Chapter 7. In this chapter, I summarize this 
study's main findings, recapitulate answers to the general research questions, and evaluate the 
hypotheses and research methods. I end my study by suggesting new questions, hypotheses and 
methods. These suggestions may constitute a framework for a fourth generation in research of 
status homogamy. 
2 THE ROLE OF SOCIAL ORIGIN AND EDUCATION IN MATE 
SELECTION: HUNGARY 1930-1979 
Abstract In this chapter I examine the role of spouses' social origin and educational levels in mate 
selection in Hungary between 1930 and 1979. My main research questions are to what extent parameters 
for homogamy of social origin and education obtained from common single trait models are by-products, 
and to what extent trends in these parameters differ from trends assessed with newer dual trait models. To 
answer this question, I pool data on spouses' educations and social origin from three Hungarian 
household surveys and apply loglinear models of scaled association. The results of my single and dual 
trait analyses indicate that although at each point in time single trait models overestimate the tendency 
towards status similarity, trends in homogamy of social origin and education do not differ much among 
the two types of analyses. Both single and dual trait analyses point to a weaker role of social origin and a 
stronger role of education in mate selection for Hungarian couples married between 1930 and 1979. 
2.1 Introduction' 
Research on mate selection has generally shown great resemblances among spouses: most 
people marry a person with similar characteristics. This tendency towards homogamy applies 
to wide range of characteristics, both in physical and social traits but is particularly strong with 
respect to status characteristics like education and occupation (for a recent overview see Surra 
1990). For stratification analysts, homogamy with respect to social status has long been an 
important object of study (Sorokin 1959 [1927], Berent 1954, see also Chapter 1). Status 
homogamy directly indicates the extent to which members of different social groups accept 
each other as equal in the social hierarchy. This chapter continues the line of research on status 
homogamy by studying homogamy of social origin (the association between husband's father's 
and wife's father's occupation) and educational homogamy (the association between spouses' 
educational levels). 
The point of departure for the analysis reported here is the finding that in most 
industrializing countries after World War II the association between spouses' educational 
levels declined (Ultee and Luijkx 1990). That is, in most of the world's marriage markets 
people increasingly wind up marrying a person of dissimilar educational level. Exceptions to 
this world wide pattern of decreasing educational homogamy are Belgium (Ultee and Luijkx 
1990) and the United States (Kalmijn 1991a). 
From a theoretical point of view, the finding of an overall declining trend in educational 
homogamy is unexpected. This is firstly so, since from modernization theory (Davis and 
Moore 1945; Kerr et al. 1960) I expect that education replaces origin status as the main asset 
in the distribution of societal rewards. For mate selection this would imply that people pay 
1
 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the meeting of the ISA Research Committee on 
Social Stratification in Salt Lake City, Utah (August 1992), and at the Annual Convention of the 
Hungarian Sociological Association in Miskolc (Hungary, July 1993). A recent version of this chapter is 
accepted for publication in Quality and Quantity (Uunk, Ganzeboom and Robert 1996). 
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more, and not less attention to the education of the potential spouse. If so, the tendency 
towards educational homogamy should increase. Secondly, due to the increasing labor market 
participation of women and the educational convergence between men and women, mate 
selection may believed to be more symmetric than it used to be (Oppenheimer 1977). 
Marriages of poorly educated, wealthy men with highly educated, poor women are nowadays 
less attractive for both men and women. This decreased popularity of the traditional trade-off 
in the marriage market should enhance the likelihood of marriages that are homogamous with 
respect to education. Thirdly, as Mare (1991) pointed out, due to educational expansion and 
the increasing length of education, the time interval between leaving school and entering 
wedlock narrowed. If one holds that friendships from school last some years, this smaller time 
interval will have increased the chances of educational homogamy. 
In this chapter I propose that the solution of the contradiction between the empirical 
finding of declined educational homogamy and the theoretical expectation of increasing 
educational homogamy does not lie in a revision of marriage market theories, but in a revision 
of the applied methodology (see also Chapter l).2 I argue that older methods of status 
homogamy were too simple. The finding of a global decrease in educational homogamy has 
been obtained with models that consider the association between husband's and wife's 
education only. The problem of this bivariate approach to modeling homogamy is that 
educational homogamy is (implicitly) assumed to be an outcome of people choosing on one 
characteristic: their educational attainment. However, the selection of a spouse is a more 
complex process. When choosing a mate, people consider several traits simultaneously, such 
as age, religion, race, education and social origin (Collins 1985). 
The complex structure of the spousal selection process must have consequences for models 
of status homogamy. The degree of homogamy observed in single trait models can be a 
spurious by-product of people's tendency to choose each other on related characteristics (Blau 
and Duncan 1967: 358). Here, I argue that these by-product effects occur both with respect to 
educational homogamy and homogamy of social origin. Educational homogamy may be a by-
product in the following way: if two people of high social origin choose each other as spouses, 
this homogamous marriage is likely to also be a marriage between two highly educated people 
since people of high social origin on average have high educational attainment. That is, an 
educationally homogamous marriage can take place without preferences to match on 
education. Conversely, homogamy of social origin can be a by-product of people's tendency 
to match on education (Warren 1966; Blau and Duncan 1967). 
Given the potential by-product effects, I expect that studies using single trait models for 
homogamy yield biased estimates. First, the propensity to marry someone of similar 
educational level or of identical social origin can be lower than the results of single trait 
2
 One such revision could be Goode's version of modernization theory (Goode 1964). He suggests that 
while in working life achievement values replaced ascriptive values, in other parts of life - including the 
choice of a partner - people gained more freedom. Although this explanation is appealing, it does not lead 
to new predictions and therefore does not suffice as an alternative explanation. 
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analyses would indicate. A second, more serious problem is that trends in homogamy can be 
distorted as well. In particular, the single trait finding of a world-wide decrease in educational 
homogamy observed by Ultee and Luijkx (1990) can be a by-product of a decreased tendency 
to match on social origin. To test such a hypothesis of by-products, multivariate or dual trait 
models of status homogamy are needed in which the associations between spouses' educations 
and spouses' social origins are simultaneously analyzed. This chapter's primary aim is to apply 
dual trait models, and to compare its results with findings from single trait analysis. 
2.2 Research Questions 
In order to clarify the way in which a match on social origin can influence a match on 
education, assume a marriage market in which besides partners' education the social origins of 
the spouses are important in the decision whom to marry. In this particular situation, spouses' 
similarity with respect to education is a result of four types of relationships: (a) a comparison 
of one's social origin with the social origin of the potential mate, (b) the relation between 
one's social origin and one's educational attainment, (c) a comparison of one's education with 
Husband's social 
origin 
A 
в 
Wife's social 
origin 
A 
в 
Husband's education -<-
- ^ Wife's education 
Figure 2.1 Dual trait model for educational homogamy (arrow d), 
homogamy of social origin (arrow a), intergenerational 
reproduction (arrows b), and exchange of origin and education 
(arrows c) 
the social origin of the potential mate, and (d) a comparison of one's education with the 
education of the potential mate. These relationships are shown in Figure 2.1. Associations a 
and d in Figure 2.1 are straightforward. They respectively indicate matching on social origin 
and matching on education. Associations b and с need more explanation. Associations b 
represent the association among one's social origin and one's educational attainment, both for 
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husbands and wives. Most likely, these associations will be positive, as social status is 
inherited through the educational system. I speak here of 'intergenerational reproduction'. In 
the status attainment literature intergenerational reproduction is represented by a causal 
influence of social origin on child's educational attainment. However, in marriage markets 
causality seems odd. The matching processes in these markets do not operate in a life-course 
perspective, but occur at a single point in time. Kalmijn (1991a: 510) stated this as follows: 
"In the process of marriage selection, individuals demonstrate a set of attributes to others and 
evaluate a similar set of attributes in their potential spouses. While social origins and education 
are causally related, it is doubtful whether the mechanisms of demonstration and evaluation 
have an underlying causal order. People look at each other's origins, given their current 
destinations, and they look at their destinations, given their origins." 
Associations с in Figure 2.1 link husband's social origin to wife's education and wife's 
social origin to husband's education. They represent the (partial) association between a 
person's education and his or her spouse's social origin over and above the association 
expected on the basis of educational homogamy and homogamy of social origin only. 
Substantively, these relations make sense because a match on the marriage market does not 
only involve a comparison of one's own trait with the same trait for another person, but also 
involves a process of exchange between certain characteristics. One could for example assume 
that a marriage between a man of high social origin and a woman with a high level of 
education, forms a more attractive combination on the marriage market than a marriage 
between a man with a high level of education and a woman of high social origin (Murstein 
1986). This idea stems from traditional sex-specific roles within marriage, in which the man 
earns the money and the woman raises the offspring. The first role requires a good occupation 
or high social origin, whereas for the last role cognitive skills are more important. In the 
sequel, such processes of exchange between traits will be referred to as 'exchange-effects'. 
If I return to Figure 2.1 and assume that parameters for intergenerational reproduction (b) 
and exchange (c) are positive, it follows that a positive association between spouses' social 
origin (a) produces a positive match on education. In other words: spouses are similar with 
respect to educational level, because they have matched homogamously on social origin and 
because origin and education are positively related. Educational similarity may arise even when 
the tendency to marry someone of similar educational level (association d in Figure 2.1) is 
absent. In that particular instance, the single trait measure of educational homogamy is 
completely due to other processes involved in mate selection. 
When different points of time are compared - as I will do in the sequel by way of marriage 
cohorts -, dual trait analysis of homogamy of social origin and education can show that 
distinct, and possibly opposite trends underlie changes in the observed homogamy pattern. 
This would in particular be the case if intergenerational reproduction (b) and homogamy of 
social origin (a) have positive parameters, and if these parameters decline over time. Under 
these conditions, I expect - all other things being equal - an a priori decline in the single trait 
measure of educational homogamy. Net of processes a and b, however, the tendency to match 
homogamously on education (d) may have remained stable. The tendency to match on 
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education can also demonstrate an increase, but not so strong as to undo the expected decline 
in educational homogamy. If the latter situation occurs, the aforementioned contradiction 
between an empirically observed decline in the single trait measure of educational homogamy 
and a theoretically expected increase is resolved: the observed decline reflects a decrease in 
homogamy of social origin or a decrease in the associations between social origin and 
education, and not a decrease in the preferences for educational homogamy. After dual trait 
analyses, preferences for educational similarity may even have increased. 
To test the by-product explanation, I apply single and dual trait models for homogamy of 
social origin and education for cohorts in Hungary married between 1930 and 1979. Hungary 
is chosen because it has three highly comparable, large-scale household surveys that contain 
information both on spouses' social origins and educations. By combining the data sets, I am 
able to use a database of considerable sample size (total N=21,164 couples). For a loglinear 
analysis, such a large database is required because the cross-classification of spouse's social 
origins and educations produces many cells. Substantively, Hungary is of interest because it 
underwent strong economic and political developments in the period of investigation: it 
underwent a rapid decline of the number of employees in agriculture and a shift from orthodox 
communism to more liberal politics (Ferge 1979; Kolosi and Robert 1985). These fundamental 
changes may have led to a stronger role of educational attainment and a weaker role of social 
origin both within the labor and marriage market. It is to be noted that Ultee and Luijkx 
(1990) did not find trends in educational homogamy in Hungary between 1960 and 1980. My 
analyses of marriage patterns may however reveal significant trends because I make use of 
more up-to-date models for status homogamy. In sum, I address the following questions: 
(1) To what extent did the single trait measure of educational homogamy change in 
Hungary between 1930 and 1979? 
(2) To what extent did the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin change in 
Hungary between 1930 and 1979? 
(3) To what extent did (trends in) the single trait measures of homogamy of social origin 
and education differ from (trends in) the dual trait measures of homogamy of social 
origin and education in Hungary between 1930 and 1979? 
By answering these questions I improve upon earlier research on mate selection. Although in 
older studies single trait models (for example, Ultee and Luijkx 1990) or dual trait models for 
status homogamy were estimated (for example, Kalmijn 1991a), no comparison of outcomes 
of both types of analyses exists. 
2.3 Data 
In order to construct a sufficiently filled marriage table cross-classifying spouses' social origin 
by educations by time, I pooled three Hungarian data sets. The first data set is the survey 
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'Social Mobility and Occupational Changes in Hungary', conducted in 1973. This survey 
originates from a Micro census earned out in 1973 by the Central Statistical Office in 
Budapest under the direction of Andorka (Andorka 1973). For the Micro census a stratified 
sample (by districts) of 0.5 percent of the total population over 14 years of age was taken The 
questions in the 1973 survey were addressed to 40,426 members of different households, 
among them 7,661 couples who reported on their education, their social origin - measured by 
father's occupation - and their year of marriage 
The second data set is a household survey entitled 'A Model of Stratification Survey', 
conducted in 1981-1982 by the Institute for Social Sciences in Budapest and the Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office under the general direction of Kolosi (Kolosi 1982). Its 
questionnaires were administered independently to all adult (18 years and older) members of 
approximately 9,000 households. Among these households 4,781 contained two surviving 
marriage partners that reported on their educational levels, their father's occupation and their 
year of marriage. 
The third data set is the 'Hungarian Social Mobility and Life History Survey', conducted in 
1983 by Kulcsar and Harcsa (1983) This is a household survey which addressed questions to 
each member of a household. In total 32,301 household members were interviewed. The 
corresponding file contains 8,722 couples that were married and that reported on their 
educational levels, their father's occupation and their year of marriage. 
By pooling the three surveys I have a total sample size of 21,164 couples Trends in 
homogamy are assessed by assigning the couples from the pooled file to five cohorts married 
between 1930 and 1979: (a) 1930-1939, (b) 1940-1949, (c) 1950-1959, (d) 1960-1969, and 
(e) 1970-1979 Comparison of these cohorts yields estimates of changes in the various kinds 
of status homogamy.3 
I measure social origin of the spouses by the occupations of the father and the father-in-
law. I do this because other indicators of spouses' social origins were not available in the data, 
and because father's occupation has widely been used as an indicator of social origin both in 
research on social mobility and in studies about mate selection The occupations of the father 
and fathsr-in-law refer to the situation when the spouses were between 14 and 18 years old 
The occupational categories I used are. (a) farmers, (b) lower manuals, (c) higher manuals, (d) 
lower non-manuals, and (e) higher non-manuals This classification of occupations covers a 
distinction between white-collar and blue-collar workers, makes further distinction in skill 
levels and employs a farm category. Earlier research has proven these to be important 
divisions in terms of social mobility chances (Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman 1989) 
31 tested whether between the three surveys cohorts change in their degree of homogamy of social origin 
and education This did not turn to be the case Therefore my data do not suffer from the 'duration of 
marriage' problem (Kalmijn, 1991a) This duration problem may cause bias in homogamy estimates 
when homogamous marriages are more stable and have lower chances of divorce than heterogamous 
marriages (Bumpass and Sweet 1972) 
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The educational levels of both partners were recoded into: (a) 0-5 classes of elementary 
school, (b) 6-7 classes of elementary school, (c) 8 classes of elementary school, (d) secondary 
education (academic, vocational and technical), and (e) post-secondary education (including 
college and university). Compared to conventional classifications of education, this 
classification differs by distinguishing three categories of elementary school. For the 
Hungarian case such a sub-distinction is necessary because selection of pupils from primary 
into secondary schools occurs at these levels (Robert 1991), and because persons with 
elementary education only are over represented. 
Unfortunately, the data do not allow for a distinction among first married and remarried 
people. This can be a problem because people who remarry may be - due to a more limited 
pool of spouses to choose from - less homogamous in their latest marriage than people who 
marry once. Jacobs and Furstenberg (1986) observed this phenomenon with respect to 
educational homogamy for two age cohorts of married American women. However, their 
findings also indicated stability of the remarriage effect over time. If one also takes into 
account that remarriage is fairly stable in the 1930-1979 period, it cannot confound the 
observed trends in homogamy in a substantial manner.4 
2.4 Models 
I apply loglinear models to assess (trends in) homogamy. Recent studies of homogamy have 
applied these models with almost no exception (for example, Hout 1982, Jones 1987, Ultee 
and Luijkx 1990, Hendrickx 1994). The main advantage of this technique over older 
correlation models for status homogamy is that loglinear models allow one to disentangle 
effects of marginal frequencies ('forced or structural homogamy') from the association in a 
marriage table ('relative homogamy') properly. That is, loglinear models take differential 
availability of men and women on marriage markets into account and produce an unbiased 
estimate of the degree of attraction between people of similar or near-similar standing (see 
also Chapter 1). The second advantage of loglinear modeling is that one can define multiple 
parameters to characterize the association between two or more variables. In the analysis of 
intergenerational occupational mobility chances this is often done by specifying separate 
diagonal parameters for 'excessive inheritance' (for example, for farmers), and the same can 
be applied to tables cross-classifying spouses' characteristics (Hout 1982). 
To model homogamy, several loglinear specifications are available. Here, I choose for a 
model of (scaled) association. More specifically, I use the log-multiplicative Quasi Row and 
Column Effects Model II (RCII) as proposed by Goodman (1979).5 The RCII model has three 
4
 In 1930 the percentage of couples in which one or both of the spouses remarried was 18.4%, while in 
1980 it was 29.3% (Central Statistical Office 1990). 
5
 I also tested other loglinear models such as the crossings parameter model (Hout 1983). These models 
did not fit better than the RCII models. 
28 Chapter 2 
attractive properties. First, the RCII model yields a measure of the social distances among 
groups. Substantively, this of interest since people's preferences on the marriage market may 
be regarded as a function of these distances (Bogardus 1925a, 1925b). Second, the RCII 
model does not assume uniform, but scaled (uniform) association. For a marriage market the 
latter assumption seems to be appropriate, since some groups are closer to each other on the 
'intermarriage dimension' than others. Third, the RCII model uses only one association 
parameter for homogamy outside the diagonal cells of a marriage table. In comparison to 
loglinear models that use many parameter to characterize the association in a table, the RCII 
model makes it more easy to assess differences in the strength of single and dual trait measures 
of status homogamy. Consequently, the by-product explanation can be tested in a 
straightforward manner. 
For the multivariate table cross-classifying spouses' social origins by spouses' educations 
by time, the single trait RCII model that assumes educational homogamy only, can be 
specified as: 
In (F,juc) = HO, + WO, + HEk + WE, + CC + HOK + WOf + HE^ + WEk + (1) 
UE + UE
c
UkU, + DEk 
where Fljkk are the expected frequencies for the multivariate table, and where subscript i refers 
to husband's social origin, j to wife's social origin, к to husband's education, / to wife's 
education, and с to cohort. HO,, WO]f HEt, WE,, and Cc are the main effects for the origin, 
education and cohort variables, and HO^WO^ HE^., and WE^ are the interactions of origin 
and education variables with cohort. Together these main and interaction effects (plus one 
parameter for the grand mean) constitute the marginal effects in the multi-way contingency 
table. For the association between spouses' traits net of the marginals I define the following 
parameters: the uniform association parameter UE for the association between spouses' 
educations; UEC for cohort-specific uniform associations; and Uk and Ui as the scaled 
categories of respectively husband's and wife' education with (identifying) constraints EkUk = 
Σ,υ, = 0, and 27t Uk
2
= Σ, U,2=l. Finally, DE^ are diagonal parameters for each educational 
category.6 
Ignoring the main and interaction effects of cohort and social origin, the association 
parameter for educational homogamy is related to expected odds ratios in the following way 
(Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman 1989): 
Fu x Fk',' 
In — = UE χ (Uk -Uk)x (U, - U,') (2) 
F ' χ F ' 
6
 I did not assume interactions of cohort with the diagonal parameters (DE) and with the scale 
parameters (Ut and Ц). In my analyses these interactions did not prove to be significant. This outcome 
makes it easier to compare the association and diagonal parameters among different marriage tables. 
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where notations from Equation 1 apply and where k and k' are adjacent categories, likewise 
for I and /'. This means that the association parameter (UE) is equivalent to the log odds-ratio 
of the expected frequencies, but scaled by the distance between category scores. Hence, it is a 
model of scaled association. Note that if the intervals between adjacent educational categories 
are unity, that is (Uk - Uk') = (U ¡- U,') = 1 ΐοτ г&\ j and I, the scaled association model of 
Equation 2 is equivalent to the model of uniform association in which adjacent odds-ratios 
have identical values. 
The dual trait RCII model that specifies next to educational homogamy also homogamy of 
social origin and interactions between origins and educations, can be specified as follows: 
In (F,jklc) = HO, + WOj + HEk + WE, + CC + HOx + Ол + НЕ^ + WElc + (3) 
UE' + UE\UkU, + DEk +UO+ UOcU,Uj + DO, + 
ΗΟΗΕ
Λ
 + WOWEj, + HOWEd + WOHE^ + 
HOHE*, + WOWEßc + HOWEdc + WOHE^ 
where restrictions and notations from Equation 1 apply, where UO and DO refer to the 
uniform association parameter for homogamy of social origin and its diagonal parameters, and 
where ΗΟΗΕ
Λ
 and further (lines 3 and 4 of Equation 3) refer to intergenerational 
reproduction and exchange-effects (by cohort). In the dual trait model, UE' is an important 
parameter because it refers to the uniform association between spouses' educations net of the 
other relations in the model. Comparison of this dual trait parameter with the single trait 
parameter UE from Equation 1, yields an estimate of the degree to which educational 
homogamy is a by-product. Similarly, I will compare the single trait parameter for homogamy 
of social origin with the dual trait measure. For reasons of sparsity, however, I do not write 
down the equations for homogamy of social origin here. 
In the analyses, additional constraints are imposed upon the models of Equations 1 and 3. 
One obvious restriction is to restrict Uk and U, to be equal. This implies that the educational 
categories of husband and wife are equally scaled. In that case, the categories define an 
intermarriage dimension along which categories are ordered according to their propensity to 
intermarry (relative to their absolute sizes). The same can be applied to the categories of social 
origin, U, and U). Another restriction is to model the associations for intergenerational 
reproduction {ΗΟΗΕ
Λ
 and WOWEj ) and exchange of origin and education (HOWEii and 
WOHEjk) as uniform associations. This makes it easier to assess the strength of these effects 
and to test the consequences these effects have for homogamy of social origin and education. 
For practical reasons, I estimate the RCII models using a two-step approach (see for this 
procedure also Ganzeboom et al. 1989). First, scale values for the categories of spouses' 
educations and spouses' social origins are estimated using the program AssocPc (Luijkx 
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1988).7 Then, in the second step, the scale values are applied as fixed scores in loglinear 
models with the GLIM program (McCullagh and Neider 1983). To select a proper model, I 
use the bic statistic (Bayesian Information Criterion; Raftery 1986). This measure is preferred 
over the Log-Likelihood Ratio L2, because L2 has the disadvantage that any small discrepancy 
between observed and expected frequencies turns out to be significant when the sample size is 
large. The bic measure adjusts for sample size as follows: bic = L2 - Df*ln(N), where Df 
stands for degrees of freedom and N is the sample size. If the bic measure is negative, the 
alternative model is more likely than the saturated model. The appropriate selection criterion 
then, is to look for a model with the most negative bic. 
2.5 Results 
In this section I describe results of single and dual trait analyses of homogamy of social origin 
and education. First, I shed light on the strength of both kinds of homogamy and on the 
selection of a well fitting, parsimonious model (this paragraph). Second, I estimate trends in 
homogamy of social origin and education with single trait models (paragraph 2.5.1), and 
finally I assess the degree to which single trait parameters for status homogamy are by­
products (paragraph 2.5.2). 
To begin with, Table 2.1 presents loglinear models for the multi-way contingency table. It 
starts off with a model of null association, the 'marginals' model (Model 1). This model allows 
the educations and social origins of spouses to vary by cohort, but assumes no further 
interactions between spouses' educations and social origins. The bic statistic of the marginals 
model shows a negative value (bic=-7392) which implies that the marginals model is to be 
preferred over the saturated model. This finding may lead one to accept the hypothesis of null 
association, but if one compares the model to the other (association) models in Table 2.1, the 
marginals model fits badly. This indicates that spouses' educations and spouses' social origins 
are associated. 
Models 2a to 2d in Table 2.1 put restrictions on the association between spouses' 
educations. The first of these models - Model 2a - uses a single parameter for the diagonal 
cells. The diagonal cells are the cells in which spouses have equal educational levels. The bic 
measure of this diagonal model shows a much more negative value (bic=-12562) than the 
marginals model, which indicates that the diagonal cells are disproportionally under- or over 
represented. In conformity with results of earlier research (Ultee and Luijkx 1990), the 
diagonal parameter for educational homogamy is positive (1.13; not shown in table). This 
means that people have a tendency to marry someone of identical educational level rather than 
to marry someone across their educational group. The next model of Table 2.1 - Model 2b -
7
 To estimate the Equal Row and Column Effects Model Π, Luijkx rewrote the program ANOASC 
(Shockey and Clogg 1983). This adaption is known under the name AssocPc. The program uses an 
iterative proportional fitting algorithm to provide estimates of the parameters. 
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specifies this 'inmarriage' tendency to be dependent on educational level by allowing category-
specific diagonal parameters. Model 2b reduces the L2 substantially at the cost of 5 degrees of 
freedom and is, according to the bic criterion (bic=-13382), to be preferred over Model 2a. 
Apparently, the tendency to marry within one's educational group varies among educational 
groups. The diagonal parameters (from low to high respectively 1.96, 1.05, 0.69, 0.96, and 
2.83) show that inmarriage is highest at the extremes of the educational hierarchy, and 
demonstrates that no such inmarriage tendency exists in the middle ranks. 
Table 2.1 Loglinear single and dual trait models for homogamy of social origin and 
education: Hungary 1930-1979 
Models 
Df bic 
1 MARGINALS 3040 22886 -7392 
EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY 
1 + one diagonal parameter 
1 + category-specific diagonal parameters 
2b + uniform association 
2b + scaled uniform association' 
3 HOMOGAMY OF SOCIAL ORIGIN 
a 2d + one diagonal parameter 
b 2d + category-specific diagonal parameters 
с 
d 
3b + uniform association 
3b + scaled uniform association 
4 SINGLE TRAIT TREND IN EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY 
a 3d + fluctuation in association 
b 3d + linear trend in association 
с 3d + curvilinear trend 
5 SINGLE TRAIT TREND IN HOMOGAMY OF SOCIAL ORIGIN 
a 4a + fluctuation in association 
b 4a + linear trend in association 
с 5b + curvilinear trend in association 
6 DUAL TRAIT TREND MODELS 
a 5a + uniform reproduction and exchange-effects 
b 6a + fluctuation in reproduction and exchange 
3039 
3035 
3034 
3032 
3031 
3027 
3026 
3024 
3020 
3023 
3022 
3016 
3019 
3018 
3012 
2996 
17706 
16847 
13367 
13131 
10130 
9641 
9016 
8989 
8923 
8958 
8926 
8879 
8892 
8880 
3391 
3331 
-12562 
-13382 
-16852 
-17068 
-20059 
-20508 
-21123 
-21130 
-21156 
-21151 
-21173 
-21160 
-21177 
-21179 
-26608 
-26509 
Notes: Df is degrees of freedom; L2 is the Log-Likelihood Ratio; bic is the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (see above); * two degrees of freedom were used for the scaling of spouses' educational levels 
Model 2c of Table 2.1 adds to the previous model (Model 2b) a parameter of uniform 
association that takes into account the association between spouses' educational levels outside 
the main diagonal. The bic value of this uniform association model again shows a larger 
negative value compared to the previous models (bic=-16852). Since the uniform association 
parameter is positive (0.76), one can conclude that spouses do not only have a tendency for 
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inmarriage, but also tend to associate with people near in educational status while avoiding 
relations at a large social distance. 
The next model, Model 2d, tests whether this association is dependent on the distances 
among educational groups. This model of scaled association indeed performs better than the 
model of uniform association, Model 2c. With two more degrees of freedom for the scaling 
procedure, the scaled uniform association model has a bic of -17068. The association 
parameter of this model has a value of 7.39. The scale values for the five educational groups, 
which proved to be equal among husbands and wives, are respectively -0.46, -0.45, -0.08, 
0.28, and 0.71. In general, these results suggest that people tend to associate with 
(educationally) likes more than with dislikes. However, this tendency is not uniform but 
depends on the educational groups one considers: some educational groups (for example, 
people with almost no education and people with some education) are closer to one another 
on the intermarriage dimension than others (for example, the highest educated versus the one-
but highest educated). 
To assess whether next to educational homogamy people prefer to marry someone of equal 
social origin, I add in Models 3a to 3d of Table 2.1 associations between spouses' social 
origins. These models approximately yield the same results as the analyses of educational 
homogamy. First, they indicate a tendency for inmarriage, because the diagonal model (Model 
3a) improves upon the best fitting model so far (Model 2d). Second, the inmarriage tendency 
depends on specific categories of social origin. For the five groups the diagonal parameters are 
(from low to high) 1.38, 0.28, 0.60, 0.87 and 1.98. This again shows excessive inmarriage at 
the extremes of the social hierarchy, notably the farmers and higher non-manuals. Third, next 
to the inmarriage tendency people prefer to associate with persons near in origin status (Model 
3c). Fourth, the association between spouses' social origins depends on the distances among 
occupational classes because the model of scaled uniform association (Model 3d) fits better 
than the unsealed model. Furthermore, the scaling of the occupational classes (respectively -
0.45, -0.48, -0.05, 0.28, and 0.70) corresponds highly to the scaling of the educational 
categories. Although the association between spouses' social origins (2.34) is lower than the 
association between spouses' educations (7.39), it again indicates a tendency to marry likes 
and to avoid relations with status dislikes. 
2.5.1 Trends in Single Trait Measures of Status Homogamy 
Having found acceptable and parsimonious baseline models for homogamy of social origin and 
education, the central questions of this chapter can now be addressed. The first two of these 
questions pertain to trends in the single trait parameters of educational homogamy and 
homogamy of social origin. To what extent did these associations change in Hungary between 
1930 and 1979? To answer this question, Models 4a to 4c of Table 2.1 test trends in 
educational homogamy, and Models 5a to 5c test trends in homogamy of social origin. In the 
first of these models, Model 4a, educational homogamy is assumed to fluctuate between 
cohorts in a trendless way. That is, I add to Model 3d cohort-specific association parameters. 
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According to the bic criterion, the trendless fluctuation model improves upon the static models 
addressed before (bic=-21156) Apparently, educational homogamy was not stable in Hungary 
during the 1930-1979 period 
Table 2 2 Parameters of single and dual trait trend models for homogamy of social origin 
and education by marriage cohort Hungary 1930-1979 (selected models of Table 2 1) 
Parameter 
A SINGLE TRAIT TREND MODELS 
((Model 5a, Table 2 1) 
educational homogamy 
homogamy of social origin 
В DUAL TRAIT TREND MODELS 
(Model 6b, Table 2 1) 
educational homogamy 
homogamy of social origin 
reproduction effect men 
reproduction effect women 
exchange-effect men 
exchanee-effect women 
30-39 
7 85 
3 85 
6 39 
231 
0 30 
0 33 
0 14 
0 15 
40-49 
6 77 
3 15 
5 63 
191 
0 22 
0 32 
0 16 
0 13 
Cohort 
50-59 
6 63 
2 37 
5 98 
154 
0 25 
0 26 
011 
0 08 
60-69 
8 08 
1 99 
7 36 
128 
0 27 
0 36 
0 16 
0 07 
70-79 
951 
2 13 
8 53 
1 52 
0 32 
0 35 
0 16 
0 10 
Notes the reproduction effect for men is the association among husband's social origin and his education 
level, the exchange-effect for men is the association between wife's social origin and husband's 
education, for women, these effects are vice versa 
In panel A of Table 2 2 the exact values for the association between spouses' educations are 
shown by cohort, and in Figure 2 2 the corresponding trend line is drawn graphically From 
these data one can observe that the single trait measure of educational homogamy declined 
during the 1930-1959 period, but increased thereafter from 1960 to 1979 The latter increase 
is stronger than the initial decline, which makes the association end up higher than it started 
off Overall then, in Hungary educational homogamy seems to have increased 
The finding of a U-shaped trend in educational homogamy is substantiated by Models 4b 
and 4c in Table 2 1. Model 4b assumes a linear trend in educational homogamy Not 
surprisingly, the fit of the linear trend model (bic=-21151 ) is worse than the fluctuation model 
Note here that the linear trend parameter is positive (0 61), which is in line with the finding 
that in the data educational homogamy is stronger for the younger than the older married In 
Model 4c a quadratic term is added to the linear trend model It states a curvilinear slope in 
educational homogamy As may have been expected, this model fits the data better (bic=-
21173) than the previous models Hence, my conclusions from visual inspection stand firm 
Educational homogamy shows a U-curved trend it was strong in the thirties, weaker during 
the war-penod and the fifties, and rapidly increasing thereafter 
My next question is whether homogamy of social origin declined in Hungary during the 
period of investigation (1930-1979) Models 5a to 5c in Table 2 1 provide an answer to this 
question In the fluctuation model - Model 5a - Model 4a is taken as a baseline and cohort-
34 Chapter 2 
specific association parameters for the association between spouses' social origins are added. 
The model fit improves (bic=-21160), which demonstrates that homogamy of social origin also 
fluctuated significantly among cohorts. In panel A of Table 2.2 and in Figure 2.2 I show the 
corresponding scaled association parameters per cohort. It can be seen that homogamy of 
social origin steadily declined from 1930 to 1969. However, in the last cohort (1970-1979) 
this decrease leveled off and the association increased slightly. Nonetheless, the overall decline 
in the association is large: in the last cohort (1970-1979) the parameter of homogamy of social 
origin (2.13) is almost half the size of the parameter of the first cohort (1930-1939). Models 
5b and 5c specify this trend as respectively a linear and curvilinear trend. Not surprisingly, the 
bic statistics show that not a linear trend specification (bic=-21177), but a curvilinear trend 
specification fits the data best (bic=-21179). These statistics are however very close to one 
another and do not alter the conclusion of strongly decreased homogamy of social origin. 
2.5.2 Trends in Dual Trait Measures of Status Homogamy 
From the previous results one may conclude a shift at Hungarian marriage markets from 
selection on the basis of social origin to selection on the basis of educational level. However, 
as was pointed out in the first two paragraphs of this chapter, single trait analyses of 
homogamy may yield trends that are distorted by other processes involved in mate selection. 
To assess whether this is true for the data at hand, I apply dual trait models for status 
homogamy. In these multivariate models I do not only assume that people match on origins 
and destinations (for example, as in Model 5a), but also take into account the links between 
origin and destination (for example, as in Equation 3). Model 6a and 6b of Table 2.1 contain 
the additional associations. In the models, reproduction and exchange-effects are added to the 
previous models. I take Model 5a, in which educational homogamy and homogamy of social 
origin fluctuate among cohorts, as a baseline. The reason why I do so is that it allows me to 
assess for each cohort separately the degree to which single trait parameters are by-products. 
In the first dual trait model of Table 2.1 - Model 6a - invariant reproduction and exchange-
effects are modeled. These effects - that have the form of scaled uniform associations (see also 
the models section) - improve the model fit greatly according to the bic criterion (bic=-26608). 
Hence, reproduction and exchange-effects must be significant. Inspection of the corresponding 
parameters (not presented here) shows these effects to be positive. This implies that the by-
product explanation may be at work. Given the positive associations between origins and 
destinations on the marriage market, homogamy on one dimension may cause homogamy on 
another dimension. 
To see what consequences the reproduction and exchange-effects have for trends in 
homogamy of social origin and education, the second dual trait model of Table 2.1 - Model 6b 
- allows these reproduction and exchange-effects to vary among cohorts. The corresponding 
dual trait trend model fits worse (bic=-24509) than the previous one. This shows that at least 
some and perhaps all of the reproduction and exchange-effects are invariant. Table 2.2 informs 
more specifically which of these effects changed and which not. The parameters in this table 
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cohort 
Figure 2.2 Trends in single trait measures (solid lines) and dual trait 
measures (dotted lines) for homogamy of social origin and education: 
Hungary 1930-1979 
demonstrate that intergenerational reproduction for men and women and the exchange-effects 
for women changed in a curvilinear fashion, while the exchange-effects for men did not show a 
trend. Modeling these changes (not shown here) proves the U-shaped trends in reproduction 
to be significant, both for men (bic=-26608) and women (bic=-26613). The exchange-effects 
for men did not show a particular trend, however, and remained constant over time. 
From Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2 one may conclude that the changes in the multivariate 
pattern of homogamy - including the reproduction and exchange-effects - leave the trends in 
educational homogamy and homogamy of social origin almost unaffected. Although at each 
point in time the single trait measure of homogamy is substantially lower than its dual trait 
counterpart, the trend slopes only slightly differ. The by-product explanation holds for each 
cohort, but in the aggregate trends in the various forms of status homogamy are not distorted. 
However, a more detailed cohort-specific inspection of Divariate and multivariate 
homogamy reveals some interesting differences between the two types of analysis. The largest 
of these differences occurs with respect to the change in educational homogamy between the 
second (1940-1949) and third marriage cohort (1950-1959). In the single trait case, 
educational homogamy slightly decreased from 6.77 to 6.63, whereas in the dual trait case it 
increased from 5.63 to 5.98. Single trait analysis hides an upward trend here. The reason for 
this distortion of the trend can be understood from the parameters confounding the single trait 
measure of educational homogamy, notably homogamy of social origin, intergenerational 
reproduction and the exchange-effects: these distorting factors decreased in size between the 
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second and third marriage cohort (Table 2.2). Since it is clear from Model 6a that origins and 
education associate positively, such a decrease leads me - all other things being equal - to 
expect a decrease in educational homogamy. Given the relatively stable trend in the single trait 
measure of educational homogamy during this period, the 'residual' homogamy (arrow d in 
Figure 2.1) must have increased to compensate the expected decrease in homogamy. Hence, 
the discrepancy between single and dual trait analyses arises. 
2.6 Conclusions and Discussion 
The analyses of marriage patterns in Hungary between 1930 and 1979 have shown some 
interesting results. First, I demonstrated that in Hungary between 1930 and 1979 homogamy 
of social origin decreased considerably. That is, those who marry pay less and less attention to 
the social origin of the prospective spouse and increasingly prefer marriage to someone of 
dissimilar origin status. This result is in line with expectations from modernization theory that 
postulate a shift from 'ascriptive' to 'achievement' values both within labor and marriage 
markets. Alternatively, the finding of declining homogamy of social origin can be explained by 
the decreased possibilities and motivation of parents to interfere in marital decisions of their 
offspring. Due to this development, prospective partners feel less pressure to marry within the 
social class they stem from. Unexpected, however, is the leveling of the trend towards less 
homogamy of social origin in the last marriage cohort studied (1970-1979). Perhaps, it can be 
explained by the Hungarian experience with socialism. During the 1970s, socialism was at it 
weakest in Hungary, and private property gained in importance. Since property was still 
distributed unequally along lines of social origin, this increased the tendency to match on 
origin status. 
The second noteworthy result of my analyses is that educational homogamy showed a U-
shaped trend: until the 1960s it decreased, while after this period it increased. Since the latter 
increase was stronger than the initial decline, I must conclude that the tendency of Hungarian 
people to match on similar educational levels increased over the full 1939-1979 period. This 
result confirms expectations from modernization theory again: achievement values - choosing 
someone of high educational level - have become increasingly important in selecting an 
attractive partner. However, because the increase in educational homogamy was not linear, 
other factors must also have influenced this tendency. Here, like with regard to homogamy of 
social origin, the Hungarian experience with socialism seems to have ben important. In the 
fifties, for example, when educational homogamy was weakest, Hungarian socialism was in its 
most extreme form. During this period, quota recruitment was successfully maintained in 
educational selection procedures. People of low social origin were given priority in the 
selection for higher education. This created opportunities for interaction between people that 
finally achieved different levels of education. If friendships from schools hold some time, the 
quota system may consequently have led to a decrease in educational homogamy. 
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The chief purpose of this chapter was not to replicate existing research on homogamy, but to 
find out whether trends in homogamy obtained with single trait models distort 'real' trends in 
homogamy. The results did not indicate any major distortions of this kind. Although at each 
point in time single trait models overestimate the degree of status homogamy, both with 
respect to social origin and education, dual trait analyses did not lead to substantially other 
trend findings than single trait analyses. I regard this as the third interesting result of my 
analyses. It is to be noted that in the 1940-1959 period minor differences in trends occurred. 
Between the two marriage cohorts for this period the single trait measure of educational 
homogamy decreased, but the dual trait measure of educational homogamy increased. 
The reason why the dual trait approach to modeling marital homogamy only worked for 
the 1940-1959 period lies in the fact that during this period the factors influencing educational 
homogamy - homogamy of social origin, intergenerational reproduction and exchange of 
origin and education - changed to a considerable extent and also in the same direction, namely 
weaker association. For the other periods no such uniform and strong changes were observed. 
Consequently, these factors did not distort trends in homogamy to a large extent. 
Notwithstanding the modest results, it would be would be wrong to conclude that 
multivariate homogamy models are of little use. In fact, I have shown that single trait models 
overestimate the tendency towards educational homogamy and homogamy of social origin. 
Moreover, I have specified the conditions under which dual trait analysis leads to other trend 
findings than single trait analysis. In the data these conditions only applied to one period, and 
only to educational homogamy. However, they may very well apply to other countries or 
periods in time, or to other strongly related characteristics of spouses. Future research on 
status homogamy must certainly take the multivariate pattern of mate selection into account. 

3 THE ROLE OF SOCIAL ORIGIN AND EDUCATION IN MATE 
SELECTION: THE NETHERLANDS 1947-1992 
Abstract. In this chapter I examine the role of spouses' social origin and educations in mate selection in 
the Netherlands between 1947 and 1992. My main research questions are to what extent parameters of 
homogamy of social origin and education obtained from common single trait models are by-products, and 
to what extent trends in these homogamy parameters differ from trends assessed with newer dual trait 
models. To answer these questions, I use data on spouses' social origin and educations from the 
Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993 and apply zero-order and residual correlation models. The results 
of my single and dual trait analyses demonstrate that at each point in time single trait models overestimate 
the tendency towards status similarity, and that in some periods the two types of analysis yield different 
trends. The more informative dual trait findings point to a weaker role of social origin and a stronger role 
of education in mate selection in the Netherlands after World War Π. Although not uniformly, the 
findings results confirm predictions from modernization theory which postulates a shift from ascriptive to 
achievement values at marriage markets of industrializing societies. 
3.1 Introduction1 
In most industrial countries of the West, processes of rationalization and democratization have 
had great consequences for social life. People have geographically and socially become more 
mobile, educational systems have expanded and welfare systems have been established. 
According to some sociologists, this modernization of society affected such intimate decisions 
as choosing a partner for life (Goode 1964, Shorter 1976). While in traditional societies the 
selection of a mate was a rational, business-like choice in which the parents and the church had 
an important vote, in modern societies marriages are agreed upon romantic reasons. 
Nowadays, people base their decision whom to marry on love reasons and increasingly young 
adolescents marry across existing social barriers. 
In empirical studies, the view of declining financial and religious calculation in partner 
selection has been confirmed for the Netherlands, the country on which I focus in this chapter. 
First, the extent to which people marry within their denominational group declined after World 
War Π (Hendrickx, Lammers and Ultee 1991). Second, people decreasingly married someone 
of similar occupational status (Smits, Ultee and Lammers 1993). Third, and finally, potential 
spouses more and more prefer to marry persons with other educational levels (De Hoog 1979, 
Sixma and Ultee 1984, Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits 1995). The similarity with respect to these 
traits, also known as 'homogamy' or 'endogamy', declined. 
From a theoretical point of view, the finding of declining religious homogamy can fairly 
simply be explained. As a consequence of longer school careers, stronger urbanization and 
equalizing social measures, parents have lost much of their power and possibilities to influence 
' This chapter is a revised and from Dutch translated version of a paper that appeared in Sociale Wetenschappen 
(Uunk and Ultee 1995). 
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the marriage plans of their offspring. In addition, the church has lost much of its attraction to 
younger people, and its influence on the daily life of believers deteriorated (Peters 1993). 
Contrary to the decline in religious homogamy, however, the finding of decreased 
educational homogamy cannot easily be understood. First, in modem societies educational 
attainment has become the key to success in life. Choosing somebody of similar educational 
level would be increasingly important. Second, the possibilities of similarly educated to meet 
increased due to longer school careers: similarly educated have greater chances than before to 
become romantically involved. Third and finally, due to smaller status inequalities among men 
and women, the selection of a mate should have become more symmetric between the two 
genders. Whereas in the past highly educated men searched their mate within culturally 
developed circles of society, nowadays - with decreased gender stratification - men also prefer 
marriage to higher educated women. In short: I would not expect a decrease but an increase 
in educational homogamy. 
Apparently, empirical findings (decreased educational homogamy) and theoretical 
arguments (an increase in educational homogamy) are in conflict. How can this anomaly be 
solved? In my opinion, the solution of the anomaly does not lie in a revision of existing 
theories or in better data, but in the applied models of status homogamy.2 The observed 
finding of declining educational homogamy has been based on models that (implicitly) assumed 
people to match on only one characteristic: their educational attainment. Although this could 
be a realistic assumption for the recently married, it is quite unrealistic for people that have 
been married for a while. For the latter group, other characteristics than education may have 
played a role in the selection of a mate. As the findings above have illustrated, in the past 
people were not only eager to attract similarly educated, but also wanted to attract persons of 
the same religious and/or occupational group. 
The multivariate structure of the marriage market - in which several factors play a role 
simultaneously -, may have important implications for research on status homogamy. Studies 
that analyzed the association between spouses' educational levels only, may have 
overestimated the degree to which people prefer educational similarity. Educational 
homogamy can be spurious and a 'by-product' of other processes involved in marital selection 
(Blau and Duncan 1967: 358). It could, for example, have been caused by spouses' similarity 
with respect to social origin. Because social origin and education are positively related, a 
homogamous match on social origin is likely to have produced a homogamous match on 
education. In Figure 3.1 this can be illustrated by multiplying the positive association a 
(homogamy of social origin), by the positive associations b (intergenerational reproduction) 
and с (exchange of origin and education). Multiplication will under these conditions produce 
educational homogamy as the likely outcome. This even holds if the tendency to match on 
:
 One such revision is Goode's revision of modernization theory (Goode 1964). It holds that during modernization 
in some fields of life (notably the labor market) (he constraints that are imposed on individuals increased, whereas in 
other fields of life (the mamage market) constraints have become weaker 
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education (association d) is absent or slightly negative. Single trait models for educational 
homogamy hence run the risk of concealing weaker preferences for educational similarity. 
Likewise, single trait measures of homogamy of social origin may be by-products too. A 
marriage between two people of identical social origin may have been caused by educational 
similarity between these people. Blau and Duncan (1967) demonstrated this in their analysis of 
homogamy of social origin and education for the United States: while the zero-order 
association between spouses' social origins was 0.30, the partial association - taking into 
account spouses' educations - was 0.20. One third of the initially observed association 
between spouses' social origins appeared to be a spurious by-product. 
In my opinion, the by-product explanation provides the clue to the anomaly between the 
theoretically expected increase and empirically observed decrease of educational homogamy in 
Husband's social 
origin 
A 
Husband's education 
Wife's social 
origin 
A 
Wife's education 
Figure 3.1 Dual trait model for educational homogamy 
(arrow d), homogamy of social origin (arrow a), 
intergenerational reproduction (arrows b), and exchange of 
origin and education (arrows c) 
the Netherlands after World War II. Just as at one point in time the single trait measure of 
educational homogamy may be attributed to homogamy of social origin, the observed decrease 
in the single trait measure of educational homogamy may be explained by the (supposedly) 
decreased association between spouses' social origins. All things being equal (that is, 
associations b and с in Figure 3.1 remain constant), a decrease in homogamy of social origin 
may have caused the zero-order association between spouses' educations to decline. That is, 
people married less and less within their educational group not because they paid less attention 
to education, but because they paid less attention with respect to social origin - a trait that is 
strongly related to educational attainment. Net of the effects of spouses' social origins, the 
preferences for educational homogamy (dual trait measure d in Figure 3.1) may have remained 
stable, however. People may prefer marriage within their educational group as strong as 
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before while in the aggregate they may many less homogamously. If so, a decrease in the 
single trait measure of educational homogamy is a by-product, caused by decreased 
homogamy of social origin. 
3.2 Research Questions 
In order to test the by-product explanation of homogamy of social origin and education, 
multivariate models need to be applied and compared to single trait models. In this chapter I 
will do this using data of marriage cohorts in the Netherlands between 1947 and 1992. The 
analyses are guided by three questions: 
(1) To what extent did the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin change in 
the Netherlands between 1947-1992? 
(2) To what extent did the single trait measure of educational homogamy change in the 
Netherlands between 1947-1992? 
(3) To what extent are the observed trends in the single trait measures of homogamy of 
social origin and education artificial, and to what extent can these trends be 
attributed to changes in the association between spouses' educations, spouses' social 
origin, and spouses' educations and social origin? 
By addressing and answering these questions, I improve on earlier research in several ways. 
First, for the Netherlands longer and more recent periods are described with respect to 
matching on social origin (Van Tulder 1972) and education (Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits 
1995). Second, dual trait models for homogamy of social origin and education are assessed. 
An earlier dual trait analysis of Dutch data was Hendrickx' (1994) analysis of the role of 
spouses' educations and religious affiliations in mate selection. Third and finally, I compare 
results of single and dual trait analyses to assess the by-product explanation. By doing so, I go 
beyond earlier questions about educational homogamy. I do not only determine (changes in) 
educational homogamy, but also explain why. It is to be noted that for the United States 
(Kalmijn 1991a) and Taiwan (Tsai 1994) dual trait models for homogamy of social origin and 
education were applied, but in these studies single trait models were not estimated. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows: the hypotheses are formulated in paragraph 3.3, 
the data are presented in paragraph 3.4, and in paragraph 3.5 I discuss the statistical models 
for homogamy of social origin and education. Paragraph 3.6 presents the results of single and 
dual trait analyses, and in paragraph 3.7 I summarize this chapter's main findings and discuss 
its implications for the hypotheses I addressed. 
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3.3 Hypotheses 
In order to derive hypotheses on trends in homogamy of social origin and education, I make 
use of existing theories of mate selection. In general, these theories state that three factors are 
important in the matching of spouses: (a) the preferences of prospective partners, (b) the 
social pressure of significant others, and (c) the opportunities of partners to meet (Collins 
1985, Kalmijn 1991a). Put simply: two people with similar characteristics marry when other 
options such as marriage with another person or staying single are less attractive than 
homogamy (ad a); they marry homogamously when other persons accept the marriage (ad b); 
and they marry within their social group when they have the opportunity to meet (ad c). By 
examining the changes in these three factors over time, hypotheses on trends in homogamy can 
be formulated. 
First, I consider the preferences of prospective spouses. To what extent did these 
preferences change in the Netherlands after World War II? To answer this question, I make 
use of two theories that originate from research on social stratification: modernization theory 
(Parsons 1940; Kerr et al 1960) and the theory of compensatory strategies (Bourdieu 1979). 
Modernization theory states that as a consequence of rationalization processes, jobs are less 
and less distributed by means of (social class) origin and more and more by what people 
achieve on the basis of their own efforts. With this shift from 'ascription' to 'achievement' 
values on the labor market, a parallel shift would occur on marriage markets. It would pay off 
less to match on social origin, while it would pay off more to match on a good education. A 
good educated spouse, namely, raises the likelihood of achieving high status and well-being. 
Correspondingly, I expect from modernization theory that homogamy of social origin 
decreased, while educational homogamy increased in the Netherlands after World War II. 
The prediction that in modern societies the choice of a partner strongly depends on 
education, can also be derived from Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies (Bourdieu 
1979; see also Chapter 5). His theory states that as certain strategies of higher status groups 
become less successful in the reproduction of social inequalities within society, alternative or 
'compensatory' strategies will be applied to maintain social status. One such strategy is to 
marry someone of equal educational level. This strategy will increase the chances that scarce 
resources run within higher strata. To date, the strategy of educational homogamy must have 
become popular in the Netherlands as of World War II. In the post-war period, economic 
strategies of social reproduction such as direct financial inheritance from parents to offspring, 
became less successful due to more severe duty rights. Under these conditions, educational 
homogamy could thrive. However, because as of the seventies enrollment in higher education 
strongly expanded and people of lower social origin attained higher educational credentials to 
a much greater extent than before, at some point in time - I assume, the late seventies -
distinction by education and educational homogamy became less successful as a reproductive 
strategy itself. In short then, from Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies and additional 
assumptions I predicted that educational homogamy increased in strength as of World War II, 
but decreased in the late seventies when high school diplomas suffered from inflation. 
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From the second factor that influences the choice of a mate, the social pressure of others, I 
predict that homogamy of social origin declined in the Netherlands after World War II. First, 
people have had less chances to influence marital decisions of younger adults. Children stay in 
school longer, they live in urbanized areas more frequently, and the legal possibilities of 
parents to interfere in marital decisions have diminished. Second, better social security 
hampered the wish of parents to influence the marital decisions of their offspring. 
The last factor that I consider, the opportunities to meet, leads me to predict that 
educational homogamy increased. Blau and colleagues (Blau 1977, Blau and Schwartz 1984) 
have given this factor a decisive weight in their theory on marriage selection. They state that 
marriage patterns are shaped by the availability of attractive mates on the market. Mare (1991) 
applied this idea to derive hypotheses on trends in educational homogamy. He stated that as a 
consequence of longer school careers, the timing between leaving school and entering 
marriage narrowed. This shorter time interval will increase the chances that friendships 
between students last until marriage, and will hence lead to stronger educational homogamy.3 
In sum, I hypothesize that due to changes in preferences, social pressure and opportunities, 
homogamy of social origin declined in the Netherlands after World War Π and became weaker 
than the tendency of educational homogamy. The latter type of homogamy may have increased 
linearly during the post-war period, but it may - according to a prediction from Bourdieu's 
theory of compensatory strategies - also have leveled off in recent decades in which 
educational credentials have suffered from inflation. 
3.4 Data 
To find out whether the in older research observed trend towards less educational homogamy 
is artificial, I would ideally have to re-analyze the (Census) data that were used to produce this 
single trait finding (see also Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits 1995). Such is not possible, however, 
since the data do not contain indicators for the social origin of both spouses. In this chapter I 
therefore use another data set that does contain information on both spouses' educations and 
social origin: the Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993 (Ultee and Ganzeboom 1993)." This 
1
 I excluded hypotheses on the effects of differential availability of males and females on the marriage market. 
These 'supply side' factors only shed light on marriages that are 'forced' by differential availability ('structural 
heterogamy') and do not indicate the theoretically more interesting phenomenon of social barriers among different 
status groups ('relative heterogamy'). The homogamy measures to be used hereafter take into account the supply 
side factors and can therefore meaningfully be interpreted in terms of attraction or repulsion between marriage 
candidates of distinct social groups (see also Chapter 1). 
4
 To my knowledge, there are two other Dutch surveys that contain information on spouses' educations and 
spouses' social origins; the 'Beroepsprestige en Mobililcitsmeting 1982' (Sixma and Ultee 1982, Occupational 
Prestige and Mobility Survey) and the 'Arbeidsaanbodpanels 1985-1988' (Praal and Mekkclholt 1991, Labor 
Supply Panels) I do not use these surveys here because they have important drawbacks. The Occupational Prestige 
and Mobility Survey contains information on spouse's father's occupation but this information pertains to another 
point in time (at the time of marriage) than respondent's father's occupation ('when the respondent was aged 12'). 
In the ІлЬог Supply Panels no information is available for year of marriage and the educational classification (SOI 
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survey is based on a nationwide representative sample of 1,000 households in which adult 
respondents and spouses answered questions on their social and cultural background. 
From the data of the Netherlands Family Survey, I selected 773 heterosexual couples that 
were - for at least one year - married or cohabitated at the time of interview.5 The social origin 
of the spouses were assessed by the highest completed educations of the fathers of both 
partners.6 For that purpose, I used a tenfold classification of education, ranging from 
incomplete primary education (1) to Ph.D.-degree (10).7 The educational attainments of 
spouses were obtained by career questions in which for ten possible educations, exact timing, 
level and certificates were recorded. This construction enabled me to compute spouses' 
educations at the time of marriage. When one of the partners was not enrolled in education at 
the time of marriage, the highest education prior to marriage was selected. 
To examine trends in homogamy, I made use of marriage cohorts. These cohorts are 
groups of people that married in the same period of time. In this chapter I distinguish seven 
marriage cohorts: (a) 1947-1962, (b) 1963-1967, (c) 1968-1972, (d) 1973-1977, (e) 1978-
1982, (0 1983-1987, (g) 1988-1992.8 Comparison of homogamy in these seven cohorts 
enables me to examine the historical factors that influence marital patterns. Such a cohort 
design improves upon previous research on educational homogamy for the Netherlands. In 
earlier research, all existing marriages at time point tO were compared with all existing 
marriages at another time point t l . This may introduce bias since the loss of older cohorts can 
artificially influence the degree of homogamy at time point tl. In addition, because middle-
aged couples are in the survey at both points in time, the design is likely to render conservative 
estimates of trends in homogamy (see also Chapter 7). 
A disadvantage of my cohort design is that I cannot estimate the extent to which marriage 
cohorts suffer from 'selective attrition'. This can be a problem if heterogamous pairs divorce 
or die more often than homogamous pairs (Bumpass and Sweet 1972). The older cohorts may 
1978; Standard Educational Scale) introduces problems in distinguishing people with college education ('HBO') 
from the university educated ('WO'). 
5
 I did not distinguish firstly wed from remarried people The argument that the latter group would marry less 
homogamous due to more restricted circumstances on marriage markets (Jacobs and Furstenberg 1986) did not 
apply to my data Additional analysis has shown that firstly wed and remarried people are equally homogamous, 
both with respect to education and social origin 
6
 I used the education of fathers instead of the occupations of fathers of spouses as a proxy for social origin, 
because it has a stronger connection to spouses' educations - the other trait in the homogamy model -, and also 
because it is measured in the same metric as spouses' educations This makes it easier to test the hypothesis that 
single trait measures of status homogamy are by-products 
7
 The ten categories for education are (1) incomplete primary school ('LO-'), (2) primary school, (3) lower 
secondary and vocational education ('LBO'), (4) middle secondary education ('MAVO'), (5) middle vocational 
training ('MBO'), (6) higher secondary education ('HAVO'), (7) higher pre-university education ('VWO'), (8) 
higher vocational training ('HBO'), (9) university education ('WO'), and (10) PhD-degree Notice that, in 
contradiction to many other classifications, I scaled 'MBO' lower than 'HAVO' Analyses with scaled association 
models showed this to be important I also tried other classifications of education, like the four-level CBS 
classification, but the results from this study did not change substantially when the four-level scale was applied 
8
 The first marriage cohort (1947-1962) encompasses a longer period of lime than the other six cohorts There 
were too few parrs to split up the first marnage cohort in five-year intervals 
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be more homogamous than the younger cohorts by design. Since I only have one survey, I 
cannot directly solve this problem. Still I think that my findings do not suffer much from 
attrition effects because previous research for the Unites States demonstrated that marriage 
cohorts did not change in their extent of educational homogamy during time (Kalmijn 1991b; 
see also Chapter 2). 
3.5 Models 
In this chapter I use zero-order and residual correlation models to test the by-product 
hypothesis and to assess the strength of homogamy of social origin and education in different 
time periods. In doing so, I continue and extend analyses by Warren (1966) and Blau and 
Duncan (1967). These scholars computed the partial association among spouses' social origins 
while controlling for both spouses' educations, and compared this partial association to the 
zero-order correlation among spouses' social origin. In that manner, they estimated the degree 
to which homogamy of social origin is a by-product of educational homogamy. Blau and 
Duncan, and Warren did, however, not apply the partial association model to account for 
educational homogamy. Their estimates of educational homogamy are hence likely to 
overestimate the degree to which people prefer educational similarity in mate selection. 
In this chapter I try to improve upon the analyses of Blau and colleagues by studying for 
the Netherlands the degree to which both homogamy of social origin and educational 
homogamy are by-products of each other. I apply two residual correlation models, one to 
account for the zero-order association between spouses' educations, and one to account for 
the zero-order association between spouses' social origins. Figure 3.2 presents these models 
graphically, respectively in Panel A and Panel B. In the residual correlation model of 
educational homogamy (Panel A), the zero-order association between spouses' educations is 
accounted for by the association between spouses' social origins and the association between 
origin and education. The remaining, unexplained association between spouses' educations, is 
the residual correlation between spouses' educations and can be interpreted as the net 
preference for educational homogamy. It is computed as the difference between the zero-order 
association and the association expected by the model. Vice versa, I also compute the residual 
correlation between spouses' social origins (see Panel В of Figure 3.2). 
The associations between origin and education in the two residual correlation models of 
Figure 3.2, can be dubbed 'reproduction' and/or 'exchange-effects'. The reproduction effects 
refer to the transfer of education from father to son (origin husband - education husband), or 
from father to daughter (origin wife - education wife). The exchange-effects are the 
associations between spouse's social origin and own education. I distinguish exchange-effects 
for men (origin wife - education husband), and exchange-effects for women (origin husband -
education wife). Substantively, these exchange-effects refer to exchange of resources on the 
marriage market. A positive association between one's education and spouse's social origin 
could be interpreted as an exchange of high education for high social standing, or of success in 
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A. Educational homogamy 
B. Homogamy of sonai origin 
Old cohort Young cohort 
Figure 3.2 Fictive parameters of residual correlation models for 
(a) educational homogamy, and (b) homogamy of social origin 
life with 'good taste and manners'. In the past, marriages in which such exchange played a 
role, are believed to have taken place more frequently for men than for women. In recent 
decades, however, I do not expect much exchange of origin and education, and also believe 
that, due to the fact that women have caught up educationally with men, gender differences in 
exchange-effects converged. 
To show how the residual correlation models work numerically, Figure 3.2 presents fictive 
parameters of two marriage cohorts, an old and a young cohort. If I take Panel A as an 
example, one may compute the expected correlation between spouses' education as a sum of 
four 'paths': (a) homogamy of social origin and the reproduction effects, (b) homogamy of 
social origin and the exchange-effects, (c) the variance of husband's social origin, the amount 
of intergenerational reproduction for men and the exchange-effect for men, and (d) the 
variance of wife's social origin, wife's reproduction effect and her exchange-effect. Using the 
fictive parameters from Figure 3.2, the expected correlation equals 0.30 for the old cohort, 
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and 0.22 for the young cohort.' If I assume the zero-order correlation between spouses' 
educations to have remained constant - for example 0.50 -, the residual correlation for the old 
cohort must be (0.50 - 0.30 =) 0.20, and for the young cohort (0.50 - 0.22 =) 0.28. What may 
be observed from these figures is that while the single trait measure of educational homogamy 
is stable, the dual trait measure increases. Single trait analysis can mask increasing preferences 
for educational similarity in mate selection. Panel В of Figure 3.2 shows that such a trend 
distortion may also apply to homogamy of social origin: it remains constant in single trait 
models, but decreases in dual trait models that take into account both spouses' social origins 
and educations.10 
With the use of residual correlation models I deviate from recent loglinear applications of 
dual trait models (for example, Kalmijn 1991a, Tsai 1994). The loglinear models are believed 
to be more appropriate than correlation models in taking into account differences in the 
availability of men and women at marriage markets. They control marginal frequencies of each 
category of a trait, whereas my (Pearson) correlation models only take differential availability 
of men and women into account as far they are represented by the mean and standard 
deviation of a characteristic (see also Chapter 1). However appropriate, for a simultaneous 
analysis of spouses' social origins and educations loglinear models are not convenient. A dual 
trait loglinear analysis requires a large data set to fill the cells of a multi-way contingency table 
sufficiently. Such a large data set - containing both spouses' social origins and spouses' 
educations - is not available for the Netherlands. 
Given the data restriction, I use correlation models to establish single and dual trait 
measures of homogamy of social origin and education. More specifically I use Pearson 
product-moment correlations as a measure of homogamy. In my data, these correlation 
measures do not suffer much from effects of differentia] availability of men and women at 
marriage markets. A test of loglinear models for the developments in the single trait measures 
of homogamy of social origin and education - for which I had to collapse the tenfold 
educational classification into a threefold scheme -, yielded similar trend findings as my single 
trait correlation analysis (see also Chapter 7). The residual or dual trait correlation models are 
estimated within LISREL (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1989), and I use Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation and the corresponding Chi-square statistic as a measure of fit. To test trends in 
homogamy, I apply a multi-group design. That is, cohorts are treated as groups and it is tested 
' For the oldest cohort, the expected correlation is ((0.70 χ 0.40 χ 0.40) + (0.7 χ 0.20 χ 0.20) + (1 χ 0.40 χ 0.20) 
+ (1 χ 0.40 χ 0.20=)) 0.30. 
'° In status attainment research, social origin causally forgoes educational attainment. In this article I also use 
education to explain (the association between spouses') social origin. Given my research question (to what extent 
can the association between spouses' social origins be explained by educational homogamy and the association 
between origin and education?), this seems appropriate Moreover, for prospective spouses causality does not play a 
role. Things that have happened at different points in time are simultaneous events for persons that make a choice on 
the marriage market. 
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whether homogamy parameters differ among groups." In Table A.l of Appendix A, the (zero-
order) product-moment correlations for spouses' educations and spouses' social origins are 
presented by cohort. These correlations serve as input for subsequent analyses. 
3.6 Results 
Having discussed the models and data, this paragraph gives answers to the research questions 
of this chapter. First, I go into results of single trait analyses (paragraph 3.6.1), then I examine 
findings of dual trait analyses (paragraph 3.6.2). 
7B-8I I3-B7 
Figure 3.3 Trends in single trait (solid lines) and dual trait 
measures (dotted lines) for homogamy of social origin (with 
triangles) and education: the Netherlands 1947-1992 
3.6.1 Trends in Single Trait Measures of Status Homogamy 
This chapter's first question concerns the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin. 
The question is to what extent this measure changed in the Netherlands after World War II. 
To provide an answer, I computed zero-order product-moment correlations between spouses' 
" I also tested whether (residual) correlations changed linearly from cohort to cohort. This is not a common option 
within LISREL, but can be done quite easily First, I specified the residual correlation in the model of Figure 3 2 as 
two non-reciprocal causal paths. Provided I constrained the coefficients of both paths to be equal, this produced a 
parameter that corresponds to the residual correlation parameter. Second, linear trends can be estimated by using 
so-called phantom variables that mediate each of the two mutual paths. The phantom variables must have zero 
variances and if one of the two parameters for each phantom variables is set equal to the cohort number, the other 
parameter of that variable (constrained to be equal among cohorts) can be interpreted as a linear trend coefficient 
(Rindskopf 1984) 
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social origins. Taken over the full period, this correlation is 0.42 (p<0.05). This means that in 
general partners prefer similarity in social origin much more than dissimilarity. 
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3 present the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin by 
cohort. The data show a considerable decrease in the association over time. In the first cohort 
(1947-1962) homogamy of social origin amounted to a fairly strong 0.61, but in the last 
cohort (1988-1992) it was nearly half the size (0.33). Furthermore, the decrease seems to be 
linear, with the exception of a small increase in the last cohort. 
Table 3.1 Zero-order correlations, residual correlations and percentages explained 
correlation for (a) spouses' social origins, and (b) spouses' educations; the Netherlands 
1947-1992 
Parameter 
A SOCIAL ORIGIN 
zero-order 
residual 
% explained 
В EDUCATION 
zero-order 
residual 
% explained 
47-62 
0.61* 
0.44* 
27.9 
0.31* 
0.18* 
41.9 
63-67 
0.57* 
0.37* 
35.1 
0.43* 
0.27* 
37.2 
Marriaee cohort 
68-72 
0.45* 
0.15* 
66.7 
0.64* 
0.28* 
56.3 
73-77 
0.36* 
0.12 
66.7 
0.40* 
0.15* 
62.5 
78-82 
0.36* 
0.21* 
41.7 
0.51* 
0.35* 
31.4 
83-87 
0.28* 
0.09 
67.9 
0.40* 
0.25* 
37.5 
88-92 
0.33* 
0.14 
57.6 
0.57* 
0.34* 
40.4 
all 
0.42* 
0.19* 
54.8 
0.51* 
0.26* 
49.0 
Note: * significant, p<0.05 
In Panel A of Table 3.2 the decrease in the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin 
is put to a statistical test. As might have been expected from the previous findings, a model of 
constant homogamy does not fit the data (Chi2=15.04; Df=6; p=0.02). In contrast, a model 
that states a linear trend in homogamy fits the data remarkably well (Chi2=1.98; Df=5; 
p=0.85). Apparently, the decrease in homogamy of social origin took place in a linear fashion. 
This confirms my predictions from the theory section; social origin has lost much of its 
relevance in mate selection processes after World War П. However, because I have not 
applied dual trait models for homogamy yet, this decrease may be artificial. In the sequel I will 
test upon this. 
This chapter's second question pertains to the trend in the single trait measure of 
educational homogamy. Did spouses' similarity with respect to educational level increase 
linearly in the Netherlands - as the prediction from modernization theory holds -, or did it 
increase only in the first decades after World War II - as the prediction from Bourdieu's 
(1979) theory of compensatory strategies holds? To answer this question, I present zero-order 
correlations among spouses' educations in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3. From these data a 
fluctuating trend can be observed; educational homogamy first increased (1947-1972), then 
decreased (1973-1977), increased (1978-1982), decreased (1983-1987), and finally increased 
(1988-1992). 
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The picture of trendless fluctuation in educational homogamy is confirmed by a statistical test 
of cohort differences (see Panel A of Table 3.2). Both a model of constant homogamy 
(Chi2=14.82; Df=6; p=0.02), and a linear trend model (Chi2 =11.91; Df=5; p=0.04) do not fit 
the data well. This rejects the prediction from modernization theory that postulates a linear 
increase in educational homogamy. Due to problems of convergence, a curvilinear trend model 
- the trend prediction from Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies - could not be fitted. 
Given the parameter estimates of Table 3.1 and the form of the trend in educational 
homogamy in Figure 3.3, a curvilinear trend model would not have achieved a high fit, 
however. Quite surprisingly, my trend findings also reject findings of earlier studies on 
educational homogamy in the Netherlands (Sixma and Ultee 1984; Dessens, Jansen and Ultee 
1990; Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits 1995). These findings pointed to a general decrease in 
educational homogamy after World War II. Why my findings did not show such a general 
decrease will be discussed in paragraph 3.7 in greater detail. 
Table 3.2 Fit of single and dual trait models for trends in homogamy of social origin and 
education; the Netherlands 1947-1992 
Models 
Df Ch¿ 
6 
5 
6 
5 
15.04 
1.98 
14.82 
11.91 
0.02 
0.85 
0.02 
0.04 
A SINGLE TRAIT MODELS 
Homogamy of social origin 
constant association 
linear trend 
Educational homogamy 
constant association 
linear trend 
В DUAL TRAIT MODELS 
Homogamy of social origin 
constant association 6 16.81 0.01 
linear trend 5 — 
Educational homogamy 
constant association 6 5.20 0.52 
linear trend 5 ^^ — 
Notes: Df is degrees of freedom, Chi2 is the Chi-square statistic; Due to problems of convergence linear 
trends in the dual trait measures were not estimated. 
3.6.2 Trends in Dual Trait Measures of Status Homogamy 
This article's third question pertains to the degree to which the observed trends in the single 
trait measures of homogamy of social origin and education are by-products. To answer this 
question, I compare findings of single trait analyses with findings of dual trait analyses. 
First, I discuss the estimates of residual correlation models for homogamy of social origin 
(see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3). From the figures in Table 3.1 one can see that over the full 
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period the residual correlation for spouses' social origins is equal to 0 19 (p<0 05) Compared 
with the zero-order correlation (0 42), the residual association is 55% smaller This means that 
about half of the association between spouses' social origins can be attributed to educational 
homogamy, reproduction and exchange-effects Stated differently, people marry as often 
homogamous with respect to social origins because of their preferences for similarity on this 
trait, as because of preferences for similarity on another trait, in particular educational 
attainment 
Table 3 3 Parameters of residual correlation models for (a) the association between spouses' 
social origins, and (b) the association between spouses' educations, the Netherlands 1947-
1992 
Parameter 
A SOCIAL ORIGIN 
reproduction men 
reproduction women 
exchange men 
exchange women 
В EDUCATION 
reproduction men 
reproduction women 
exchange men 
exchange women 
47-62 
0 15 
0 37* 
014 
0 34* 
0 15 
0 28* 
0 16 
021 
63-67 
0 23* 
0 45* 
0 08 
0 27* 
0 28* 
041* 
0 12 
0 14 
68-72 
031* 
0 44* 
0 25* 
0 22 
0 27* 
051* 
041* 
0 20* 
Cohort 
73-77 
0 33* 
0 43* 
021* 
0 22* 
0 33* 
044* 
0 26* 
0 19* 
78-82 
0 32* 
0 47* 
0 02 
0 13 
0 34* 
0 43* 
0 14 
0 14 
83 87 
051* 
0 02 
0 34* 
0 03 
0 46* 
0 10 
0 23* 
0 21 
88-92 
031* 
018 
0 33* 
017 
0 30* 
0 28* 
0 34* 
0 25* 
all 
031* 
0 36* 
021* 
0 22* 
0 32* 
0 37* 
0 26* 
0 23* 
Notes * significant, p<0 05, reproduction men is the association between husband's social origin and his 
education, exchange-effect men is the association between wife's social ongin and husband's education, 
vice versa for women 
Panel A of Table 3 3 shows the reproduction and exchange-effects of the residual correlation 
analysis both for men and women The effects are positively significant, which means that m 
general these effects cannot be ignored If I also consider the strong, positive zero-order 
association between spouses' educations (0 51, see also Table 3 1), I can explain why the 
overestimation of the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin is large, the positive 
parameters for educational homogamy, and the reproduction and exchange processes multiply 
to a strong by-product effect 
Notwithstanding the strong by-product effect, trends in the single and dual trait measure of 
homogamy of social origin appear to be similar Figure 3 3 shows a clear decrease in both 
measures A closer look at the figures reveals discrepancies between the two measures, 
however For example, between the third (1968-1972) and fourth marriage cohort (1973-
1977) the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin decreased firmly from 0 45 to 
0 36, but the dual trait measure only showed a small decrease from 0 15 to 0 12 A greater 
discrepancy occurred between the fourth (1973-1977) and fifth marriage cohort (1978-1982), 
the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin remained constant (0 36) but the dual 
trait measure showed a strong increase (from 0 12 to 0 21) These differences in the two types 
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of analysis indicate that for some periods trends in the single trait measure of homogamy of 
social origin are spurious by-products. 
In a statistical test, the dual trait measure of homogamy of social origin reveals fluctuation. 
Panel В of Table 3.2 shows that, similar to the results of single trait analysis, the dual trait 
measure of homogamy of social origin is not stable. A model of constant homogamy does not 
fit the data (Chi2=16.81; Df=6; p=0.01). Due to problems of convergence within LISREL, 
however, I could not test whether the dual trait measure of homogamy of social origin 
decreased in a linear fashion throughout the 1947-1992 period. Visual inspection of the 
cohort-specific residual correlations in Figure 3.3 do not point to a linear trend, though. It can 
be seen that the decrease in the dual trait measure of homogamy of social origin is due to a 
sharp fall in the residual correlation between the second (1963-1967) and third marriage 
cohort (1968-1972). In the other periods, homogamy of social origin remained fairly constant. 
Apparently, the earlier observed linear decrease in the single trait measure of homogamy of 
social origin concealed a trend that was not linear, but abrupt. In a very particular way then, 
the trend in homogamy of social origin proved spurious. 
Similar to homogamy of social origin, educational homogamy may be a by-product. To 
test this, I use the data from Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3 anew. From Table 3.1,1 observe a large 
over-estimation of educational homogamy. While the general zero-order association between 
spouses' educations is 0.51, the residual association is 0.26. That is, 49% of the single trait 
measure of educational homogamy may be attributed to homogamy of social origin and the 
associations between social origin and education. Just as similarity in social origin results from 
a match on educational level, similarity in education results from a match on social origin. 
In Figure 3.3, I compare the trends in the single and dual trait measures of educational 
homogamy. Again, these trends seem much alike; both the single and dual trait measures show 
trendless fluctuation in the Netherlands after World War II. Nevertheless, a closer look at the 
data reveals discrepancies. The largest difference takes place between the second (1963-1967) 
and third marriage cohort (1968-1972); in single trait analysis one can observe a strong 
increase in educational homogamy (from 0.43 to 0.64), while in dual trait analysis no 
substantial change occurred (from 0.27 to 0.28). A smaller difference in findings of the two 
types of analysis pertains to the fourth (1973-1977) and fifth cohort (1978-1982); in single 
trait analysis an increase of 22% (from 0.40 to 0.51) and in dual trait analysis an increase of 
56% (from 0.15 to 0.35). 
The finding for the period 1973-1982 of a weak increase in the single trait measure of 
educational homogamy and of a strong increase in the corresponding dual trait measure, may 
serve as an illustration as to why the two sorts of analysis can lead to different trends. In the 
1973-1982 period, the exchange-effects for both men and women decreased sharply (see also 
Table 3.3). Given relatively stable effects of intergenerational reproduction and homogamy of 
social origin, the decrease in exchange-effects has - according to the rules of path analysis (see 
Figure 3.2) - led to an expected decrease in the single trait measure of educational 
homogamy. Since the observed single trait measure of educational homogamy increased 
slightly in the 1973-1982 period (from 0.40 to 0.51), the residual correlation (or dual trait 
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measure) has increased to a much stronger degree (from 0.15 to 0.35) to offset the expected 
decrease in educational homogamy. Hence, the differences in trends between single and dual 
trait analyses have arisen. 
Panel В of Table 3.2 shows a statistical test of the trend in the dual trait measure of 
educational homogamy. The figures demonstrate that a model of constant association fits the 
data only just (Chi2=5.20; Df=6; p=0.52). Compared with the result of trendless fluctuation 
under single trait analysis, this finding is another proof of the by-product explanation. 
However, because the differences in model fit of the two types of analysis are not high one 
must attaching not too much weight to the differences in trend findings. Similarities between 
single and dual trait analysis continue to prevail. Both types of analysis have shown a decrease 
in homogamy of social origin and a trendless development of educational homogamy in the 
Netherlands after World War П. 
3.7 Conclusions and Discussion 
In this chapter I addressed questions on the role of social origin and education in mate 
selection in the Netherlands for marriage cohorts between 1947 and 1992. Analyses with 
single trait models showed that in the post-war period, homogamy of social origin decreased 
strongly (question 1), while educational homogamy fluctuated in a trendless way (question 2). 
Analyses with dual trait models for homogamy of social origin and education, at first sight 
demonstrated similar results (question 3). However, closer examination of successive marriage 
cohorts also revealed differences among the two types of analysis. For example, while the 
single trait measure of educational homogamy increased firmly in the 1963-1972 period, the 
corresponding dual trait measure remained stable. Furthermore, in single trait analysis the 
decrease in homogamy of social origin was linear, but in dual trait analysis the decrease in 
homogamy of social origin proved to be due to a sharp fall in the beginning of the seventies. 
The differences in the findings of single and dual trait analyses stress the need of 
multivariate models for the various types of status homogamy. At each point in time single 
trait models overestimate the degree to which spouses match on a single trait. In addition, for 
some periods dual trait analyses show that single trait trend findings are spurious by-products 
that conceal trends in 'real' preferences for status similarity. Notwithstanding these results, the 
dual trait models did not show a general trend reversal. The initial by-product hypothesis 
which holds that the observed decrease in the single trait measure of educational homogamy 
hides a stable or upward trend, cannot be confirmed. 
The first reason why the by-product hypothesis of a trend reversal did not apply to my data 
is that - in contradiction to earlier research on educational homogamy for the Netherlands -, I 
simply did not observe a general decrease in the single trait measure of educational 
homogamy, but trendless fluctuation. The contradiction problem of empirically a decrease and 
theoretically an expected increase in educational homogamy appeared to be a paradox. That 
my findings differ from other research findings on educational homogamy may seem odd, but 
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it is not. The differences are likely to be a matter of design. The general decrease in 
educational homogamy that was observed in earlier studies, was obtained from a comparison 
of all existing marriages among different survey years instead from a comparison of couples 
that enter the married population (marriage cohorts). The 'survey-design' produces more 
conservative estimates of homogamy than the 'cohort-design' because middle aged couples 
are represented in various survey years. Moreover, if changes occur in a survey comparison, 
they may not only be due to entry of newly married - as in a cohort comparison - but they may 
also be due to dropout of old couples in the married population. The initial decrease in 
educational homogamy between survey years 1959 and 1977 that was observed by Sixma and 
Ultee (1984) might have been due to such dropout, while educational homogamy of newly 
wed may in fact have remained stable. Likewise, the leveling of the decrease in educational 
homogamy between later survey years 1977 to 1990 may have been caused by the entry of 
newly wed that were much more homogamous than the average level of homogamy; this entry 
compensated the dropout of older, homogamous couples (for a more detailed discussion see 
also Chapter 7). In my study I found evidence of a trend towards stronger homogamy of the 
recently married. 
Even if I had found a trend towards less educational homogamy within my cohort design, I 
would not have expected this trend to be entirely spurious. In my data, homogamy of social 
origin showed a decrease, but the reproduction and exchange-effects did not show a uniform 
trend towards less association. All things being equal, this means that the degree to which the 
zero-order association between spouses' educations is a by-product, remained fairly constant 
during time. Therefore, as a second reason for the rejection of the by-product hypothesis, dual 
trait analyses did not show a general trend reversal of findings obtained from single trait 
analyses. Nevertheless, other data that do show unanimous trends in the processes affecting 
either type of status homogamy, may reveal trend reversals. Future research on status 
homogamy must therefore take into account the multivariate pattern of mate selection. 
The aforementioned findings can only partially confirm the predictions I derived from 
theories of stratification and additional assumptions of mate selection theories. Although the 
dual trait measure of homogamy of social origin demonstrated the expected decrease, this 
decrease was not linear but abrupt. The trend in homogamy of social origin showed a break in 
the early seventies. In this period homogamy of social origin decreased more strongly than in 
other periods. This break was also observed with respect to religious homogamy (Hendrickx 
et al 1991). Among Catholics, Reformed and Jews, the tendency to marry within the own 
denomination decreased strongly in the early seventies, and after this period the changes 
became more gradual (Ellemers 1980). Why both trends have occurred simultaneously is an 
important question for further research. An obvious explanation is that with the rapid 
expansion of the educational system during the seventies and the further development of the 
Dutch welfare state, younger persons have had less motivation, social pressure and 
opportunities to marry within their class of origin or within their denominational group. 
The trend in the dual trait measure of educational homogamy did not correspond to my 
predictions either. The prediction of a linear increase in educational homogamy that was 
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derived from modernization theory did not hold because a statistical test proved the trend not 
to be linear, and because the parameter estimates indicated that in some periods (early 
seventies and early eighties) educational homogamy decreased. The prediction from 
Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies that educational homogamy would first increase 
and then - during educational expansion - decrease, could also not be confirmed. Although in 
the early seventies and early eighties educational homogamy decreased, in the late seventies 
and late eighties it increased considerably despite continuous expansion of the educational 
system and increased chances of persons from lower social origin to enroll in higher education. 
Whether other strategies of social reproduction - such as homogamy with respect to cultural 
characteristics - function as compensatory strategy is a question for future research (see also 
Chapters 5 and 6). 
Although the aforementioned findings do not quite show the expected changes in 
homogamy of social origin and education, the two trend findings of my analyses point to a 
relative decline of social origin vis-a-vis education in mate selection in the Netherlands after 
World War II. Given the also declined tendency of religious endogamy in the Netherlands 
(Hendrickx, Lammers and Ultee 1991), I conclude a shift from ascribed to achieved 
characteristics in mate selection. Whereas just after World War II religion and social class 
origin determined the selection of a partner, nowadays education does. Contrary to what some 
may believe then, love has not become socially blind. 
4 SOCIAL ORIGIN AND EDUCATION IN MATE SELECTION: 15 
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
Abstract. In this chapter I examine the role of spouses' social origin and educations in mate selection of 
15 industrial countries during the twentieth century. My main research questions are (a) to what extent 
cross-national and cross-temporal variations in the single trait parameters of homogamy of social origin 
and education are by-products, (b) to what extent the observed marriage patterns can be accounted for by 
traditional notions from mobility research such as the level of industrialization and the type of political 
regime, and (c) to what extent hypotheses derived from an individual-level framework fare better in 
explaining the observed marriage patterns. To answer these questions I use data on spouses' social origin 
and educations from surveys of 15 industrial countries and create six birth cohorts between 1900-1960. 
Descriptive analyses show that single trait analysis overestimate the degree of status homogamy and 
demonstrate that in some periods and countries trend findings from single and dual trait analysis differ. 
Explanatory analyses show that the observed marriage patterns (decreased homogamy of social origin and 
stable educational homogamy) can best be explained by the more refined hypotheses of mate selection, in 
particular by the decreased gender differences in educational attainment 
4.1 Introduction' 
Since long scholars of social stratification have debated over the question whether chances of 
social mobility increase in industrial societies of the twentieth century, or whether these 
chances have remained stable. Findings of recent loglinear analyses cannot solve the issue. 
Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman (1989) showed in a large-scale comparison of 149 national 
mobility tables from 35 countries that intergenerational occupational mobility increased in a 
linear fashion after World War Π. Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) contend this finding of 
increased mobility, and Wong (1994) demonstrated in a reanalysis of Ganzeboom, Luijkx and 
Treiman's data to current and first jobs that only four countries show a linear increase in 
mobility rates (Wong 1994). 
In this chapter I do not want to make contributions to the debate on intergenerational 
mobility, but I want to question findings about another indicator of the openness a society's 
stratification system: the amount to which people marry persons with similar education levels, 
also termed educational homogamy. With regard to this indicator, a large-scale study of 
marriage tables of 23 industrial nations demonstrated that the chances to marry someone of 
similar education decreased after World War II: increasingly persons prefer to marry someone 
of dissimilar educational level. At first sight, this finding seems to be line with increased 
intergenerational social mobility: both processes suggest a trend towards more openness in 
stratification systems of contemporary industrial societies. On second thoughts, however, the 
finding of a world-wide decrease in educational homogamy is surprising. It is theoretically 
unexpected and methodologically weak. 
1
 A recent version of this chapter - of which the second author is Wout Ultee - was submitted for publication in 
Research in Social Stratification and Mobility (September 1995). 
58 Chapter 4 
Theoretically, there are good reasons to expect an increase instead of the observed decrease in 
educational homogamy. This is firstly so since within labor markets education has become a 
more important determinant for occupational success than social origin. If marriage candidates 
are rational in the sense that they want to marry a partner with good financial prospects, the 
shift from ascriptive to achievement-based mechanisms of allocation within labor markets 
would lead to a corresponding shift within marriage markets (Kalmijn 1991a). Persons would 
pay less attention to marrying someone of high social origin and more attention to marrying 
someone with high education. Inevitably, this tendency would lead to stronger educational 
homogamy because higher educated will choose among each other and consequently lower 
educated will do also. A second reason for increasing educational homogamy may be the 
decreased gender gap in education, occupation and earnings. Whereas in the past the selection 
of a mate often was asymmetric in the sense that male persons with good financial prospects 
married females with other attractive properties, nowadays - in times in which many women 
also have attractive financial prospects - the selection of mate is more symmetric because men 
more frequently consider economically attractive wives for marriage (Oppenheimer 1988). 
Third and finally, educational homogamy is likely to increase in modem societies due to 
educational expansion and longer school careers. Because of this development not only 
chances to meet similarly educated have increased, but also the chances of school friendships 
to last until marriage have become greater because the time interval between leaving school 
and entering wedlock narrowed (Mare 1991). 
Methodologically, the finding of a world-wide decline in educational homogamy is weak. It 
was obtained from bivariate, single trait models in which only the association between 
spouses' educations was modeled. More complex, multivariate models in which several related 
traits are assessed simultaneously can show that weaker educational homogamy can be 
accounted for by other processes involved in mate selection. One such process is the 
decreased role of social origin. Given the interconnected role of social origin and education in 
stratified societies, a development of decreasing homogamy of social origin may a priori have 
produced a weaker association between spouses' educations. In terms of path-analysis: if χ 
and y are positively associated variables, a decline in χ will produce a decline in y. Net of the 
influence of x, however, y may have remained stable or it may have increased slightly. In other 
words: independent of spouses' social origins, the decrease in the single trait measure of 
educational homogamy may show up to be insignificant or it may show a slight increase. In 
that case the initial decrease in educational homogamy is spurious and a 'by-product' of 
decreased homogamy of social origin (Blau and Duncan 1967: 358). 
4.2 Research Questions 
To test the tenability of the abovementioned trend predictions and by-product explanation of a 
spurious trend in educational homogamy, this chapter first reassesses trends in educational 
homogamy. I do so by comparing trend findings from single with trend findings from dual trait 
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analysis of homogamy of social origin and education. Such a comparison can demonstrate that 
the earlier observed world-wide trend towards decreasing educational homogamy is a spurious 
by-product of decreased homogamy of social origin and weaker associations between origin 
and educational attainment. In addition, it can show that net of spouses' social origins the 
tendency to match on a similar level of education has increased. Such a finding would be more 
in conformity with theoretical arguments on developments in educational homogamy than the 
earlier observed trend towards less educational homogamy. I apply the single and dual trait 
models to data from 15 industrial countries. Unfortunately, a reanalysis of Ultee and Luijkx' 
(1990) data on educational homogamy in 23 industrial countries is not possible since most of 
the data Ultee and Luijkx used do not contain information on spouses' social origins. 
Comparison of my results with Ultee and Luijkx' findings is therefore limited. 
A second aim of this chapter is to reassess the effects of macro-factors on educational 
homogamy. In their comparative study, Ultee and Luijkx found that industrialization - as 
measured by the number of telephones - and a longer period of state-socialist government 
make for less educational homogamy. I test whether these findings also hold after dual trait 
analyses, or whether these factors make for more educational homogamy as more refined 
theories of mate selection would point to. In addition, I test whether social-democracy, which 
had no overall effect on educational homogamy, has an effect once spouses' social origins are 
taken into account. To examine the possibly different effects of these macro-factors in single 
or in dual trait analyses, I regress the single and dual trait parameters of status homogamy that 
I obtained from individual-level analysis, in a second step of my analyses for each country and 
time period on the level of industrialization, state-socialism, and social-democracy. 
A third aim of this chapter is to go beyond an explanation that points to industrialization 
and political regime as explanatory factors for patterns of status homogamy, and to provide a 
more refined explanation as to why industrialization, social-democracy and state-socialism 
affect these patterns. Ultee and Luijkx (1990) applied notions from mobility research to 
account for cross-national and cross-temporal differences in educational homogamy and 
hypothesized that industrialization makes for less educational homogamy, just as it makes for 
weaker transfer of intergenerational status. I want to improve upon such a straightforward 
extrapolation of research findings by hypothesizing that industrialization is not one clear-cut 
process that influences status homogamy in one way, but in several, sometimes opposite ways. 
The greater role of education for job selection within labor markets that accompanied 
industrialization, for example, may have increased educational homogamy, but urbanization -
another process of industrialization - may have decreased this tendency. To account for the 
effects of industrialization and political regime, I review the influence of five 'more specific' 
indicators of industrialization and political regime on the degree of homogamy of social origin 
and education. These more specific indicators are: (a) the shift from 'ascription' to 
'achievement' values within labor markets, (b) urbanization, (c) educational expansion, (d) 
decreased gender-inequality, and (e) selection of students for secondary education at a late 
age. In sum, the research questions of this chapter are as follows: 
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(1) To what extent are cross-national and cross-temporal differences in homogamy of 
social origin and education by-products, and to what extent do dual trait analyses 
lead to other findings than single trait analyses of the two types of status homogamy? 
(2) To what extent can cross-national and historical variations in homogamy of social 
origin and education be accounted for by traditional indicators of industrialization 
and political regime - such as the number of telephones and the length of social-
democracy or state-socialism -, and to what extent do effects of these traditional 
indicators differ among single and dual trait models for status homogamy? 
(3) To what extent can cross-national and historical variations in homogamy of social 
origin and education be accounted for by more specific indicators of industrialization 
and political regime - such as the shift from 'ascription' to 'achievement' values 
within labor markets, urbanization, educational expansion, decreased gender-
inequality, and selection of students for secondary education at a late age -, and to 
what extent do these more specific indicators fare better than traditional indicators of 
industrialization and political regime? 
To answer the research questions, the next paragraph (4.3) formulates hypotheses on cross-
national and historical differences in status homogamy. Paragraph 4.4 presents the data and 
paragraph 4.5 addresses the models, among which the single and dual trait models of status 
homogamy. Paragraph 4.6 shows descriptive results using both models and paragraph 4.7 tests 
the hypotheses. The final paragraph (4.8) ends with conclusions and a discussion of the thesis 
that general societal openness is increasing. 
4.3 Hypotheses 
Why are some countries or time periods characterized by a higher degree of status homogamy 
than other countries or time periods? A simple and straightforward answer is given by 
researchers of social stratification. They argue that since social mobility and educational 
homogamy are indicators of societal openness, the factors that make for weaker transfer of 
status between generations must also make for weaker educational homogamy. In particular, 
stronger industrialization and a longer period of social-democracy or state-socialism should 
make for less educational homogamy since these factors also made for weaker 
intergenerational reproduction (Lipset and Zetterberg 1956; Heath 1981). I regard these 
traditional statements on the effects of industrialization, social-democracy and state-socialism 
on status homogamy as my initial hypotheses. They hold: 
INDUSTRIALIZATION HYPOTHESIS: In countries or time periods with a high level of 
industrialization, homogamy of social origin and education will be lower than in countries or 
time periods with a low level of industrialization. 
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SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY HYPOTHESIS: In countries or time periods with a social-democratic 
government, homogamy of social origin and education will be lower than in countries that 
are not ruled by a social-democratic government. 
STATE-SOCIALISM HYPOTHESIS: In countries or time periods with state-socialism, homogamy 
of social origin and education will be lower than in countries that do not know state-
socialism. 
A more complex answer to the question as to why countries or time periods differ in their 
extent of status homogamy, is an answer that rivals the traditional notions from mobility 
research. According to this more complex explanation, a mechanical application of ideas from 
a related field of research may sometimes confuse more than clarify. Industrialization is not 
one clear-cut process, but is a catch-all term in which several processes like rationalization, 
urbanization, or increasing scale of education play a role (Goode 1964). These underlying 
processes may differentially affect the matching of spouses. Rationalization of production 
processes, for example, may have increased educational homogamy by shifting people's 
preferences towards a stronger emphasis on educational attainment, but urbanization may have 
decreased educational homogamy by reducing chances of people to live in (educationally) 
homogeneous neighborhoods. Various processes of industrialization may hence affect 
educational homogamy in opposite ways. The same drawbacks pertain to the influence of 
social-democracy and state-socialism on educational homogamy. What is it in a society's 
government that makes people change the way they choose partners? 
To answer this more complex question, I need to go into more detail and review the 
consequences that the different industrialization processes and political factors have for status 
homogamy. In doing so, I make use of ideas from mate selection theories and assume three 
micro-level factors to be important in the matching of spouses (Kalmijn 1991a): (a) the 
preferences of potential mates, (b) the opportunities of potential spouses to meet, to date and 
to get married, and (b) the social barriers involved in the mate selection process. Distinction 
of these micro-level factors is important in deriving new hypotheses since they point to 
substantially different mechanisms at the marriage market. Let me now consider the new, 
'extended' hypotheses. 
ACHIEVEMENT HYPOTHESIS 
First, I review the rationalization process by which I refer to the increasing role of technology 
in production processes. As Kerr's version of modernization theory holds, with rationalization 
of the industry recruitment of persons on the labor market shifts from selection on the basis of 
'ascriptive' values - such as class of origin, gender or race - to selection based on what people 
achieve by own efforts, notably their educational attainment (Kerr et al. 1960). If one assumes 
people to maximize their utility in terms of (household) status and income, I expect 
prospective spouses to increasingly desire higher educated mates. The shift from ascription to 
achievement will alter people's preferences on the marriage market: potential spouses will 
attach less weight to marrying someone of high social origin and more weight to marrying 
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someone of high education. Given the fact that a higher weight to marrying someone of high 
social status will lead to increased homogamy (the higher social strata will choose among 
themselves), I expect that: 
In countries or time periods with a strong emphasis on education for recruiting people on 
labor markets, homogamy of social origin will be lower and educational homogamy will be 
higher than in countries or time periods with a weak emphasis on education. 
URBANIZATION HYPOTHESIS 
Second, I consider the process of urbanization. This process that accompanied most 
industrializing countries of the twentieth century, may have affected the opportunities for 
people to marry and the social barriers they face when doing so. When moving away from 
small communities, persons grow up in areas that are less homogenous with respect to social 
class and education. This creates opportunities for social mixing. Furthermore, in large cities 
parents have fewer possibilities than in small communities to exert influence on the people 
their children meet. Children often go to school in another neighborhood than the one they live 
in. Given the increased opportunities to meet people of different status and weaker social 
barriers for mixed marriage, I expect that: 
In countries or time periods with strong urbanization, both homogamy of social origin and 
education will be lower than in countries or time periods with weak urbanization. 
SCHOOLING HYPOTHESIS 
Third, I consider the general increase in amount of schooling that has attended 
industrialization. All over the world educational systems have expanded, resulting in higher 
proportions of people participating in regular schooling and on average longer school careers. 
This development would affect both the barriers against and the opportunities for certain 
types of marriages. Longer school careers decrease the likelihood of others to interfere since 
children spend more time away from their parents. This weaker social pressure would decrease 
homogamy of social origin. Furthermore, longer school careers affect the opportunities to 
meet similarly educated persons. Extended education does not only do so in a trivial way by 
increasing the likelihood of finding a similarly educated partner - for which I hold constant -, 
but it also does so in a substantively interesting way. According to Mare (1991), longer school 
careers decrease the time gap between leaving school and entering wedlock, and increase the 
likelihood that ties existing during schooltime persist in the period people usually marry. If the 
age at marriage increases less than the school leaving age, longer school careers will promote 
educational homogamy. Hence, I expect that: 
In countries or time periods with long school careers, homogamy of social origin is lower 
and educational homogamy is higher than in countries or time periods with short school 
careers. 
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GENDER-EQUALITY HYPOTHESIS 
Fourth and finally, I consider the increased educational equality between men and women. 
This process that occurred in most industrial societies of the twentieth century, may have 
affected people's preferences in mate selection. According to the gender-equality hypothesis, 
preferences in mate selection became more symmetric. While in the past men valued women 
primarily on their beauty, fertility and cultural status and women valued men on their 
economic resources, nowadays - with more equal gender stratification - men also pay attention 
to women's economic potential. Under more equal divisions of scarce goods between the two 
genders, competition for economic resources in the marriage market will increase 
(Oppenheimer 1988). If I assume education to be a strong determinant of economic status and 
social origin a decreasingly weaker determinant, I expect that: 
In countries or time periods with weak educational differences between men and women, 
educational homogamy is higher than in countries or time periods with high educational 
differences between the two genders. 
LATE-SELECTION HYPOTHESIS 
Next to industrialization, a nation's politics may affect the degree of status homogamy. It may 
create barriers or opportunities for social mixing. Well-known barriers are laws on 
intermarriage, such as laws prohibiting marriage between blacks and whites or between 
Catholics and Jews. In the early and later phases of industrialization, however, no such laws 
existed for educational intermarriage or for marriage between people of different social 
origins. Politics may also affect marital patterns more indirectly by way of government policies 
inadvertently creating opportunities for social mixing. One such policy is the abolition of early 
streaming in education and the introduction of comprehensive schooling. In comprehensive 
school systems students are selected for higher and lower types of secondary education at a 
later age than in other systems. Ford (1969) pointed out that selection according to ability at a 
late age creates school classes that are more heterogeneous with respect to social origin and 
final educational attainment. If in such classes friendships arise and hold throughout 
marriageable age, selection in school systems at a late age leads to less homogamy of social 
origin and education than selection at an early age. Hence, I expect that: 
In countries or time periods with selection of students for secondary education at a late age, 
homogamy of social origin and education will be lower than in countries or time periods with 
selection at an early age. 
Table 4.1 lists the traditional macro-hypotheses on industrialization, social-democracy and 
state-socialism and summarizes the predictions derived from individual notions on preferences, 
opportunities and barriers headed under the extended macro-hypotheses. When I contrast the 
new, and more specific macro-hypotheses with the traditional macro-hypotheses from mobility 
research, I observe important differences. Contrary to the notions from mobility research, 
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several of my systematically derived hypotheses - the achievement, the urbanization and 
gender-equality hypotheses - predict more educational homogamy as industrialization 
proceeds. Another process accompanying industrialization, the process of urbanization, has 
the opposite effect: it diminishes educational homogamy. More systematic derivation of 
hypotheses therefore leads to a refinement of the initial predictions from mobility research. 
The new macro-hypotheses may also show that a zero association between industrialization 
and politics on the one hand and measures of homogamy on the other hand, may be due to 
counterbalancing effects of various industrialization processes. 
Table 4.1 Traditional and extended macro-hypotheses on the effects of industrialization and 
left politics on status homogamy 
Hypotheses Homogamy of social Educational homogamy 
origin 
TRADITIONAL MACRO-HYPOTHESES 
industrialization 
social-democracy 
state-socialism 
EXTENDED MACRO-HYPOTHESES 
achievement 
urbanization 
schooling 
gender-equality a 
late-selection ^ 
Note: a means no hypothesis stated 
4.4 Data and Research Design 
To estimate patterns of homogamy of social origin and education, I use information on 
spouses' educations and social origins from the ongoing project on comparative social 
stratification and mobility research (Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman 1989). In this project, 
data on people's social origins and destinations are obtained from as many surveys of as many 
countries as possible. Of the surveys, 19 contain useful information on educational attainment 
and social origin of both husbands and wives. They amount to 15 industrial countries of the 
twentieth century. Among the countries are advanced industrial societies such as the United 
States and England, countries with a social-democratic government such as Sweden and 
Finland, and countries that had a socialist regime such as Bulgaria and the former Soviet 
Union. Table B.l of Appendix В of this study lists the sources of the data. 
I apply a country-cohort design to assess trends and cross-national variations in 
homogamy. That is, for each country I stack the appropriate data files and construct cohorts. 
These cohorts are based on year of birth, not on year of marriage. The reason for this second 
best choice is that about half of our data sets lacks information on year of marriage, while at 
the same time all data files contain information on year of birth of the primary respondent. I 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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think that this will not introduce much bias since the average year of marriage does not vary 
strongly in time and correlates highly with year of birth. 
Table 4.2 Design of the study: number of couples per country and cohort 
Country Birth cohort 
AUS 
BUL 
CSK 
DEN 
ENG 
FIN 
HUN 
ΓΤΑ 
JAP 
MAL 
NET 
NOR 
RUS 
SWE 
USA 
all 
00-09 
290 
— 
— 
— 
327 
— 
840 
— 
776 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
4783 
7016 
10-19 
1223 
— 
— 
154 
1875 
122 
4504 
— 
924 
... 
— 
147 
— 
152 
1063 
1973 
20-29 
1896 
144 
218 
186 
2136 
148 
9660 
645 
936 
— 
342 
185 
— 
187 
12762 
29445 
30-39 
1911 
775 
1243 
160 
2009 
148 
9693 
838 
— 
358 
574 
169 
523 
164 
10160 
28725 
40-49 
1035 
926 
1698 
168 
1580 
132 
9391 
893 
— 
464 
865 
161 
565 
158 
6749 
24785 
50-59 
154 
901 
2043 
— 
— 
— 
3714 
729 
— 
— 
807 
— 
923 
— 
... 
9271 
all 
6509 
2746 
5202 
668 
7927 
550 
37802 
3105 
2636 
822 
2588 
662 
2011 
661 
45085 
118974 
Table 4.2 lists the country-cohort design. It shows the number of married couples for each 
combination of country and cohort. For practical reasons, I use six birth cohorts of each ten 
years ranging from birth year 1900 to birth year 1960.1 restrict the analysis to married couples 
aged 25-65.2 Furthermore, couples in which the primary respondent was bom in a country-
cohort of less than 100 pairs were omitted from the analyses. These restrictions leave me with 
62 of (6 χ 15=) 90 possible combinations of country and cohort, and with 118,974 of the 
original 138,645 couples (85.8% of all cases). 
For each cell in the country-cohort table I computed the 'dependent variables' - the degree 
of educational homogamy and homogamy of social origin -, and the 'independent variables' 
relating to industrialization and a nation's left politics. These variables will be discussed below. 
4.4.1 Dependent Variables 
Spouses' social origins were measured by father's occupation and father-in-law's occupation. 
Other information, on for example father's or mother's education, was not widely available. 
2
 Cohabitatmg couples were not considered because they were not uniformly coded in the surveys I used, and 
because they comprise only a small percentage of all existing pairs The age restriction of 25 was chosen because 
most persons of that age finished their education The age restriction of 65 was chosen because older people may 
give biased answers to retrospective questions and because older cohorts may suffer from selective attrition (see 
also Chapter 7). 
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For the classification of occupations I used the International Socio-Economie Index of 
Occupational Status (ISEI; Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Treiman 1992). This occupational scale 
has the advantage that it is of a continuous character (see also the model section) while 
corresponding highly with an important categorical approach to measuring occupation, the 
EGP-scheme (Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portecarero 1979). The ISEI scores were computed 
by converting detailed local occupation scores to the International Standard Classifications of 
Occupations (ISCO; Treiman 1977) and by subsequently converting this scale into ISEI.3 
Spouses' educations were recoded into years of education up to the highest educational 
level attained.4 I did not choose a classification into a few levels of education since the 
different national classifications of education made it difficult to construct a uniform typology. 
In addition, such a typology would cause a loss of valuable information since I would have to 
collapse educational categories. 
4.4.2 Independent Variables 
In the sequel I shortly describe the 'independent' variables of my explanatory analyses of 
status homogamy. The values of these variables are listed for each country and cohort in Table 
B.2 of Appendix В. 
INDUSTRIALIZATION 
As in previous research I use the number of telephones per 1000 inhabitants as indicator of the 
level of industrialization in each combination of country and cohort (Ultee and Luijkx 1990). 
Because most people meet in their early twenties, industrialization was computed as the 
average proportion of telephones for each birth cohort plus 20 years. Birth cohort 1900-1909, 
for example, refers to the average industrialization for the 1920-1929 period. Data were 
obtained from Bank's Cross-National Time Series 1815-1973 (Banks 1976). 
SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY 
Social-democracy was assessed by the years a social-democratic government headed a country 
in a birth cohort plus 20 years. A year of coalition between a social-democratic party and a 
party to its right was counted as half a year. After inspection of the data, it was recoded into 0 
'never social-democracy', 1 'less than 5 years of social-democracy', and 3 'five years social-
democracy or more'. Data were obtained from De Swaan (1973) and the Political Handbook 
of the World (Banks 1995). 
3
 Some surveys do nol contain a measure of father's or father-in-law's occupation at the time the respondent was in 
his or her childhood. However, they do contain information on father's or father-in-law's occupation at a later stage 
m life. I think that this time lag will not introduce much bias in the measures of status homogamy, because most job 
changes occur at an early stage of (fathers') careers. 
4
 A better estimate of the role of education in partner selection would be the education at ame of marriage. The 
highest education that people attain in Ufe does not cause serious problems, however, because most people left 
school when they marry. 
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SOCIALISM 
Socialism was assessed by the years a socialist regime headed a country in a birth cohort plus 
20 years. After scrutinizing the data, it was recoded into a dummy variable indicating whether 
a country ever had a period of state-socialism (1) or not (0). Data were obtained from national 
encyclopedias. 
ACHIEVEMENT 
The relative influence of educational attainment within labor markets, dubbed 'achievement', 
was computed from my stacked data file. It is assessed by regressing for each combination of 
country and cohort, male's occupation - also scaled in ISEI - on male's father's occupation 
and male's educational attainment (coded as before). For each data point, achievement is the 
standardized regression coefficient of occupation on education minus the standardized 
regression coefficient of occupation on father's occupation. This variable was not assessed for 
females since many women did not have paid occupation at the time of the interview. 
Furthermore, because achievement was obtained from the same file as the dependent variables, 
I smoothed it for each country using a second order polynomial. 
URBANIZATION 
Urbanization is computed as the percentage of the total population living in cities of 100,000 
persons or more. Similar to the measure of industrialization, it is averaged for each birth 
cohort plus 20 years. Data were also obtained from Banks (1976). 
SCHOOLING 
The amount of schooling was computed from my stacked data file as the average years of 
education for men and women in each birth cohort of each country. This variable was also 
smoothed using a second-order polynomial. 
GENDER-EQUALITY 
Educational equality between men and women was computed from my stacked data file by 
subtracting in each country-cohort combination, the average years of schooling for husbands 
by the average years of schooling for wives. For easy interpretation I multiplied this difference 
by -1 . A zero score means perfect gender-equality, while a negative score indicates that men 
on average have higher education than women. This variable was also smoothed using a 
second-order polynomial. 
LATE-SELECTION 
Information on selection of students for ability at secondary school at an early or late age was 
obtained from Ultee and Luijkx (1990) and sections of a country's encyclopedia. Early 
selection - selection at age 12 - was recoded as 0, late selection - selection at a later age than 
12 years - recoded as 1. To compute it for the different birth cohorts, I added 12 years to each 
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birth cohort and assessed whether at the corresponding age students were selected for 
secondary schools (0) or whether they were selected at a later age (1). 
4.5 Models 
A wide range of statistical models has been applied to assess (status) homogamy. From the 
late eighties onwards, most studies have used loglinear models. These models have advantages 
over earlier models of homogamy, because they take into account the marginal distributions of 
spouses' characteristics more accurately (see also Chapter 1). In addition, loglinear models 
allow for specification of multiple parameters for the association in a contingency table (Hout 
1983). Although appropriate for the analysis of single traits, the loglinear models are not 
useful for multivariate purposes. Multivariate loglinear models make use of large contingency 
tables and consequently require data sets with a large number of cases. This limits the analysis 
of educational homogamy and homogamy of social origin severely, since large data sets with 
information on spouses' social origins and educations are available only for England, Hungary, 
and the United States. 
Alternatively, I use Pearson correlation models to compute status homogamy. These 
models assume a linear relationship between characteristics of spouses. Although they are less 
efficient than loglinear models, the Pearson correlation models also take into account the 
marginal distributions by adjusting for the mean and standard deviation of spouses' educations 
and social origins. They hence give an indication of the attraction between men and women, 
irrespective of the availability of potential mates.5 The specific advantage of the Pearson 
correlation models for status homogamy over loglinear models is that the correlation models 
require data sets that are much smaller in size (only the covariance matrix is used). As a 
consequence, a large-scale comparison of multivariate homogamy parameters can be achieved. 
In single trait models, the homogamy measures are computed as zero-order correlations, 
either between spouses' educations or between spouses' social origins. In dual trait models, 
the parameters for homogamy are obtained by taking into account both spouses' educations 
and social origins. The dual trait parameters for homogamy are computed as residual 
correlations. Figure 4.1 illustrates the residual correlation models of educational homogamy 
(Panel A) and homogamy of social origin (Panel B) for two fictive cohorts. The residual 
correlations in these examples can be computed as the difference between the observed and 
expected correlation. Numerically this can be illustrated as follows: assume that the observed 
zero-order correlation between spouses' educations is 0.50; further compute from the fictive 
parameters of Figure 4.1 the expected correlation between spouses' educations in the old 
cohort by rules of path algebra as the sum of four paths, (0.70 χ 0.40 0.40) + (1 χ 0.40 χ 
' Provided characteristics of husbands and wives are not distributed very skewly among the two genders - an 
assumption which my data can meet - Pearson correlations correspond to association parameters of loglinear models 
of uniform association (sec also Chapter 7). 
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0.20) + (1 x 0.20 x 0.40) + (0.70 χ 0.20 χ 0.20) = 0.30; the residual correlation is in this 
situation (0.50 - 0.30 =) 0.20. Similarly, I can compute the residual association between 
spouses' educations for the young cohort. If I assume the zero-order correlation between 
spouses' educations to have remained constant (0.50), the residual correlation for the young 
adults is (0.50 - 0.22 =) 0.28. What can be observed then, is that in single trait analysis 
educational homogamy is stable (0.50), while in dual trait analysis educational homogamy 
increases (from 0.20 to 0.28). In other words, a trend towards stronger preferences for 
educational homogamy was rendered invisible in single trait analysis. Panel В also shows such 
a situation for homogamy of social origin: if the zero-order association is stable, the residual 
correlation declines. 
A. Educational homogamy 
Young cohort 
03 
B. Homogamy of social origin 
Old cohort Young cohort 
0.3 0.7 
Figure 4.1 Fictive parameters of residual correlation models for (a) 
educational homogamy, and (b) homogamy of social origin 
With the use of residual correlation models, I follow the lead of Warren (1966) and Blau and 
Duncan (1967). These researchers calculated the zero-order correlation among spouses' social 
origins, and compared this to the residual correlation among spouses' educations once 
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spouses' educations were controlled. They found for the United States that while the zero-
order correlation was approximately 0.30, the partial association dropped to 0.20. One third of 
the association between spouses' social origins could be attributed to educational homogamy 
and the associations between education and social origin. 
In a second step of my analyses, I will relate the cross-national and cross-temporal 
differences in the single and dual trait parameters of status homogamy to explanatory factors 
such as industrialization and socialism. That is, I regress the observed homogamy parameters 
on the 'independent variables' for all combinations of countries and cohorts. In doing so, I do 
not make use of common regression techniques such as Ordinary Least Squares. OLS 
estimation can produce inefficient estimates and standard errors because the residual errors 
from pooled regression can be dependent on cross-section ('heteroscedastic') or dependent on 
time ('auto-regressive'). To take these disturbances into account, I use Random Coefficient 
Models instead (Sayrs 1989). These models assume that the analytical units - countries and 
cohorts - form a random sample of a population of all countries and cohorts, normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance σ2. Random Coefficient Models utilize the 
information contained in the covariance structure to derive unbiased and efficient estimates for 
the pooled time series. They do so by estimating random error in time, random error in space, 
and random error not unique to time or space but still random to the regression model. I do 
not consider another pooled time series model such as the Least Squares Dummy Variables 
(LSDV) model, because this model introduces dummies for each country and cohort. This 
produces unstable and inefficient estimates and standard errors when the sample size is small, 
as is the case with my sample of 62 country-cohort combinations. 
4.6 Results: Descriptive Analyses 
Having discussed this chapter's data and models, I proceed with the analysis of homogamy of 
social origin and education in 15 industrialized countries of the twentieth century. I empirically 
answer this chapter's first question regarding the degree of cross-national and historical 
variations in homogamy of social origin and education. First, I review results of single trait 
analysis (paragraph 4.6.1), then I explore results of dual trait analyses (paragraph 4.6.2). 
4.6.1 Trends in Single Trait Measures of Status Homogamy 
HOMOGAMY OF SOCIAL ORIGIN 
Panel A of Table 4.3 lists zero-order correlations among spouses' social origins for each 
combination of country and cohort, and Figure 4.2 displays the trend in the single trait 
measure of homogamy of social origin per country graphically. 
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From the data in Table 4 3 and Figure 4 2, four general observations can be made First, as the 
positive parameters indicate, spouses have a tendency to marry within rather than across their 
class of social origin In general, the parameter of homogamy of social origin is 0 30 (p< 10) 
Second, there seems to be considerable between-country variation in homogamy of social 
origin In some countries - for example, Hungary and Italy (around 0 40) - homogamy of 
social origin is almost twice as large as in other countries - for example, Australia and Bulgaria 
Table 4 3 Single and dual trait measures of the association between spouses ' social origins 
per country and cohort. 15 industrial countries of the twentieth century 
Country Birth cohort 
00-09 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 all 
A SINGLE TRAIT MEASURE 
AUS 
BUL 
CSK 
DEN 
ENG 
FIN 
HUN 
ITA 
JAP 
MAL 
NET 
NOR 
RUS 
SWE 
USA 
Total 
В D U A L TRAIT MEASURE 
AUS 
BUL 
CSK 
DEN 
ENG 
FIN 
HUN 
ΠΑ 
JAP 
MAL 
NET 
NOR 
RUS 
SWE 
USA 
all 
0 160 
0213 
0 479 
0 309 
0 333 
0 299 
0 297 
0 253 
0 259 
0 225 
0 443 
0319 
0313 
0 404 
0 302 
0312 
0 245 
0 101 
0 374 
0251 
0 274 
0 291 
0417 
0 457 
0 332 
0 380 
0 238 
0 233 
0313 
0 301 
0 266 
0 108a 
0 245 
0 357 
0 250 
0 309 
0 323 
0 460 
0 362 
0 385 
0 289 
0 260 
0 260 
0 322 
0 300 
0 231 
0 317 
0 247 
0 278 
0 246 
0 227 
0 342 
0419 
0 369 
0 273 
0 305 
0 280 
0 271 
0 295 
0 293 
0 149 
0 251 
0 239 
0314 
0 322 
0 237 
0 266 
0 254 
0 225 
0194 
0 276 
0 285 
0 248 
0 263 
0 386 
0415 
0 320 
0 366 
0319 
0 286 
0 269 
0 292 
0 313 
0 295 
0 056' 
0 098' 
0218 
0 126 
0 181 
0136 
0 165 
0 152 
0117 
0218 
0 195 
0 126 
0 120" 
0 178 
0 137 
0 156 
0 148 
0 098* 
0 234 
0 107" 
0 134 
0 134' 
0217 
0 144 
Olli 
0180 
0 115' 
0 091' 
0 155 
0144 
0151 
0 026* 
0131 
0 152 
Olli 
0 188 
0 171 
0161 
0 253 
0 241 
0 191 
0 160* 
0 097* 
0 149 
0 156 
0 121 
0 214 
0 135 
0 185 
0 107 
0 122 
0 160 
0 142 
0 228 
0 170 
0 239 
0 154 
0Π7' 
0 121 
0 160 
0 115' 
0 056' 
0 102 
0 159 
0 123 
0 139 
0151 
0121 
0126 
0 099 
0151 
0149 
0113 
0166 
0187 
0143 
0121 
0241 
0183 
0166 
0155 
0126 
0 155 
0149 
Note a indicates non-significance, p>0 05 
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A U S BUL CSK 
DEN ENO 
HUN ITA JAP 
MAL NET NOR 
RUS SWE «τ USA 
Figure 4.2 Trends in single trait (solid lines) and dual trait measures (dotted) for homogamy 
of social origin (lower lines) and education (upper lines) by country 
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(around 0.20). Third, homogamy of social origin seems to vary among cohorts. Between the 
first (1900-1919) and second birth cohort (1910-1919) homogamy slightly increased (from 
0.30 to 0.31), but thereafter it showed a steady decrease (from 0.31 in birth cohort 1910-1919 
to 0.25 in birth cohort 1950-1959). The fourth remark is that some countries deviate from this 
picture of an overall decrease in homogamy of social origin. England and the former Soviet 
Union, for example, show stability, while Bulgaria and Denmark demonstrate an increase. 
Table 4.4 Test of differences in fit of regression models of country and cohort variation in the 
single and dual trait measures of homogamy of social origin and education: 15 industrial 
countries of the twentieth century 
Tes 
A 
В 
С 
D 
¡t of models 
SINGLE TRAIT MEASURE: SOCIAL ORIGIN 
(1) country versus no variation 
(2) cohort versus (1) 
(3) linear trend versus (1) 
(4) curvilinear trend versus (1) 
SINGLE TRAIT MEASURE: EDUCATION 
(1) country versus no variation 
(2) cohort versus (1) 
(3) linear trend versus (1) 
(4) curvilinear trend versus (1) 
DUAL TRAIT MEASURE: SOCIAL ORIGIN 
(1) country versus no variation 
(2) cohort versus (1) 
(3) linear trend versus (1) 
(4) curvilinear trend versus (1) 
DUAL TRAIT MEASURE: EDUCATION 
(1) country versus no variation 
(2) cohort versus country 
(3) linear trend versus country 
(4) curvilinear trend versus country 
ADf 
14 
5 
1 
2 
14 
5 
1 
2 
14 
5 
1 
2 
14 
5 
1 
2 
Fit statistics 
AF 
4.59 
1.46 
4.14 
4.76 
14.23 
1.60 
0.33 
2.78 
2.50 
1.10 
1.34 
1.43 
7.73 
1.79 
1.93 
1.87 
D 
0.000 
0.224 
0.048 
0.055 
0.000 
0.182 
0.568 
0.072 
0.010 
0.373 
0.253 
0.250 
0.000 
0.136 
0.171 
0.166 
AR2 
0.58 
0.06 
0.03 
0.05 
0.81 
0.03 
0.00 
0.02 
0.43 
0.07 
0.00 
0.03 
0.70 
0.05 
0.01 
0.02 
Notes: ADf is the difference between two models in degrees of freedom; ΔΡ is the difference in the F-
statistic; AR2 is the difference in the R-square statistic (unadjusted). 
A formal test of the observations from visual inspection is provided in Table 4.4. This table 
shows results of regressions of the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin on 
country and cohort parameters. Panel A of Table 4.4 contains a test of the different sources of 
variation. The first test is that of country variation. Compared to a model that does not assume 
any variation in homogamy of social origin, this model significantly improves the fit (p<. 10). 
The second test is that of cohort-differences. Compared with the first model of only country-
difference, the second model does not improve the fit significantly. Hence, homogamy of 
social origin varied between countries, but not between birth cohorts. 
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It might however, as my visual observations indicate, have decreased in a linear fashion. This 
is tested in the third model. Compared to the first model of country-differences, the third 
model improves the fit indeed (p<.10). The linear parameter of -0.011 (standard error=.006) 
suggest that homogamy of social origin decreased linearly throughout the twentieth century. A 
model that states the trend to be curvilinear (Model A4; Table 4.4) does not further improve 
the fit. I hence conclude that homogamy of social origin varied among countries and decreased 
linearly in industrial countries during the twentieth century. If one assumes each birth cohort 
to have an average age of (first or later) marriage of 25, marriage markets appear to be less 
open before than after the Second World War. This finding is in line both with my traditional 
and extended hypotheses. Apparently, preferences, opportunities and social barriers to marry 
within one's class of social origin diminish as countries industrialize. 
EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY 
Table 4.5 (Panel A) and Figure 4.2 describe the cross-national and cross-temporal variations in 
the single trait measure of educational homogamy. According to Table 4.5, all parameters are 
significantly positive: in general they amount to 0.56 (p<.10). This indicates a preference for 
educational similarity and also signifies the preference to be stronger than the corresponding 
preference of homogamy of social origin. Another observation from the data is that there is 
considerable cross-national variation in educational homogamy. From Table 4.5 and Figure 4.2 
one can observe that while some countries - for example Finland and Italy - show correlations 
of approximately 0.70, other countries - for example the Soviet Union and the Netherlands -
have much lower values of about 0.40. Contrary to the large cross-national differences in 
educational homogamy, historical differences are modest. The zero-order association between 
spouses' educations has remained fairly stable throughout the twentieth century (around 0.55), 
and only shows a substantial decrease in the last birth cohort (1950-1959: from 0.57 to 0.48). 
Some countries differ from this picture of world-wide stability. England and the United States, 
for example, show a steady increase in the single trait measure of educational homogamy. 
Australia, Denmark and Finland on the other hand, show a decrease after an initial increase. 
Table 4.4 formally tests the variation in the single trait measure of educational homogamy. 
The regressions in this table confirm the results from visual inspection. Panel В of Table 4.4 
shows that cross-national differences are by far the greatest source of variation in educational 
homogamy: it accounts for more than 80% of the total variation. The cohort differences 
appear to be non-significant (p>.10) as the second model shows. The same pertains to a linear 
trend specification (Model B3), but a curvilinear trend model (Model B4) fits the data well and 
improves upon the first model of cross-national differences. The parameters of this model - a 
linear trend parameter of 0.049 (standard error=0.023) and a curvilinear trend parameter of -
0.007 (standard error=0.003) - show the trend to be reversely U-shaped. Assuming an average 
age at marriage of 25, the latter finding suggests that before the Second World War 
educational homogamy increased, but that after this period the increase in educational 
homogamy leveled of and tends to decrease. This finding confirms Ultee and Luijkx' (1990) 
single trait finding of decreasing educational homogamy in 23 industrial countries after World 
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War II. After dual trait analyses cross-national and historical variations in status homogamy 
may appear to be different, however. The next section addresses these analyses. 
4.6.2 Trends in Dual Trait Measures of Status Homogamy 
Panel В of Tables 4.3 and 4.5 list residual correlations for respectively spouses' social origins 
and spouses' educations, and Figure 4.2 shows these correlations graphically. Global 
inspection of the figures demonstrates that single and dual trait analyses yield results that are 
much alike. In most countries, trends in the single and dual trait measures of status homogamy 
correspond highly. At first sight, single trait analyses do not conceal trends or cross-national 
differences in status homogamy. 
More detailed inspection shows by-products to occur, however. First, one can observe that 
in all countries and in all birth cohorts, dual trait parameters of status homogamy are 
substantially lower than their single trait counterparts. While the general single trait parameter 
for homogamy of social origin is 0.30 (p<.10), it is 0.15 (p<A0) after dual trait analysis. This 
means that 50% of the initial zero-order association between spouses' social origins can be 
attributed to educational homogamy and the associations between origin and education. 
Likewise, one third of the zero-order association between spouses' educations (0.56; /?<0.01) 
can be attributed to homogamy of social origin: the dual trait parameter for educational 
homogamy amounts to 0.38 (p<A0). Hence, in single trait models the degree to which 
spouses match on education or social origin is seriously overestimated. 
Second, dual trait analysis leads to somewhat different conclusions on global trends in 
homogamy than single trait analysis. From Table 4.3 (Panel B) it can be seen that while the 
single trait measure of homogamy of social origin decreased as of the second birth cohort 
(1920-1929), the dual trait measure of homogamy of social origin only decreased as of the last 
birth cohort (1950-1959). The latter dual trait trend was rendered invisible by trends in 
educational homogamy and the association between social origin and education. Trend 
distortions do not apply in the same extent to educational homogamy. The single and dual trait 
measures of educational homogamy behave quite similarly throughout time. Still one can see 
that while the single trait measure of educational homogamy ended up lower (0.48) than it 
began (0.53), the dual trait measure remained stable (respectively 0.32 and 0.33). Apparently, 
there is not something like a general decrease in educational homogamy. 
Third, cross-national differences in homogamy change after dual trait analysis. For 
example, while Italy ranked highest with respect to the single trait measure of homogamy of 
social origin, it ranked much lower after dual trait analysis. More formally, the cross-national 
change in the single and dual trait parameters for status homogamy can be evaluated in Table 
4.4. As the fit statistics (R2) of the country-models show, cross-national differences in 
homogamy of social origin and educational homogamy substantially decline after dual trait 
analysis (Panels С and D). The observed between-country differences in the single trait 
measures of homogamy appear to be partly spurious. 
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Table 4.5 Single and dual trait measures of the association between spouses' educations per 
country and cohort: 15 industrial countries of the twentieth century* 
Country Birth cohort 
00-09 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 all 
A SINGLE TRAIT MEASURE 
AUS 
BUL 
CSK 
DEN 
ENG 
ΗΝ 
HUN 
ITA 
JAP 
MAL 
NET 
NOR 
RUS 
SWE 
USA 
Total 
0.408 
0.396 
0.606 
0.588 
0.631 
0.526 
0.513 
0.655 
0.412 
0.644 
0.623 
0.558 
0.673 
0.642 
0.627 
0.594 
0.475 
0.550 
0.563 
0.724 
0.399 
0.737 
0.624 
0.668 
0.597 
0.409 
0.491 
0.577 
0.618 
0.572 
0.498 
0.605 
0.480 
0.597 
0.474 
0.764 
0.660 
0.675 
0.577 
0.444 
0.557 
0.490 
0.686 
0.634 
0.582 
0.518 
0.656 
0.488 
0.527 
0.470 
0.646 
0.645 
0.682 
0.700 
0.448 
0.523 
0.343 
0.665 
0.666 
0.570 
0.330 
0.603 
0.436 
0.637 
0.645 
0.408 
0.323 
0.483 
0.457 
0.604 
0.492 
0.626 
0.430 
0.698 
0.633 
0.668 
0.581 
0.639 
0.427 
0.561 
0.385 
0.643 
0.635 
0.563 
В D U A L TRAIT M E A S U R E 
AUS 
BUL 
CSK 
DEN 
ENG 
FIN 
HUN 
ITA 
JAP 
MAL 
NET 
NOR 
RUS 
SWE 
USA 
all 
0.280 
0.265 
0.319 
0.350 
0.452 
0.333 
0.355 
0.526 
0.252 
0.507 
0.346 
0.329 
0.423 
0.371 
0.425 
0.393 
0.356 
0.303 
0.397 
0.511 
0.246 
0.521 
0.393 
0.308 
0.335 
0.220 
0.338 
0.384 
0.424 
0.364 
0.363 
0.490 
0.340 
0.360 
0.310 
0.548 
0.469 
0.333 
0.448 
0.291 
0.420 
0.363 
0.459 
0.421 
0.401 
0.378 
0.528 
0.351 
0.405 
0.315 
0.523 
0.423 
0.349 
0.526 
0.331 
0.444 
0.210 
0.487 
0.442 
0.408 
0.284 
0.352 
0.276 
0.442 
0.389 
0.296 
0.200 
0.320 
0.336 
0.418 
0.341 
0.451 
0.278 
0.525 
0.399 
0.345 
0.338 
0.487 
0.285 
0.406 
0.258 
0.425 
0.433 
0.379 
Note: * all parameters are significant, p<0.05 
Fourth and finally, dual trait analyses lead to other trend findings for countries separately. 
With respect to spouses' social origins, Finland and Italy are instructive examples. In Finland, 
the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin showed an initial increase and then a 
decrease, but after dual trait analysis the opposite occurred: first a decrease, then an increase. 
In Italy, the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin showed a steady decrease, but 
after dual trait analysis it appeared to be stable. Similar examples pertain to educational 
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homogamy. Bulgaria showed a linear trend towards stronger educational homogamy in single 
trait analysis, but a curvilinear trend after dual trait analysis. Finland demonstrated a 
curvilinear trend in the single trait measure of educational homogamy, and stability after dual 
trait analysis. 
Despite the differences between single and dual trait analyses, the distortions described 
above do not alter the conclusions of single trait analyses in a very substantial way. As can be 
seen from Panel С and Panel D of Table 4.4, both for spouses' social origins and educations 
the best models are those that allow homogamy to vary among countries and that allow the 
association to change in a curvilinear fashion. For the dual trait measure of homogamy of 
social origin the linear trend parameter is 0.040 (standard error=0.020) and the curvilinear 
trend parameter -0.006 (standard error=0.003). For the dual trait measure of educational 
homogamy these parameters are respectively 0.051 (standard error=0.026) and -0.006 
(standard error=0.003). Note that compared to the single trait analysis, the trend in 
educational homogamy flattened and also note that a model of constant homogamy was only 
just rejected. These findings again suggest slightly more invariant educational homogamy in 
dual than in single trait analysis, and seem to contradict the general decrease Ultec and Luijkx 
(1990) earlier observed in their single trait analysis. 
That in general results of single trait analyses stand firm in dual trait analyses, can also be 
illustrated by high and positive correlations among the single and dual trait measures of status 
homogamy. For all combinations of countries and birth cohorts, the single and dual trait 
measures correlate 0.63 with respect to homogamy of social origin (p<.05) and 0.81 (p<.05) 
with respect to educational homogamy. The very fact that these correlations are not unity 
makes multivariate analysis important. The dual trait parameters are more precise estimates of 
the net weights of social origin and education in partner selection than single trait parameters. 
The latter measures may sometimes reveal important distortions in trends and country 
differences in various forms of status homogamy. 
4.7 Results: Explanatory Analyses 
In the first part of the present section (paragraph 4.7.1), I answer this chapter's second 
question about the influence of traditional indicators of industrialization and politics on 
homogamy of social origin and education. The second part (paragraph 4.7.2) gives an answer 
to this chapter's third question about the influence of more specific indicators of 
industrialization and politics on the various types of status homogamy. 
4.7.1 Traditional Hypotheses: Industrialization and Politics 
Table 4.6 presents results of random coefficient models, regressing the single and dual trait 
measures of homogamy on the level of industrialization, social-democracy and state-socialism. 
According to the first regression in which I account for historical and cross-national variations 
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in the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin (Model 1), the traditional hypotheses 
from mobility research come true: countries or cohorts with a high degree of industrialization, 
with a social-democratic government, or state-socialism are characterized by weaker 
homogamy of social origin than countries or cohorts that are less industrialized, without 
social-democracy or without state-socialism. After dual trait analysis (Model 3) these 
conclusions do not hold. Although the parameters of industrialization and political regime 
diminish the tendency of spouses to match on social origin - net of educational homogamy -, 
they do not do so significantly (p>0.10). I consider the latter result as weak evidence against 
the traditional macro-hypotheses. 
Table 4.6 Estimates of random coefficient models regressing single and dual trait measures 
of homogamy of social origin and education on 'traditional' indicators of industrialization 
and politics (standard errors between brackets) 
SINGLE TRAIT MEASURES DUAL TRAIT MEASURES ~ 
(1) origin (2) education (3) origin (4) education 
homogamy homogamy homogamy homogamy 
industrialization -0.003* (.001) 0.000 (.001) -0.001 (.001) 0.000 (.000) 
social-democracy -0.026-(.016) -0.008 (.021) -0.007 (.011) 0.016 (.019) 
state-socialism -0.120* (.026) 0.015 (.045) -0.035 (.021) 0.061 (.043) 
adjusted R2 0.219 0.000 0.080 0.000 
Notes: * indicates p<0.05; - indicates p<0.01 
Model 2 of Table 4.6 tests effects of industrialization and political regime on educational 
homogamy. From the parameter estimates and standard errors one can see that none of the 
macro-factors contributes significantly to variations in the single trait measure of educational 
homogamy. Stronger industrialization, social democracy and state-socialism do not make for 
less educational homogamy, as was earlier found in Ultee and Luijkx (1990) single trait study 
of educational homogamy in 23 industrial countries. After dual trait analysis (Model 4) these 
conclusions do not change. Note, however, that the coefficient of social-democracy reverses 
(although non-significantly). Also note that the effect of socialism is stronger than for the 
single trait parameter. The latter finding seems to indicate that in socialist countries the role of 
education in mate selection is stronger than in non-socialist countries. 
4.7.2 Extended Hypotheses: Five More Specific Indicators 
How can the effects of industrialization and political regime on homogamy of social origin and 
education be accounted for? To what extent do processes that underlie industrialization and 
politics affect status homogamy? What is the role of (1) the shift from ascription to 
achievement within labor markets, (2) the process of urbanization, (3) the increased length of 
school careers, (4) the increased gender equality with respect to educational attainment, and 
(5) the selection of students for secondary education at a late age? Table 4.7 lists the estimates 
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(1) origin 
homogamy 
0.008 (.091) 
0.000 (.002) 
-0.014 (.010) 
-0.017 (.026) 
-0.009 (.027) 
(2) education 
homogamy 
0.108 (.098) 
-0.002 (.002) 
-0.014 (.012) 
0.049~(.028) 
0.020 (.029) 
(3) origin 
homogamy 
0.058 (.052) 
0.000 (.001) 
-0.008 (.005) 
-0.035*(.015) 
-0.004 (.016) 
(4) education 
homogamy 
0.172~(.094) 
-0.001 (.002) 
-0.009 (.011) 
0.046~(.027) 
0.008 (.028) 
of random coefficient models that regress the five more specific indicators of industrialization 
and left politics on the various types of status homogamy. 
Table 4.7 Estimates of random coefficient models regressing single and dual trait measures 
of homogamy of social origin and education on 'more specific' indicators of industrialization 
and politics (standard errors between brackets) 
SINGLE TRAIT MEASURES DUAL TRAIT MEASURES 
achievement 
urbanization 
schooling 
gender-equality 
late-selection 
adjusted R2 0.143 0.420 0.258 0.277 
Notes: * indicates p<0.05; - indicates p<0.01 
With regard to the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin (Model 1, Table 4.7), the 
extended macro-factors fare worse than the traditional macro-factors (industrialization, social-
democracy and state-socialism). None of the more systematically derived hypotheses comes 
true. Neither the process of a shift from ascription to achievement values, nor urbanization, 
educational expansion and late school-selection dot significantly account for variations in 
homogamy of social origin. Similar conclusions pertain to the dual trait measure of homogamy 
of social origin (Model 3). The more informative macro-hypotheses still do not come true. The 
only significant effect pertains to gender-equality, the factor on which I had not formulated 
explicitly an hypothesis. The data show that stronger gender-equality reduces spouses' 
tendency to match on social origin. An ad-hoc explanation of this finding is that as women's 
economic statuses (education) increase, parents have fewer possibilities and less motivation to 
influence marital decisions of their daughters. 
The extended macro-factors fare better in accounting for the observed variations in the 
single trait measure of educational homogamy (Model 2, Table 4.7), both in comparison to the 
traditional macro-hypotheses (Model 2, Table 4.6) and in comparison to the single trait 
measure of homogamy of social origin (Model 1, Table 4.7). It appears that stronger gender-
equality enhances educational homogamy. This is in line with the gender-equality hypothesis 
which holds that due to the decreasing gender-gap in educational attainment, partner selection 
becomes more symmetric. The other hypotheses, on the role of achievement, urbanization, 
schooling and late school-selection do not true, however. The corresponding parameters are 
non-significant. Moreover, the effects of longer school careers (less educational homogamy) 
and selection at a late age (more educational homogamy) go in an unexpected direction. After 
dual trait analyses (Model 4, Table 4.7) I find somewhat better results than in single trait 
analysis, and also observe more confirmation than in the earlier assessment of the traditional 
macro-factors (Model 4, Table 4.6). In addition to the positive effect of gender-equality, the 
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greater emphasis on achievement within labor markets increased spouses' tendency to marry 
someone near in educational ranking. Nevertheless, the urbanization, schooling, and late-
selection hypotheses still do not hold. 
4.8 Conclusions and Discussion 
This chapter's chief aim was to describe and explain cross-national and historical variations in 
homogamy of social origin and education. My first research question was to what extent 
patterns of educational homogamy and homogamy of social origin differ among countries and 
birth cohorts, and to what extent dual trait analyses lead to other outcomes than single trait 
analyses. The descriptive analyses have generally shown large cross-national differences and 
only small historical differences in both types of homogamy. When addressed in single trait 
models, homogamy of social origin showed a steady decrease in industrial countries during the 
twentieth century, while educational homogamy showed an increase in the 1900-1919 period 
and a decrease in the 1940-1959 birth period. After dual trait analyses, both kinds of 
homogamy appeared to comparable to the single trait measures. On the whole, the by-product 
explanation of a trend reversal does not hold. 
More detailed inspection showed differences between single and dual trait analyses to have 
occurred, however. First, in each country and cohort, dual trait parameters of status 
homogamy were considerably lower than single trait parameters. Second, cross-national 
differences in status homogamy diminished after dual trait analyses. Third and more important, 
in some instances trends in status homogamy were affected. For example, while the single trait 
measure of homogamy of social origin decreased as of the second birth cohort (1920-1929), 
the dual trait measure only decreased substantially as of the last birth cohort (1950-1959). 
Also, the trend in the dual trait measure of educational homogamy was flatter than in single 
trait analysis. Fourth, trends within countries were sometimes distorted. In Italy, for example, 
the trend towards decreasing homogamy of social origin appeared to be stable after dual trait 
analysis. These differences among single and dual trait analysis underline the need of 
multivariate models for (status) homogamy in research on partner selection. The parameters of 
multivariate models are more precise estimates of the net weights of social origin and 
education in mate selection than parameters of single trait models. The latter parameters may 
conceal important historical and cross-national variations in homogamy. 
This chapter's second question was how and to what extent the observed world-wide 
patterns of status homogamy can be accounted for. For that purpose I first reviewed an 
application of notions from mobility research. This application holds that just as 
industrialization and social-democracy made for greater social mobility on labor markets, these 
factors will make for greater openness on marriage markets. My explanatory analyses have 
generally demonstrated these notions not to hold. Although a higher degree of 
industrialization, a period of social-democratic government or state-socialism diminished 
homogamy of social origin, they did not do so after dual trait analyses. Patterns of educational 
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homogamy could not well be explained by the traditional macro-factors. Findings of dual trait 
analyses suggested, however, that the role of education in mate selection is somewhat stronger 
in socialist than in non-socialist countries. On the whole, my findings confute results of Ultee 
and Luijkx (1990). These authors observed educational homogamy to decrease with economic 
development and state-socialism. Part of this refutation is due to the dual trait analysis. 
Another part may be due to differences in research design (I compared birth cohorts instead of 
existing marriages: see also Chapter 7) and statistical models employed (I applied correlation 
models instead of loglinear models, see also Chapter 7; random coefficient models versus 
analysis of covariates in loglinear models). 
This chapter's third question was how and to what extent effects of industrialization and 
political regime on status homogamy can be accounted for by processes that underlie these 
macro-factors. To answer this question I reviewed four processes that underlie 
industrialization (the shift from ascription to achievement, urbanization, educational 
expansion, decreased gender-inequality in educational attainment) and one that underlies the 
effects of political regime (selection of students for secondary education at an early or late 
age). In general, these processes could better account for the observed cross-national and 
cross-temporal differences in status homogamy than the less informative notions from mobility 
research. However, the parameter estimates of the extended macro-factors did not uniformly 
confirm the hypotheses. First, although the shift from ascription to achievement within labor 
markets made people change their preferences towards educational similarity in mate 
selection, it did not lead to weaker homogamy of social origin. Second, urbanization had a 
slightly negative effect on homogamous people to marry, as was expected, but this effect was 
non-significant both with regard to homogamy of social origin and education. Third, longer 
school careers did not affect patterns of status homogamy significantly. Contrary to my 
hypotheses and to Mare's finding for the United States (Mare 1991), the decreased time gap 
between leaving school and entering wedlock did not lead to stronger educational homogamy 
and weaker homogamy of social origin. Fourth, the effects of comprehensive schooling and 
the accompanying later age at which schools select their students were non-significant and in 
an unpredicted direction: more instead of less educational homogamy. This contradicts the late 
school-selection hypothesis which holds that selection of students for secondary education at a 
late age creates opportunities for interaction among people of dissimilar status. 
In contrast to the other hypotheses, the gender-equality hypothesis deserved more credit. 
The decreased gender-gap in educational attainment expectedly made partner selection more 
symmetric. This increased the tendency of persons to marry someone of similar education. 
With respect to spouses' social origin, I found it hard to come up with a hypothesis. The data 
showed that greater gender-equality reduces spouses' tendency to match on social origin. An 
ad-hoc explanation of this finding is that as women's economic independence increases, 
parents have had less motivation to help their daughters in finding Mr. Right. 
Why the more informative 'individual-level' hypotheses did not receive uniform 
confirmation may be explained by potentially false assumptions I made in deriving these 
hypotheses. One may have occurred with respect to the effect of longer school careers on 
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educational homogamy. In deriving the schooling hypothesis, I assumed the age at marriage to 
increase less than the age of leaving school. This need not be true. Higher educated often 
refrain from marriage and in some countries this may have led to a disproportional increase in 
age at first marriage. The time interval between leaving school and entering wedlock would 
widen instead of narrow. Following Mare's argumentation (Mare 1991), a wider time gap 
would diminish educational homogamy instead of enhance it. The data show that such an 
alternative explanation may indeed hold. 
Taken together, the results of my descriptive and explanatory analyses reject a simple, 
mechanical application of notions from mobility research. This rejection may be viewed as a 
contribution both to research on social stratification and to research on marriage formation. I 
have shown that educational homogamy does not relate to industrialization in a simple way, 
but in a more complicated way. Industrialization does not decrease educational homogamy 
unequivocally as Ultee and Luijkx (1990) found in their large-scale study, but influences the 
matching of spouses in various, often opposite ways. Urbanization, longer schooling and 
school-selection at a late age decrease chances of educational homogamy, but the shift from 
ascriptive to achievement values within labor markets and the decreased gender differences in 
educational attainment enhance these chances. 
For a better understanding of the manner and extent to which macro-factors affect micro-
level decisions within marriage markets, other designs than my cross-national, historical design 
can be more fruitful. Recent studies on marriage formation explored longitudinal designs in 
which the timing and choice of marriage is related to spouses' characteristics and the 
availability of potential mates (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991, Stier and Shavit 1994). Such 
dynamic designs in which the individual odds of marriage are related to individual-level and 
contextual factors, open the possibility to disentangle effects of macro-factors (for example, 
the degree of industrialization in a country) and individual-level factors (for example, living in 
a large city or not), and also allow for causal inferences. For a world-wide comparison of 
marriage patterns the life-history designs cannot be applied yet, since data are scanty. 
Therefore, future research has to be awaited in order to gain more insight in as to how and 
why some people are attracted to each other and others not. 
5 THE ROLE OF EDUCATION AND HIGH CULTURE IN MATE SELECTION: 
THE NETHERLANDS 1948-1992 
Abstract. In this chapter I examine the role of spouses' educations and their cultural participation in mate 
selection in the Netherlands between 1948 and 1992. My main research questions are to what extent 
persons match on similar preferences in the high arts, to what extent this tendency is stronger than 
educational homogamy and to what extent both types of homogamy have changed in strength after World 
War Π. Another question is to what extent in the past women used their cultural knowledge and skills to 
attract higher educated men for marriage. To answer these questions, I use data on spouses' educations 
and cultural participation from the Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993 and apply zero-order and 
residual correlation models. The results of my single and dual trait analyses indicate that persons prefer to 
mate with people that participate in the high arts equally or nearly equally, that this tendency of cultural 
homogamy is as strong the tendency of educational homogamy, and that over time cultural and 
educational homogamy were fairly stable except for the last marriage cohort (1973-1982) in which 
cultural homogamy declined in strength. My analyses also show exchange of wife's cultural and 
husband's educational resources in mate selection, but in recent decades this exchange diminished. The 
recently declining role of cultural participation in processes of mate selection rejects predictions from 
Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies which hold that status groups distinguish themselves by 
increasingly higher standards of social conduct. 
5.1 Introduction' 
When people enter wedlock, they often choose a person with similar social traits. They marry 
someone with identical religious affiliation (Johnson 1980), marry someone who holds a 
similar job (Hout 1982), or marry a person who has attained similar or near-similar educational 
level (Ultee and Luijkx 1990). This phenomenon of marriage within one's social group is 
termed 'homogamy' or 'endogamy', and the opposite phenomenon - marriage across one's 
group - is termed 'heterogamy' or 'exogamy'. 
In this chapter I address questions about two forms of status homogamy in the Netherlands 
between 1948 and 1992.1 focus on educational homogamy and homogamy with respect to the 
extent to which high culture feature's in a person's life style. Educational homogamy - the 
degree to which people of similar or near-similar educational levels marry - has been studied 
extensively for the Netherlands (De Hoog 1979, Sixma and Ultee 1984, Hendrickx, Uunk and 
Smits 1995). In general, these studies have shown that people have a greater tendency to 
marry someone near in educational ranking than to marry someone with a much lower or 
higher level of education, and that this tendency of educational homogamy declined in strength 
after World War Π, although recent findings for the nineties also point to a trend reversal. 
The extent to which partners are similar with respect to their cultural life style at the time 
of marriage has not been studied well (see below). An assessment of the degree of cultural 
homogamy may be important, however. There are good reasons to expect an increase in 
1
 This chapter is a revised version of a paper I submitted for publication in Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift 
(January 1996). 
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cultural homogamy in recent decades. First, with the shift from industrial to post-industrial 
societies people have gained more leisure time and more freedom of choice. These 
developments may have given people more opportunities to engage in cultural activities and to 
develop a specific cultural life style. Second, as I will elaborate more in the sequel by the work 
of Bourdieu (1972, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1989), in contemporary societies cultural life styles may 
become a source of distinction between status groups. In times in which economic strategies 
of reproduction (such as inheritance from one generation to the next) are getting less 
successful and in which also education strategies of reproduction start to fail (educational 
credentials suffer from inflation), cultural strategies may be applied by higher status persons to 
distinguish themselves from other status groups anew. One such cultural strategy is that higher 
status persons marry people with 'appropriate' cultural skills. Given the fact that higher status 
persons have distinct cultural habits, this strategy will lead to stronger cultural homogamy. If 
so, it is worthwhile testing whether cultural life styles have actually replaced education as the 
most important form of status homogamy. 
In this chapter I specify homogamy with respect to a person's life style by highlighting the 
extent to which high culture features in it. This is, perhaps, a rather narrow view of cultural 
life styles. Wider views are certainly possible, not only by including specific low cultural 
activities, but also by including such matters as 'good manners'. The reasons why I still focus 
on the more narrow view are threefold. To begin with, one of the most elaborated theories on 
the way elites distinguish themselves - Bourdieu's work on 'economic and 'cultural capital' 
(see also below) - pertains to activities in high culture. Secondly, good measurement 
procedures exist for current participation in the high arts (see also Ganzeboom 1984). This 
makes retrospective questions - on cultural activity at the time of mate selection - less dubious. 
Thirdly, until now not much work has been done on cultural activities that distinguish, for 
example, lower from middle classes. 
5.2 Research Questions 
To investigate the role of education and cultural participation in mate selection, this chapter 
first assesses trends in educational and cultural homogamy in the Netherlands after World War 
II. The question is to what extent partners prefer similarity with respect to participation in high 
arts, to what extent cultural homogamy increased, and to what extent it has become stronger 
than educational homogamy (question ]). I answer the question by applying both simple and 
more refined models. In the simple single trait models, the association between spouses' 
educational levels (educational homogamy) and the association between spouses' cultural 
participation (cultural homogamy) are computed in separate analyses. In the more refined dual 
trait models, spouses' educational levels and spouses' cultural participation are assessed 
simultaneously. Educational homogamy is computed net of cultural homogamy, and cultural 
homogamy is computed net of educational homogamy. The dual trait analysis produces net 
weights of the strength of educational and cultural homogamy in mate selection. 
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The reason why I address both older single trait models and newer dual analyses is that it 
enables me to test the degree to which single trait measures of educational and cultural 
homogamy are 'by-products' (Blau and Duncan 1967: 358). That is, by comparing the two 
types of models I can test to what degree spouses have married homogamously with respect to 
education because of their similarity with respect to cultural participation, and vice versa. An 
assessment of the by-product explanation of homogamy is important for two reasons. First, it 
can show that the trends towards less educational homogamy that was observed in earlier 
single trait analysis is to some extent artificial (cf. Uunk and Ultee 1995): it may have been 
caused by decreased cultural homogamy or a decrease in the association between education 
and cultural participation. Second, differences in homogamy parameters between single and 
dual trait models shed light on the tenability of De Singly's by-product hypothesis (De Singly 
1993). This hypothesis holds that in contemporary societies in which people have gained 
ample leisure time, younger persons first choose their mates because of cultural similarity and 
then because of educational similarity. In statistical terms: the zero-order association between 
spouses educational levels can be accounted for by the association between spouses' cultural 
participation and the associations between education and cultural participation. The extent to 
which such differences in single and dual trait measures of homogamy exist is a second and 
ancillary question of this chapter {question 2). 
Next to questions about similarities between spouses, I investigate the role of education 
and high culture in mate selection by studying asymmetric partner choices. According to a 
prediction from exchange theory (Merton 1976 [1944]) an important asymmetry involves 
marriages between culturally active and highly educated persons. In the past these 'exchange-
marriages' were of particular importance for women. By participating in the high arts often, 
women could become attractive marriage candidates for men who did not participate in the 
high arts frequently but were potentially efficient breadwinners. Nowadays, during higher 
labor force participation of women, trade-offs of culture and education are believed to be less 
frequent since women have caught up educationally with men and can earn their own living. 
Partner choices have become more symmetric because men also compete for economically 
attractive wives. To what extent exchange of education and culture in marriage has taken 
place over above the tendency to educational and cultural homogamy, and to what extent this 
exchange declined after World War II is my third research question (question 3). In sum, I 
address the following questions: 
(1) To what extent do partners prefer similarity in cultural participation, to what extent 
did cultural homogamy increase, and to what extent did it become stronger than 
educational homogamy in the Netherlands after World War II? 
(2) To what extent do dual trait analyses of educational and cultural homogamy lead to 
smaller estimates of homogamy than single trait analyses, and to what extent do trend 
findings between the two types of analyses differ? 
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(3) To what extent is cultural participation more important for women than for men in 
achieving a higher educated partner, and to what extent did this possible gender 
difference diminish in the Netherlands after World War II? 
By answering the three questions, I try to improve upon previous studies on homogamy in 
several ways. First, I fill a gap in research on homogamy by examining the degree to which 
persons select each other as a partner on the basis of frequency of participation in the high 
arts. So far, a direct assessment of the role of cultural life style in mate selection has not been 
undertaken. For the Netherlands other research only indirectly indicates preferences for 
cultural similarity. De Hoog (1982: 114) showed that partners during their first dates visited 
theater equally often. Van Berkel and De Graaf (1995) demonstrated that partners influenced 
each other in their cultural participation during marriage, and De Graaf and Ganzeboom 
(1990) showed that a person's cultural participation does not only depend on that person's 
educational level, but also on the educational level of that person's partner. For the United 
States also indirect clues for cultural homogamy exist. Burgess and Wallin (1943) found that 
engaged couples preferred cultural similarity. Most of the investigated persons wanted to go 
out as often as their partner and held similar preferences on the frequency of visit to theater or 
dance. More recently, Kalmijn (1994a) found that persons with cultural occupations (for 
example, teachers) married relatively more often among each other than with persons that 
have economic occupations (for example, managers of a firm). This tendency of cultural 
homogamy declined between 1970 and 1980. Direct indications for the importance of cultural 
similarity at the time of mate selection are still lacking, however. 
A second manner by which I improve upon previous research on status homogamy, is that 
I apply multivariate models (dual trait models) for the analysis of educational and cultural 
homogamy. For the Netherlands these models have only been used with regard to the 
education and religion of spouses (Hendrickx 1994), and the education and social origin of 
spouses (Uunk and Ultee 1995). The use of multivariate models and the comparison of its 
findings with findings of single trait models for educational and cultural homogamy does not 
only fill a gap, but can also lead to interesting results. It enables me to test De Singly's (1993) 
statement that educational homogamy is a by-product of people's tendency to match on 
similar cultural preferences. 
A third manner by which I try to make progress is by testing models that allow for trade-
offs of resources in mate selection, notably cultural knowledge for educational standing. 
DiMaggio and Mohr (1985) have implicitly assessed exchange in marriage by examining the 
effect of one's own cultural participation on spouse's educational level, both for men and 
women. By taking into account the educational level of the respondent and his or her social 
origin, they found significantly positive effects of cultural resources on spouse's educational 
level. However, this finding may not indicate exchange of resources per se. The positive effect 
of cultural skills on spouses' education can be an artifact of cultural homogamy. The effect 
may a priori have been expected given partners' tendency towards cultural similarity and 
given the (positive) association between a person's cultural activity and educational 
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attainment. DiMaggio and Mohr could not disentangle the effects of cultural homogamy from 
the effects of cultural resources since they did not include spouse's cultural activity in their 
analyses. The effects of high culture they found are therefore potentially biased. In this chapter 
I try to solve this difficulty by taking into account both spouses' cultural participation and 
spouses' educational levels. In contrast to DiMaggio and Mohr (1985), I do not regress 
educational levels for men and women separately but estimate the regressions in one model. 
This approach leads to smaller estimates of the effect of one's education on spouse's 
education, and also produces more precise estimates of exchange-effects.2 
Fourth, my analysis of education and cultural participation in mate selection tries to 
contribute to sociology in a very specific way. It may show that Bourdieu's idea of 
compensatory strategies or defensive mechanisms (Bourdieu 1974: 32-33; Bourdieu 1989: 
386-388; see also below) is not only applicable to older societies, but also to more modem 
ones. Elias (1939) showed that defensive mechanisms were applied at the end of agrarian and 
the beginning of industrial societies. Due to the introduction of a system of taxes in France 
between 1300 and 1800, the French aristocracy distinguished itself from enriching citizens by 
increasingly severe measures of social conduct. The question is to what extent these defensive 
mechanisms operate in a more general range: are they also applied in newer types of societies, 
as for example our contemporary Dutch service society (De Swaan 1988)? 
Fifth, my analysis of the role of education and cultural participation in mate selection tries 
to bridge a gap between a sociological tradition that examines long-term trends and a 
sociological tradition that tests general hypotheses. This distinction has been formulated as a 
contrast between a comparative-historical and an empirical-analytical sociology (Wilterdink 
and Van Heerikhuizen 1985, Becker 1986). I bridge the supposed gap by deriving from 
general hypotheses and additional assumptions predictions on trends in the various types of 
status homogamy. It is to be noted that while trend predictions can be rejected, general 
hypotheses may still hold. 
5.3 Hypotheses 
I formulate four hypotheses on the role of education and cultural participation in mate 
selection of industrial societies: (a) the reproduction hypothesis, (b) the by-product hypothesis, 
(c) the affluence hypothesis, and (d) the exchange hypothesis. The first three of these 
hypotheses pertain to the strength of educational and cultural homogamy. The fourth 
2
 DiMaggio and Mohr (1985) acknowledged the problem of separate regressions: "Testing these hypotheses raises 
problems of specification, in that the expectation that partners match each other's characteristics implies 
simultaneity in the effects own education and that of the spouse. Because simultaneity is likely to be greatest 
between own education and spouse's education, the misspccification is likely to inflate the effects of own education 
on that of the spouse and, in so doing, to bias downward the estimates of the effects of cultural capital and other 
independent variables" (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985: 1250) 
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hypothesis pertains to exchange of cultural and educational resources in mate selection. In the 
sequel, I discuss the four hypotheses. 
REPRODUCTION HYPOTHESIS 
The term 'cultural capital' has become common coin in sociology. Bourdieu introduced this 
expression and the name of this French sociologist has indissolubly been associated with it. 
With the expression cultural capital, Bourdieu supplemented the Marxist hypothesis according 
to which individual life chances depend on one's amount of economic capital with the 
hypothesis that individual life chances also depend on one's amount of cultural capital. 
However, this supplement is only one - possibly less important - part of a theory that is much 
more informative (although not always as informative as one might like) and has a much wider 
scope. Perhaps because Bourdieu's work appeared in various articles and books spanning a 
long period (Bourdieu 1972, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1989) and because of the tendency of experts 
of Bourdieu's work to equate theory with concepts rather than with propositions, the greater 
part of his theory has not become well-known.3 In the sequel I want to enunciate Bourdieu's 
lesser known theory by reviewing some of the passages in his work. This provides the 
background to which I state the reproduction hypothesis on status homogamy. 
Bourdieu's theory does not merely state that there are two forms of capital, it also relates 
to developments in the relevance of economic and cultural capital. In modem French society 
as well as in other industrial societies, two developments have taken place. First, the weight of 
education for various life chances has increased at the expense of the weight of economic 
possessions. Second, among the owners of cultural capital, technical titles have lost in 
importance in favor of titles that require general knowledge for bureaucratic positions 
(Bourdieu 1989: 386). 
According to another part of Bourdieu's theory these developments have not contributed 
to a decline of social reproduction per se. The intergenerational transfer of economic capital 
(financial inheritance) and cultural capital (education) function as two of various reproduction 
strategies and these strategies form a self-reguhting system (Bourdieu 1989: 386-388). When 
irrespective of its exact reason a strategy becomes less successful in the reproduction of social 
inequalities, another reproduction strategy will be applied. For example, the decreased 
importance of economic capital and the increased importance of cultural capital has resulted in 
the fact that parents with economic capital do not educate their offspring in the family 
business, but let their offspring achieve high educational credentials by which they can gain 
bureaucratic positions outside the family business. 
The hypothesis of "changer pour conserver" (Bourdieu 1979: 176) does not only apply to 
the situation of elites but also to the situation of lower status groups. When in a class-based 
society lower status persons start to take advantages, the reaction of higher status groups is 
such that it compensates the change ("ordinaliment annulé", Bourdieu 1979: 177). Bourdieu 
illustrates this hypothesis with an argumentation on the growth of the percentage of students 
3
 Bourdieu's reproaches critics of his theory "fast reading" (Bourdieu 1989: 392, note 12). 
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from lower status groups that advances in the educational system after primary school. 
According to Bourdieu the higher status groups reacted to this growth not by letting their 
offspring leave secondary school, but by letting them study longer. 
What did Bourdieu say about marriage in his 'theory of compensatory strategies'? Next to 
inheritance and education strategies, Bourdieu reckons to the repertoire of reproduction 
strategies also marriage strategies (Bourdieu 1989: 387-388, see Bourdieu 1974: 32-33). 
Although norms on marriages exist, these marriage strategies are purposive actions of 
individuals or third parties that have interests in marriage (Bourdieu 1972: 1107). In a society 
in which economic capital is the dominant principle, marriage strategies contribute to 
reproduction of economic capital (Bourdieu 1989: 396): children of parents with high 
economic capital will marry persons with similar backgrounds. 
Bourdieu did not fully answer the supplementary question how in a society in which 
cultural capital is dominant, marriage strategies contribute to reproduction of cultural capital. 
Bourdieu only states that an association exists, not in which direction: "les stratégies 
matrimoniales ne sont sans doute pas indépendantes des stratégies scolaires et, plus 
generallement, d'ensemble des stratégies de réproduction" (Bourdieu 1989: 390). However, 
by referring to American research of Eckland (1970), Bourdieu mentions the phenomenon that 
persons with a certain educational level marry persons with the same educational level. 
Furthermore, he suggests that due to the fact that women have caught up educationally with 
men, universities increasingly function as marriage markets. This has probably caused parents 
to influence marital decisions of their offspring less than they used to do (Bourdieu 1989: 
390). In sum, with the shift from pre-industrial societies (in which economic capital was 
important) to industrialized societies (in which cultural capital is the leading principle), 
Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies leads me to expect a shift away from marriages 
based on social origin to marriages based on educational level. 
What can be expected from Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies on marriage 
patterns with the shift from industrial to post-industrial societies? Following Bourdieu's 
argumentation, at some point in time a strategy of educational homogamy can become less 
successful. This seems likely as - due to a more socially open educational system and a general 
policy of study grants -, more and more people of different social groups enroll in higher 
education. Due to these developments, diplomas attained at higher levels of education may 
become less valuable (Bourdieu 1979: 133) and higher status groups can less successfully 
distinguish themselves by high credentials or a highly educated partner. The tendency to marry 
a highly educated person will decline and educational homogamy decreases. 
Are in post-industrial societies the possibilities of higher status persons for social 
distinction exhausted? From Bourdieu's theory the answer to this question would be no. He 
states that "once it is proven that institutionalized mechanisms, such as laws on inheritance, 
are aimed at official and direct transfer of power and privilege, the interests of capital owners 
will grow to apply reproduction strategies that better conceal capital transmission" (Bourdieu 
1983: 198). According to Bourdieu, the transfer of cultural capital is the best disguised form 
of transfer of capital (Bourdieu 1983: 188). Hence, if economic and education strategies are 
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no longer effective, cultural strategies can fulfil the needs of higher status persons. These 
persons may ensure their privileged positions by transferring cultural knowledge and skills to 
their offspring in order to keep their children ahead in school. Another possible reaction is that 
higher status persons favor marriage to culturally attractive partners. Because members of 
these groups participate in the high arts more often than members of other strata, the latter 
strategy will ensure that higher status groups still marry among each other. For marriage 
patterns this shift from education to cultural strategies will mean that cultural homogamy 
replaces educational homogamy as the main form of status homogamy. I refer to this 
hypothesis as the reproduction hypothesis. It would apply to countries as the Netherlands after 
World War II and can be formulated as follows: 
The fewer the possibilities of financial inheritance in a certain marriage cohort (economic 
capital), the higher educational homogamy in that cohort. The more equal educational 
opportunities for different status groups in a certain marriage cohort, the lower educational 
homogamy and the higher cultural homogamy in that cohort. 
BY-PRODUCT HYPOTHESIS 
De Singly (1993, also De Singly 1987) challenges Bourdieu's reproduction hypothesis. He 
states that in Bourdieu's theory the assumption of explicit marriage strategies is too strong. 
Perhaps some decades ago parents used explicit strategies to acquire an attractive spouse for 
their son or daughter, nowadays this assumption is not plausible. According to De Singly, in 
recent years people married because they fell in love and not because they had similar 
education and their parents disapproved a mixed marriage. Love brings persons together that 
may have a good conversation, mutual interests and who like to spend activities together. A 
similar taste in the cultural field (for example, appreciation of classical music or art) seems to 
be a facilitation for relationships to evolve into marriage. In this respect, marriages that are 
homogamous with respect to education are, according to De Singly, a by-product of spouses' 
similarity in cultural preferences. Educational homogamy is partly caused by the fact that in 
mate selection people match on a corresponding taste in the high arts and because appreciation 
of the high arts relates strongly to one's educational attainment. In statistical terms: once 
spouses' cultural life styles are controlled, education only plays a minor role in mate selection. 
The zero-order association between spouses' educational levels is to a strong degree a by-
product of cultural homogamy. I refer to this hypothesis as the by-product hypothesis. It may 
be formulated as follows: 
In cohorts in which the influence of parents on the marriage decisions of their offspring is 
weak and in which potential spouses have much leisure time to spend together, the zero-order 
association between spouses ' education is to a stronger degree a by-product of cultural 
homogamy than in cohorts in which parental influence is strong and partners have little 
leisure time to spend. 
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AFFLUENCE-HYPOTHESIS 
The third hypothesis derives from a theory that is quite different from Bourdieu's or De 
Singly's hypotheses: Inglehart's theory of post-materialism (Inglehart 1977). This theory 
stresses the relation between the socio-economic conditions in which people grow up and their 
appreciation of material and non-material items. The theory of post-materialism holds that if 
people are confronted with material deprivation before they reach adulthood, they will adhere 
to conservative values later in life. That is, they will favor a material way of life in which the 
fulfillment of elementary needs is central. If, on the other hand, people experience material 
affluence, they will have values that are non-material, or post-materialist values such as 
personal freedom and self-development. By assuming that frequent participation in the high 
arts is a post-materialist value aimed at self-development, I expect that persons who grew in 
cohorts that experienced material affluence pay attention to marrying a spouse with a 'good 
taste' in a stronger extent than persons who grew up in cohorts that experienced material 
deprivation. This prediction is strengthened by the fact that in wealthier societies, people have 
more possibilities to develop a cultural life style. Franke (1991: 38) argued that with the 
emergence of welfare states, the poor, women and adolescents have become less dependent on 
rich people, and have received ample freedom of choice. Because to education both materialist 
(income) and post-materialist values (knowledge) are attached, I do not state a hypothesis on 
educational homogamy. In sum, the affluence hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
The better the material circumstances in a certain marriage cohort, the higher cultural 
homogamy in that cohort. 
EXCHANGE HYPOTHESIS 
The fourth hypothesis is the exchange hypothesis. I derive it from Merton's (1976 [1944]) 
exchange theory. This theory states if both parties can profit from exchange, exchange of 
resources will take place. Among others, Merton assumed exchange of money for symbolic 
status on marriage markets. In older generations the exchange involved marriages between 
low educated, culturally active women and highly educated, culturally inactive men. Women 
could profit from these marriages because they could improve their relatively low financial 
position and because they could fulfil their desire for an efficient male breadwinner; men could 
profit because they could improve their relatively poor knowledge of and skills in the high arts 
and increase their status in yet another respect. In younger generations, exchange between 
education and high culture on marriage markets would take place less frequently. In these 
generations the economic and social position of women has greatly improved and status 
differences between men and women converged. Under these more equal socio-economic 
conditions, partner choices will become more symmetric: men will derive status from marriage 
with highly educated women too, and women will not only rate men after their educational 
ranking but will also favor men who have great cultural competence (Oppenheimer 1988). 
From the exchange hypothesis I thus expect the following: 
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While in cohorts with low labor force participation of women marriages among culturally 
active women and highly educated men are more strongly favored than marriages among 
culturally active men and highly educated women, in cohorts with high labor force 
participation such exchange in marriages is less frequent and differences in exchange-effects 
between men and women have converged. 
5.4 Additional Assumptions and Trend Predictions 
To apply the aforementioned hypotheses to marriage data from the Netherlands between 1948 
and 1992, some additional assumptions are required about general social trends. In the sequel 
these assumptions will be discussed and per hypothesis predictions on trends will be derived. 
In doing so, I distinguish four marriage cohorts: 1948-1962, 1963-1972, 1973-1982 and 
1983-1992 (see also paragraph 5.5). 
From the reproduction hypothesis trends in educational and cultural homogamy may be 
predicted on the basis of the success of economic, education and cultural strategies for social 
reproduction. At the end of the nineteenth century high estate duties were introduced and 
since then they have been raised. This made direct financial inheritance from parents to 
offspring a less successful economic strategy than before. Given the increased importance of 
education for achieving high social status after World War II, education strategies may have 
been applied by the upper strata to maintain their positions. Higher status persons sent their 
offspring to high education more frequently and on marriage markets younger persons 
increasingly tried to attract highly educated persons. However, as educational opportunities 
for different status groups have become more equal throughout the twentieth century (De 
Graaf and Ganzeboom 1993) and the participation in middle and higher education boomed in 
the eighties and nineties (CBS 1994: 242-243), educational homogamy may also have declined 
at some point. On the basis of the previous developments I assume this point to be around 
1980. Around the 1980s, distinction by education did not pay off enough anymore and cultural 
strategies have been used by higher status groups to compensate their possibly worsening 
position. They have invested in high arts more and would also increasingly favor marriage to a 
culturally active spouse. Since the higher social strata participate in arts more often than other 
strata, this marriage preference resulted in a trend towards more cultural homogamy. In sum, 
the trend prediction from the reproduction hypothesis is that educational homogamy increased 
as of World War II until the eighties and declined thereafter, while cultural homogamy can be 
assumed to be stable until the eighties and increased in the eighties and nineties. 
The by-product hypothesis assumes cultural homogamy to increase as a consequence of the 
decreased social pressure of parents and as a result of a trend towards more leisure time for 
both partners. Uunk and Ultee (1995; see also Chapter 3) have demonstrated that in the 
Netherlands after World War II the (zero-order and residual) association between the social 
origins of spouses generally decreased. I consider this finding as an indication for the declining 
pressure of parents for marital endogamy. Given developments as the introduction of a five-
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days workweek in the sixties, a reduction of labor hours in the eighties and a decrease in the 
number of children to provide care for, the assumption of increased opportunities for couples 
to spend their leisure time together also seems plausible.4 Hence, I expect from the by-product 
hypothesis and additional assumptions that cultural homogamy increased from cohort to 
cohort, and that the single trait measure of educational homogamy increasingly is a by-product 
of cultural similarity between partners. This prediction only partially (for the period after 
1980) coincides with the prediction from the reproduction hypothesis. 
To predict a trend towards more cultural homogamy from the affluence hypothesis, I have 
to assume that in each successive marriage cohort material circumstances are better. This 
assumption seems plausible. According to figures from the Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS 
1994: 160), between 1959 and 1991 real expendable year incomes (in 1991 Dutch guilders) of 
unmarried and married income earners increased from 19,900 to 34,700 guilders. However, 
this increase was not linear. In 1979 year incomes reached a high of 37,000, thereafter 
incomes decreased: in 1985, for example, it was 31,500.' Given these figures, I expect from 
the affluence hypothesis weaker cultural homogamy in the last marriage cohort (1983-1992) 
than in other cohorts. The latter decrease contradicts both the prediction from the by-product 
and reproduction hypothesis. 
The trend prediction from the exchange hypothesis, finally, assumes increased labor force 
participation of women. This assumption seems plausible for the Netherlands. In 1948 labor 
participation of women aged 25-39 was 24% of all women of the same age, in 1960 18% and 
in 1992 60% (CBS 1994). In the same time labor force participation of men aged 25-39 
remained practically stable: the percentage decreased slightly from 98% in 1948 to 94% in 
1992. Labor force participation between men and women has hence converged after World 
War II, specifically in the last marriage cohort. Given the additional finding that women 
participate in high culture more frequently than men when they are young (see also Table A.2 
of Appendix A), I expect from the exchange hypothesis that in older cohorts marriages among 
lower educated, culturally active women and higher educated, culturally inactive men were 
favored more often than in other marriage cohorts.6 In younger cohorts, specifically the 
youngest one (1983-1992), the differences in exchange-effects among men and women are 
expected to have converged. 
4
 The fact that women increasingly participate in (he labor force may have resulted in less leisure time for women 
However, due to the reduction of labor hours for men spouses may at the same time have got more leisure lime to 
spend together. 
5
 The Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS 1994) did not provide figures for years before 1959. In 1967 real 
expendable income of breadwinners was 28,400 Dutch guilders, m 1977 35,300 and in 1987 32,300 guilders 
6
 An indication of the importance of culture for women in the Netherlands in post-war cohorts is the existence of 
separate girl schools ('MMS') These schools are relatively low in educational ranking but high in cultural ranking 
since a lot of attention is paid to cultural socialization 
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5.5 Data 
To test the predictions on cultural participation and educations of spouses, I use data from the 
Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993 (Ultee and Ganzeboom 1993; see also Chapter 3). The 
Netherlands Family Survey is a national representative survey in which information is available 
both on spouses' educations and on spouses' cultural participation around the age of 
marriage. In the survey 1,000 adult persons and (potentially) their partners answered questions 
about their current and earlier social and cultural traits. Of these persons, 773 were married 
during the time of interview or had been cohabitating for more than one year. 
The cultural participation of spouses was retrospectively questioned for the time spouses 
were aged 20. Since most partner meet when they are in their twenties, I consider cultural 
participation at the age of 20 to be a better indicator of the importance of cultural life style at 
the time of dating and mate selection than cultural participation at a much later age. For the 
same reason, couples that married or cohabitated earlier (before their twenties) or later (after 
their 30th birth year) were excluded from the analyses. Because of this selection, the total 
number of couples to be analyzed is 547 (71% of all married or cohabitated couples). 
In the Netherlands Family Survey spouses' educations were measured by questions about 
educational careers. For each type of education the respondent or his or her partner was 
enrolled in, the level of education was determined and also if and when this level was 
completed successfully. From the answers on these questions, I constructed the education 
levels of spouses at the time of marriage or cohabitation. If a person was not enrolled in 
education at the time of marriage or cohabitation, the highest completed level of education 
before that time point was obtained. The educational classification was tenfold and ranged 
from incomplete primary school (level 1) to Ph.D.-degree (level 10).7 
The cultural participation of husbands and wives was an index based on a list of 14 leisure 
time items. For each of these items it was asked how often spouses actively participated at the 
age of 20 ('never; at least once a year; several times a year'). Of the 14 items I selected six 
items that concern participation the high arts.8 These are: 
( 1 ) visit a museum with paintings and other art (ART MUSEUM) 
(2) visit a museum with historical objects (HISTORICAL) 
(3) visit a classical concert (CLASSICAL) 
7
 The tenfold classification of educational level is· (1) incomplete primary school ('LO'), (2) pnmary school, (3) 
lower secondary and vocational education ('LBO'), (4) middle secondary education ('MAVO'), (5) middle 
vocational training ('MBO'), (6) higher secondary education ('HAVO'), (7) higher pre-university education 
('VWO'), (8) higher vocational training ('HBO'), (9) university education ('WO'), and (10) Ph.D-degree. Note 
that, in contradiction to many other classifications, I scaled 'MBO' lower than 'HAVO'. This result is based on 
analyses with scaled association models I also tried other classifications of educauon, like the four-level CBS 
classification, but the results of this study did not change substantially when the four-level scale was applied. 
" I omitted three items that indicate liking of the high arts (1) visits to opera or ballet, (2) reading literary poetry, 
and (3) reading literature in a foreign language. The answers on these items were either skewly distributed or did not 
load high on the cultural scales of spouses. 
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(4) visit theater or cabaret (THEATER) 
(5) read Dutch literature (for example, Reve, Hermans; LITERATURE) 
(6) read Dutch translated foreign literature (for example, Boll, Marquez; FOREIGN) 
The selection of the six cultural items was based on empirical and theoretical grounds. 
Empirically, the six items form a good scale. For men the cultural items had a Cronbach's 
alpha value for reliability of 0.78 and for women 0.82. Given this result, the cultural scales for 
men and women are simply the average scores of persons on the six culture items.' 
Theoretically, the selected items are interesting because they do not only pertain to cultural 
activities that take place in public (CLASSICAL, THEATER), but also to cultural activities at 
home (LITERATURE, FOREIGN). If I assume that status considerations are of greater importance 
for domestic cultural activities than for activities outside the home, I expect from Bourdieu's 
theory of compensatory strategies that homogamy for the first type of items is greater than 
homogamy for the latter type. Exploratory analyses showed this prediction indeed to hold. The 
zero-order correlation among spouses for the items ART MUSEUM (0.34), CLASSICAL (0.36) 
and THEATER (0.36) was greater than for the items HISTORICAL (0.21), LITERATURE (0.27) and 
FOREIGN (0.26). 
I made use of marriage cohorts to test trends in educational and cultural homogamy and 
exchange-effects. Marriage cohorts are groups of people that married or cohabitated in the 
same period. As mentioned above, I distinguish four marriage cohorts: 1948-1962 (N=89): 
1963-1972 (N=153); 1973-1982 (N=176); 1983-1992 (N=129).10 Comparison of homogamy 
in these cohorts provides insight into what distinct historical circumstances - for example, 
material affluence or deprivation - have done for mate selection. In Table A.2 of Appendix A 
the correlations and means of spouses' educations and cultural participation are listed by 
marriage cohort. 
My design of marriage cohorts may run the risk of selection bias. I cannot estimate to what 
extent in a certain marriage cohort 'selective attrition' has taken place. This would be a 
problem if heterogamous relationships end more often than homogamous relationships 
(Bumpass and Sweet 1972). In that case the oldest marriage cohort would consist of a select 
group of homogamous couples and would cause an artificial trend towards less homogamy. 
However, earlier research for the United States has shown that if marriage cohorts are 
followed through time, these cohorts do not change in the extent of (educational) homogamy 
significantly (Kalmijn 1991b; see also Chapter 2)." 
9
 Principal factor analysis of the six culture items indicated that the items fitted well to the culture scale and did not 
have great between-item variance. For men the loadings of the culture items were respectively 0.83, 0 70, 0 56, 
0 61, 0 78, and 0 67 with an eigenvalue of 2 92. For women the loadings were respectively 0.82, 0.76, 0.65, 0 66, 
0.75, and 0 72 with an eigenvalue of 3 17. 
10
 The first marriage cohort comprised a greater number of years than other cohorts because of the relatively few 
surviving married or cohabitating couples I also want to note that for mamed persons the year of cohabitation was 
used if cohabitation took place much earlier than mamage 
" In other research, Kalmijn (1991a) did observe effects of selective attrition· over time, heterogamous couples 
dropped out more often from marriage cohorts than homogamous couples However, this result was derived from 
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5.6 Results 
In this paragraph I examine the tenability of the hypotheses and trend predictions that were 
addressed above. Table 5.1 summarizes the trend predictions. It serves as a framework for 
subsequent analyses. 
Table 5.1. Expected trends in educational homogamy, cultural homogamy, and exchange-
effects in the Netherlands between 1948 and 1992 by hypothesis 
Hypothesis Marriage cohort 
A REPRODUCTION HYPOTHESIS 
educational homogamy 
first version cultural homogamy 
second version cultural homogamy 
В BY-PRODUCT HYPOTHESIS 
educational homogamy 
cultural homogamy 
С AFFLUENCE HYPOTHESIS 
cultural homogamy b + + 
D EXCHANGE HYPOTHESIS 
exchange-effect men b 0 0 0 
exchange-effect women b -
 ; ; 
Notes, b is the reference point, plus-sign indicates increase, minus-sign decrease and 0 indicates stability 
compared to previous cohort; exchange-effect for men is the association between husband's cultural 
participation and wife's education; exchange-effect for women is defined vice versa 
5.6.1 Single Trait Measures of Education and High Culture 
The reproduction hypothesis predicts between the 1948-1992 period in the Netherlands an 
increase of educational homogamy, and in the final cohort (1983-1992) a decrease. The by­
product hypothesis, however, predicts a constantly decreased association between spouses' 
educational levels. To test the tenability of these contradictory predictions I first present - as 
was common in older research on educational homogamy for the Netherlands (De Hoog 1979, 
Sixma and Ultee 1984, Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits 1995) - results of single trait analyses. 
That is, I describe the trend in educational homogamy without accounting for other processes 
that may influence the degree of educational homogamy. Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 present the 
trend in the single trait measure of educational homogamy in the Netherlands between 1948 
and 1992. The single trait measure of educational homogamy has been computed as the zero-
companson of zero-order correlations for seven cohorts among only two points in time The significance of the 
effect of marriage duration was not estimated 
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order product-moment correlation (Pearson r). Product-moment correlations are convenient 
since they take into account the differential availability of men and women on marriage 
markets in as far they are represented by the mean and standard deviation, and give an 
indication of the relative attraction between people of various status groups (cf. the distinction 
between 'absolute' and 'relative' mobility, Goldthorpe 1980; see also Chapter 7). A particular 
advantage of product-moment correlations is that they are parsimonious in estimation and do 
not require large data sets such as more recently applied loglinear models. 
Table 5.2 Zero-order correlations, residual correlations and percentages explained 
correlation for (a) spouses' educations, and (b) spouses' cultural participation: the 
Netherlands 1948-1992 
Parameter 
A SPOUSES' EDUCATIONS 
zero-order correlation 
residual correlation 
% explained correlation 
В SPOUSES' CULTURAL PARTICIPATION 
zero-order correlation 
residual correlation 
% explained correlation 
48-62 
0.39* 
0.17* 
56.4 
0.34* 
0.15* 
55.9 
Marriage cohort 
63-72 
0.57* 
0.22* 
61.4 
0.53* 
0.19* 
64.2 
73-82 
0.45* 
0.24* 
46.7 
0.47* 
0.26* 
44.7 
83-92 
0.52* 
0.24 
53.8 
0.35* 
0.12* 
65.7 
all 
0.52* 
0.28* 
46.2 
0.43* 
0.22* 
48.8 
Note: * significant, p<0.05 
The data in Table 5.2 generally indicate a great extent of educational homogamy (r=0.52; 
/7<0.O5). This means that in the Netherlands after World War Π people with corresponding 
levels of education prefer each other relatively more often than people with dissimilar levels of 
education. When cohorts are examined (Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1), it can be seen that this 
tendency has not been equally strong throughout time. Between 1948 and 1973 educational 
homogamy increased, thereafter - between 1973 and 1983 - it decreased, and in the last cohort 
(1983-1992) it again showed an increase. A test of these variations did not show significant 
fluctuations, however. A model of stability fitted the data well (Chi2=1.80; Df=3; p=0.62).12 
This result is not in line with earlier analyses of the same data in which trendless fluctuation 
was observed (Uunk and Ultee 1995; see also Chapter 3). One should however not attach to 
much weight to this difference in results. First, in the earlier analyses a model of constant 
educational homogamy was just rejected. Second, the earlier analyses showed a trend which 
behaved almost similarly to the trend I found. Third, I confined the present analyses to couples 
aged 20 to 30 when they married, while in the earlier analyses younger and older couples were 
also included. 
1 21 also tested other trend models such as models which postulate a break in the trend after the 1980s. Both for the 
single trait measure of educational homogamy as for the other trend analyses that I used in this chapter, 'break' 
models did not improve upon models that postulated stability. I have to note that due to estimation problems linear 
trend models could not be estimated. 
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The observed trend in the single trait measure of educational homogamy confutes each of the 
aforementioned trend predictions. In contrast to the prediction from the reproduction 
hypothesis, educational homogamy already decreased in the sixties and showed an unexpected 
increase in the eighties and early nineties. In addition, the by-product hypothesis predicted a 
constantly decreasing zero-order association but in two of three periods an increase in 
educational homogamy was observed. Despite these results, the hypotheses need not to be 
rejected. The observed trend in educational homogamy may have been caused by the fact that 
partners also pay attention to their cultural life style in mate selection. The trend in the single 
48-62 63-72 73-82 83-92 
cohort 
Figure 5.1 Trends in single trait measures (solid lines) and dual 
trait measures (dotted lines) for educational homogamy and cultural 
homogamy (with triangles): the Netherlands 1948-1992 
trait measure may hence partly be artificial and due a trend in cultural homogamy and the 
associations between education and cultural participation. Before testing by-products, I first 
discuss the trend in the single trait measure of cultural homogamy. 
The predictions regarding the trend in cultural homogamy are threefold. First, the by-
product hypothesis expects cultural homogamy to increase linearly in the Netherlands after 
World War II. Second, the affluence hypothesis also expects such an increase, with the 
exception of the eighties in which cultural homogamy decreases due to a stop in economic 
growth. Third, the reproduction hypothesis leads to the expectation that cultural homogamy 
was stable until the eighties and increased thereafter due to the supposedly diminished 
effectiveness of educational homogamy as a reproduction strategy. The observed finding in the 
single trait measure of educational homogamy makes such a trend doubtful, however. Given 
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the fact that educational homogamy did not decline in strength after the 1980s, I should on 
second thoughts not expect a compensatory strategy of more cultural homogamy. Instead, 
cultural homogamy should be stable throughout the post-war period. In Table 5.1 this new 
trend prediction ('the second version') is added to the other trend predictions. 
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 show the development in the single trait measure of cultural 
homogamy in the Netherlands after World War II. The figures demonstrate a general tendency 
for cultural homogamy (r=0.43; p<0.05) that increased until the sixties and decreased - as of 
the mid-seventies - thereafter. This finding seems to contradict the initial trend prediction from 
the reproduction hypothesis. Cultural homogamy did not increase in the eighties, as the first 
version suggests, but much earlier in the sixties and decreased in the eighties. The second 
trend prediction from the reproduction hypothesis of stability deserves more credit. Although 
the figures showed a decrease and subsequent decrease in cultural homogamy, a significance 
test showed a model of stability to fit the data best (Chi2=2.21; Df=3 p=0.53). Apparently, 
cultural homogamy has not been used as a compensatory strategy. The conditions under which 
it might have been used (a decrease of educational homogamy) have not been met. 
The trend in the single trait measure of cultural homogamy contradicts the prediction from 
the affluence hypothesis. The association between the cultural participation of partners 
increased with economic affluence, but in the seventies when incomes still tended to rise, 
cultural homogamy decreased. The expectation from the by-product hypothesis that cultural 
homogamy would linearly increase needs stronger rejection. Again however, the results may 
change when dual trait models for educational and cultural homogamy are applied. Dual trait 
analyses will be discussed below. 
5.6.2 Dual Trait Measures of Education and High Culture 
In Figure 5.2,1 present two dual trait models for educational and cultural homogamy. In the 
first dual trait model of Figure 5.2 (Panel A) the zero-order association between spouses' 
educations is accounted for by the association between the cultural participation of spouses 
and the associations between education and cultural participation. The remaining or residual 
association, gives an indication of the extent of educational homogamy net of cultural 
homogamy. Furthermore, if the residual association is compared to the zero-order association, 
one can see to what extent the single trait measure of educational homogamy is a by-product 
of cultural homogamy (see also Chapters 3 and 4). In Panel В of Figure 5.2 I present the dual 
trait model for cultural homogamy. In this model, the association between spouses' cultural 
participation is accounted for by educational homogamy and the associations between 
education and cultural participation. 
In Table 5.2 the dual trait measures of homogamy are shown for the Dutch data set by four 
marriage cohorts in the period 1948-1992. From these figures it can be seen that the residual 
parameters for educational homogamy are considerably lower than the zero-order parameters. 
In general, the dual trait measures of educational homogamy (0.28) is almost 50% lower than 
the single trait measure (0.52). This means that half of the original (zero-order) association 
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between spouses' educations is a by-product of cultural homogamy and the associations 
between high culture and education. As De Singly expected, educationally homogamous 
marriages often exist because partners were similar with respect their participation in the high 
arts. Nevertheless, the association between spouses' educations cannot fully be explained by 
cultural homogamy. There still is a positive significant residual association. This indicates that 
partners match on education independent of cultural participation. 
A. Educational homogamy B. Cultural homogamy 
Culture man 
У 
Education 
t 
Culture woman 
t 
Education 
woman 
t 
I 
Culture man 
Education 
man 
Ψ 
Culture woman 
A 
Education 
woman 
Figure 5.2 Residual correlation models for (a) educational homogamy, 
and (b) cultural homogamy 
Vice versa, cultural homogamy can also be accounted for by educational homogamy and the 
associations between education and cultural participation. In Table 5.2 it can be seen that 
while in general the zero-order association between spouses' cultural participation is 0.43, the 
residual association is 0.22: here, 50% of the original association between spouses' 
participation in the high arts is a by-product too. Just like educationally homogamous 
marriages exist because people coincide with respect to participation in the high arts, culturally 
homogamous marriages arise because people with similar education attract each other. 
However, net of spouses' educations a positive association between spouses' cultural 
participation remains. This, indicates that one's cultural life style is also an important factor in 
mate selection of Dutch people. 
The by-products also pertain to trends in educational and cultural homogamy. The 
parameter estimates of Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 demonstrate that whereas in single trait 
analysis cultural homogamy has a reversed U-shaped trend, in dual trait analysis this trend 
becomes less pronounced. The net preferences for educational homogamy do not show much 
change in the post-war period. The only change occurs between the first (1948-1962) and 
second cohort (1963-1972) in which the dual trait measure of educational homogamy slightly 
increased from 0.17 to 0.22. The finding of stability is confirmed in a statistical test of the 
trends. A model of constant homogamy fitted almost perfectly to the observed trend in the 
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dual trait measure of educational homogamy (Chi2=0.44; Df=3; p=0.93). I hence conclude that 
the net preferences for educational homogamy have been stable in post-war Dutch society. 
The trend finding of stable educational homogamy is more in line with my predictions than 
earlier in single trait analysis. The prediction from the reproduction hypothesis of initially 
increased and finally decreased educational homogamy can partially be confirmed because in 
the eighties the slight increase in educational homogamy stopped. Whether this finding can be 
explained by educational expansion and/or democratization of the educational system cannot 
be determined. The trend prediction from De Singly's by-product hypothesis must still be 
rejected after dual trait analysis. Educational homogamy did not decrease, but slightly 
increased in strength. It became a more independent matrimonial strategy. This may also be 
seen in the percentage explained association in Table 5.2. While in the fifties and sixties more 
than half of the association between spouses' educations could be accounted for by cultural 
homogamy, in subsequent decades this percentage decreased. 
The findings of the trend in cultural homogamy also change after dual trait analysis. While 
in single trait analysis cultural homogamy increased until the seventies and decreased 
thereafter, the dual trait measures in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 show that cultural homogamy 
increased until the eighties and decreased as of then. These changes are - like single trait 
analyses - not significant, however. A model of stable cultural homogamy fitted the data well 
(Chi2=2.80; Df=3; p=0.42). Over all then, there does not seem to be an increase in the role of 
cultural participation in mate selection. 
With the new findings on cultural homogamy, the first version of the predictions from the 
reproduction hypothesis must be rejected. Cultural homogamy did not show the expected 
increase in the eighties and nineties but the trend is precisely opposite: until the eighties a 
slight increase, thereafter a slight decrease. The second version of the trend predictions from 
the reproduction hypothesis still holds: over all cohorts the trend appeared to be stable. The 
prediction from the by-product hypothesis on cultural homogamy must also be rejected after 
dual trait analysis. In the entire post-war period, cultural homogamy did not increase but 
remained at the same level as it started. The prediction from the affluence hypothesis on 
cultural homogamy deserves more credit than in single trait analysis. Cultural homogamy 
showed a slight increase in the period that the Netherlands experienced strong economic 
growth and decreased slightly in the period this growth leveled of. That cultural homogamy in 
the eighties was lower than in previous cohorts was not expected, however. The material 
circumstances had become worse in the eighties, but they were still at a higher level than in the 
fifties or sixties. 
5.6.3 Exchange of Education and High Culture 
The last hypothesis to be tested is the exchange hypothesis. The trend prediction is that in 
older cohorts in which women participated in the labor force infrequently, marriages between 
culturally active women and highly educated men were more favored than the opposite 
combination of culturally active and highly educated women. In younger cohorts, this 
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exchange diminished due to higher labor force participation of women. Table 5.3 presents the 
exchange-effects for men (the partial association between cultural participation of the husband 
and education of the wife) and women (the partial association between cultural participation of 
the wife and education of the husband) by marriage cohort. The parameters for the exchange-
effects are derived from the dual trait model of panel A (Figure 5.2) in which educational 
homogamy is accounted for by spouses' cultural participation. 
Table 5.3 The (partial) association between cultural participation of the respondent and 
education of the spouse for men (exchange-effect men) and women (exchange-effect women): 
the Netherlands 1948-1992 
Parameter 
exchange-effect men 
exchange-effect women 
48-62 
0.08 
0.31* 
63-72 
0.18* 
0.22* 
Marriage cohort 
73-82 
0.01 
0.11 
83-92 
0.11 
0.26* 
all 
0.08 
0.21* 
Note: * significant, p<0.05 
For the entire post-war period, Table 5.3 shows positive significant exchange-effects for 
women, but not for men. This means that for women - independent of their own education and 
cultural participation of their husbands - participation in the high arts increases their chances to 
marry highly educated men. Vice versa, this does not apply for men. The effect of their 
participation in the high arts on the educational attainment of women is non-significant and 
almost three times as small as the parameter estimate for women. Cultural knowledge and 
abilities therefore seem to be a means for upward mobility only for women. This finding 
confirms predictions from the exchange hypothesis. 
Over time, the exchange-effects in Table 5.3 showed a decrease for women until the 
eighties and an increase thereafter. For men, the exchange-effects are non-significant, except in 
the second marriage cohort (1963-1972). These trend findings suggest educational and 
cultural convergence between men and women and further support predictions from the 
exchange hypothesis. 
5.7 Conclusions and Discussion 
In this chapter I examined the role of education and cultural participation in mate selection in 
the Netherlands between 1948 and 1992. I did so first by investigating patterns and trends in 
educational and cultural homogamy. Single trait analyses of these patterns have shown that 
partners prefer similarity both with respect to educational level and with respect to 
participation in the high arts. Dual trait analyses that take into account both types of 
homogamy, support these findings but also show that part of the associations are by-products: 
educational homogamy may for 50% be explained by the fact that people match on similar 
cultural preferences and the fact that educational attainment and participation in the high arts 
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correlate positively; vice versa 50% of the association between spouses' cultural participation 
can accounted for by educational homogamy and the links between education and high 
culture. Given the strength of these artificial effects and the parameter estimates, I conclude 
that in the Netherlands after World War Π both types of homogamy are equally strong. 
Trend analysis did not provide evidence for substantial changes in educational and cultural 
homogamy. Both single and dual trait analyses have shown that preferences for similarity have 
remained fairly stable throughout the post-war period. Despite this stability, some slight 
changes in the role of education and high culture have occurred. Single trait analyses 
demonstrated that cultural homogamy increased until the seventies and decreased thereafter. 
Dual trait analyses also demonstrated an initial increase and subsequent decrease, but in the 
dual trait analyses cultural homogamy decreased one marriage cohort later (1973-1982) than 
in single trait analyses. When this trend finding is compared to the trend in educational 
homogamy - that showed a slight increase in dual trait analyses for the entire post-war period -
, it can be concluded that the importance of cultural participation vis-a-vis education decreased 
in Dutch marriage markets after World War II. These findings answer the first two research 
questions in this chapter. 
Next to an investigation of patterns and trends in homogamy, I investigated the role of 
education and cultural participation in mate selection by examining the degree to which one's 
cultural participation enhances the chances of marriage to highly educated persons, and by 
examining the degree to which this so-called exchange effect decreased and converged 
between men and women (research question 3). The results of my dual trait analyses showed 
that for women the role of high culture is more important than for men and also showed this 
gender difference to decline over time. 
The findings of my analyses partially reject the predictions from Bourdieu's theory of 
compensatory strategies. As expected, the development towards greater educational 
homogamy flattened in the period that the socially distinctive power of (high) school diplomas 
decreased. Cultural homogamy did, however, not react to educational homogamy as a 
compensatory strategy. Cultural homogamy decreased slightly in the eighties, whereas the 
opposite was expected.13 A better explanation of the trend in cultural homogamy is given by 
the affluence hypothesis. This hypothesis was derived from Inglehart's theory of post-
materialism (Inglehart 1977) and holds that adults pay more attention to a 'good taste' of the 
prospective spouses when they have experienced more affluence earlier in life. This hypothesis 
was generally confirmed: cultural homogamy increased somewhat in the period the 
Netherlands experienced economic growth (1948-1983) and decreased slightly in the period 
the Netherlands experience economic recession (1983-1992). That cultural homogamy ended 
up lower (in the eighties) than early cohorts was not expected. Although material 
13
 An alternative prediction from Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies would be that distinction by high 
culture took place, but first by less complex cultural activities and then by more complex activities Exploratory 
analyses did not show such a sequence of increasingly severe cultural standards of social distinction. For example, 
homogamy for reading complex books (LITERATURE, FOREIGN) was highest in the second cohort (1963-1972), while 
homogamy for a less complex item, theater visit (THEATER), had its high a cohort later ( 1973-1982) 
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circumstances had become worse in the eighties, these circumstances were still at a higher 
level than they were in the fifties or sixties. 
De Singly's (1993) hypothesis on trends in educational and cultural homogamy performed 
worst of the four hypotheses I discussed. De Singly's by-product hypothesis holds that in 
times of weak influence of parents and ample leisure time for young adults, educational 
homogamy is a by-product of the tendency to marry someone who is culturally homogamous, 
while in other times educational homogamy is a more explicit marriage strategy. This 
hypothesis was generally rejected. Educational homogamy was somewhat stronger in younger 
than in older cohorts and over time it was decreasingly influenced by cultural homogamy. This 
means that educational homogamy became a more independent matrimonial strategy, 
intendedly or unintendedly applied to reproduce social status. Despite these rejections, one 
finding was in favor of De Singly's by-product hypothesis. Comparison of homogamy 
parameters from single and dual trait models showed that the zero-order association between 
spouses' educations can for half its size be accounted for by the fact that partners are similar in 
cultural behavior during mate selection and by the fact that participation in high arts strongly 
relates to educational attainment. Apparently, the aim of persons who contract an 
educationally homogamous marriage is not only similarity in education but also similarity in 
cultural preferences. 
The exchange hypothesis on the relevance of one's cultural participation for marriage to 
highly educated persons was generally confirmed. In older cohorts when gender stratification 
was strong, for women cultural participation functioned as a way to attract highly educated 
men for marriage while for men it did so to a much lesser extent. In younger cohorts when 
women caught up in economic status, these exchange-effects decreased in size and converged 
between men and women. The last marriage cohort deviates from this general picture: during 
the period 1983-1992 the relevance of cultural participation for attracting highly educated 
spouses unexpectedly increased for women. This increase does not correspond to the strong 
growth of female labor force participation during the eighties and I do not have a good 
alternative explanation for this finding. 
If the research findings are evaluated in a more general sense, there are few reasons to 
assume an increased role of cultural participation and a decrease role of education in mate 
selection. Although in the eighties cultural participation became more important for women, 
the tendency towards cultural homogamy remained fairly stable throughout the post-war 
period and declined slightly in the eighties and begin nineties. This general finding coincides 
with findings from research on the intergenerational transmission of social status. In the latter 
type of research it has been demonstrated that the effect of cultural background on attained 
level of education has remained small and relatively stable in the Netherlands after World War 
II (De Graaf 1986, Janssen and Ultee 1994, Niehof and Ganzeboom 1995). Also, no strong 
differences between men and women were found in the importance of cultural background on 
educational attainment. These results on intergenerational transfer of social status and my 
results from analyses of marriage patterns, suggest that the highest social strata do not 
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increasingly distinguish themselves from others by higher cultural standards. The Dutch 
society may in this sense still be regarded as socially open. 
The aforementioned general findings give rise to the question to what extent Bourdieu's 
hypotheses on the relevance of cultural life styles are valid through time and space. Mendras 
and Cole (1988) provided a negative answer to this question. They showed that even its 
country of origin, the French society, Bourdieu's theoretical framework on compensating 
strategies does not apply. After the 'events of May 1968' a second French Revolution of social 
reforms took place that cannot so much be explained by compensatory strategies, but by 
structural changes in society such as greater labor force participation of women and changes in 
the educational and occupational structure. A more positive answer to the question about the 
applicability of Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies is that high culture is important 
in current societies. This chapter is proof of that. It seems important to examine the role of 
high culture again and again. 

6 THE ROLE OF LEVEL AND TYPE OF EDUCATION IN MATE 
SELECTION: THE DUTCH EDUCATIONAL ELITE 
Abstract. In this chapter I examine the role of level and type of education in mate selection of Dutch 
university graduates (the 'educational elite'). My first question is to what degree university educated 
marry a partner within rather than across their type of schooling ('type homogamy'), and to what extent 
this form of homogamy differs among various disciplines. My second question is to what degree these 
persons marry within the educational elite and to what extent this tendency for 'level homogamy' differs 
among disciplines. The third question addresses changes in these forms of homogamy. To answer these 
questions, I pool data on spouses' educations from four Dutch surveys of the 1990s, and use loglinear 
models. Five academic disciplines are distinguished: the humanities, the social sciences, the applied and 
natural sciences, economic-legal sciences, and medicine. My analyses show that there is a strong tendency 
to marry within rather than across one's discipline, but this form of homogamy is weaker than the 
tendency to marry within rather than outside the educational elite. When examining the distances between 
the various disciplines, I find evidence for a division of the educational elite into a 'cultural elite' on the 
one hand (humanities and social sciences) and an 'economic elite' on the other (medicine, natural, and 
economic-legal sciences). In addition to such a horizontal differentiation within the elite, I also find a 
hierarchical structuring. Persons from the worse paying academic disciplines, humanities and social 
sciences, are more likely to marry outside the educational elite than persons from the better paying 
sciences, such as medicine, natural or economic-legal sciences. In general, my results indicate that the 
educational elite is less homogeneous than is commonly believed. 
6.1 Introduction1 
In modern societies, individual differences in educational attainment chiefly determine who 
gets what and why. Persons with a high level of education on average have greater chances to 
find a job, earn more and also enjoy better health than persons with low education. Such 
differences are also observed within the realm of love: higher educated have greater chances 
than lower educated to marry educationally or occupationally successful persons. 
Within sociology, educationally mixed marriages have been studied extensively. Studies for 
the Netherlands are De Hoog (1979), Sixma and Ultee (1984), Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits 
(1995) and Uunk and Ultee (1995; see also Chapter 3). In general, the studies have shown that 
people have a greater tendency to marry someone near in educational ranking than to marry 
someone with a much lower or higher level of education. This tendency for educational 
homogamy is stronger for university educated than for other educational groups, and is also 
stronger than other forms of homogamy. Furthermore, after the Second World War 
educational homogamy decreased in size, although recent findings also point to a trend 
reversal (Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits 1995). 
' This chapter is a revised and translated version of a paper that was co-written by Malthijs Kalmijn. It will be 
published in June 1996 in the Sociologische Gids (Uunk and Kalmijn, 1996). 
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6.2 Research Questions 
In this chapter I study partner choices of persons with a university education, to which I refer 
as the 'educational elite'. I extend previous research on educational homogamy by examining 
the degree to which marriage patterns of the educational elite are differentiated by type of 
schooling. Three questions guide the analyses. The first question pertains to the degree to 
which university educated persons marry a partner within rather than across their type of 
schooling, and to differences in this tendency of 'type homogamy' among various academic 
disciplines. For example, I study the extent to which men with a degree in the natural sciences 
marry women with the same degree, rather than other women. The second question addresses 
the distances of various disciplines to lower educated ('level homogamy'). For example, do 
persons with a degree in the social sciences marry more often 'below' their level of education 
than persons with a degree in medicine? The third question pertains to developments in the 
degree of type and level homogamy. For example, has the previously observed trend towards 
decreasing level homogamy been compensated by an increase in type homogamy? In sum, the 
three research questions are: 
(1) To what extent do university educated persons marry a partner within rather than 
across their type of schooling, and to what extent does this tendency of 'type 
homogamy' differ among various academic disciplines? 
(2) To what extent do university educated persons marry a partner within rather than 
cross their level of schooling, and to what extent does this tendency of 'level 
homogamy' differ among various academic disciplines? 
(3) To what extent have the degree of type and level homogamy changed in the 
Netherlands after World War II, and to what extent do the various academic 
disciplines differ in possible developments? 
To answer the research questions, I distinguish 'absolute' from 'relative homogamy'. Absolute 
homogamy refers to the percentage of persons marrying within their type or level of schooling. 
Relative homogamy refers to the tendency to marry someone of equal educational level or 
discipline, independent of the supply of marriageable men and women with a certain level and 
type of education. Unlike absolute homogamy, relative measures do not simply result from the 
chances to meet someone with dissimilar or similar traits, but they indicate certain preferences 
of marriage candidates that constitute social distances among distinct social groups. 
The theories in this article follow this distinction in absolute and relative measures of 
homogamy. The first theory, the theory of sex-segregation, pertains to absolute patterns. It 
states that marriage patterns as well as trends in homogamy can be accounted for by chances 
to meet someone of the other sex, notably differences in college attendance between men and 
women (Blau 1977). The other two theories, the theory of compensatory strategies and 
economic competition theory, pertain to relative homogamy and therefore focus on 
preferences for marriage. According to the theory of compensatory strategies, preferences are 
The Role of Level and Type of Education: Dutch Graduates 109 
based on a general tendency for social distinction (Bourdieu 1979). According to the 
competition theory, marriage preferences are based on the need to marry spouses who have 
attractive financial prospects (Becker 1981). 
This chapter tries to contribute to research on homogamy in several ways. First, my 
analyses of level and type of schooling may show more clearly than earlier analyses of 
(educational) homogamy, how imbalances in the amount of marriageable men and women 
affect partner choices. These imbalances have been particularly strong at universities. Some 
disciplines, for example the applied and natural sciences, have had an enormous surplus of men 
while other studies, for example the social sciences, have had a less skewed gender 
distribution. By comparing the marriage patterns of the various disciplines, I examine to what 
degree such 'structural' factors influence on partner choices (Blau 1977). Second, the 
marriage patterns of the disciplines can provide useful insight into the extent to which the 
educational elite is horizontally differentiated. Bourdieu's (1979) suggestion of a division of 
the upper strata into a 'cultural elite' on the one hand and an 'economic elite' on the other, can 
be tested anew and more strongly by research on marital homogamy. Third and finally, the 
marriage patterns of the educational elite can show a hierarchical structuring of the various 
disciplines. The worse paying disciplines, such as humanities and the social sciences, may have 
a smaller distance to lower educated than the better paying sciences, such as medicine or 
economic-legal sciences. 
6.3 Data 
My data are taken from four Dutch household surveys: (a) Users of Services Survey 1991 
('Aanvullend Voorzieningengebruik Onderzoek 199 Γ , SCP 1991), (b) Labor Force Survey 
('Enquête Beroepsbevolking 1991', CBS 1991), (с) Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993' 
('Familie-enquête Nederlandse bevolking 1992-1993', Ultee and Ganzeboom 1993; see also 
Chapters 3 and 5), and (d) Households in the Netherlands, Telephone Survey 1994 
('Huishoudens in Nederland Telefonische Enquête 1994', Weesie and Ganzeboom 1994). 
These surveys contain information both on the level and type of education of married and 
unmarried cohabitating partners. Because university educated are a minor group in Dutch 
society, combination of the four surveys is necessary. This introduces no further problems of 
comparability because the four surveys are representative samples of the Dutch population and 
because the educational classifications can be uniformly coded into the tenfold Standard 
Classification of Education 1987 (CBS 1987). 
From the combined data file I selected couples that had completed education and that were 
married, or living together for more than one year, at the time of the interview. Because not in 
each of the four surveys data are available upon year of marriage or upon whether people had 
remarried or not, the research population consists of all married and (unmarried) cohabitating 
couples with a finished education. These couples may include people that have married once 
or more than once, and people that have married at an early age (for example, just after 
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completion of education) or at a late age (for example, late in their occupational career). This 
is a heterogenous group of people, but I think that for several reasons their partner choices 
will not be very different from a more restricted sample of spouses. First, there are relatively 
few remarried people in my combined data set, in particular in older birth cohorts. Second, 
explorative analyses have shown no substantial effects of remarriage or marriage timing on 
homogamy (both with respect to educational level and type of schooling) in the surveys that 
do contain information on year of marriage or cohabitation. If I mention marriage in the 
sequel, I therefore also refer to cohabitating and remarried people. I further want to stress that 
this chapter does not deal about partner choices of students, but about partner choices of all 
people with a completed (academic) degree. 
In all, the analyses pertain to 34,980 couples, of which 2,721 (8%) are pairs in which at 
least one of the spouses has attained university education and of which the remaining 32,259 
couples pertain to marriages between persons that have lower than university education (see 
also Table 6.1). Within academic education, I distinguish five disciplines: (a) the humanities 
(languages, history, and philosophy), (b) the social sciences, (c) the applied and natural 
sciences, (d) economic-legal sciences (law, economy, administration), and (e) medicine. This 
classification is a condensed version of the earlier mentioned Standard Classification of 
Education 1987 (CBS 1987). Mindful of Bourdieu's study on the social position of professors 
in the Académie Française, I assign the first two disciplines to the cultural and the last three 
disciplines to the economic elite (Bourdieu 1988)..2 This decisions is strengthened by actual 
differentiation in earning capacities and cultural consumption of persons from various 
academic disciplines. Kalmijn and Van der Lippe (1986) demonstrated for the Netherlands that 
persons with a degree in medical sciences earn most, then persons from economic-legal 
sciences, applied-natural sciences, social sciences, and finally the humanities. In an explorative 
analysis of data from the Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993,1 also found differences in 
cultural consumption among the five disciplines: persons from the cultural elite participate in 
six forms of high culture (see also Chapter 5) more frequently than persons from the economic 
elite, and in particular this difference applies to persons with a degree in humanities (they 
participate often) and persons with a degree in the applied and natural sciences (they 
participate infrequently). 
In Table 6.1,1 cross-classified the levels and types of schooling of the 34,980 couples. The 
first row and column of this marriage table contain university educated men or women that 
married a person who has lower than university education. The other cells of the table contain 
persons that married within the educational elite. In the sequel, I analyze this marriage table in 
two ways. In paragraph 6.4 I present measures of absolute homogamy. That is, I present 
percentages of people that have been married within or across their type or level of schooling. 
The paragraph also addresses sex-segregation theory. In paragraph 6.5 I present measures of 
21 have to note lhat Bourdieu (1988 47) characterizes persons with a degree in Ihe applied and natural sciences as 
having relatively low economic capital, but his analysis is restricted to employees at colleges or universities My 
analysis also includes people employed in other, high-wage sectors of industry 
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relative homogamy based on loglinear models and discuss the theory of compensatory 
strategies and economic competition theory. 
Table 6.1 Type and level of schooling of married and unmarried cohabitating couples of 
which at least one partner had university education: the Dutch educational elite 
MEN 
(1) Lower education 
(2) Humanities 
(3) Social sciences 
(4) Natural sciences 
(5) Economic-legal 
(6) Medicine 
Total 
(П 
32259 
323 
574 
208 
272 
492 
34128 
(2) 
24 
27 
9 
4 
7 
4 
75 
WOMEN 
O) 
20 
4 
54 
3 
5 
12 
98 
1 
(4) 
89 
19 
23 
48 
20 
26 
225 
Г5) 
36 
17 
18 
4 
47 
12 
134 
(6) 
128 
28 
34 
24 
21 
85 
320 
Total 
32556 
418 
712 
291 
372 
631 
34980 
6.4 Absolute Homogamy: the Role of Sex-Segregation 
6.4.1 Theoretical Considerations 
With whom a person marries strongly depends on the opportunities that person has to marry 
the desired mate. If the supply of potential mates is high within one's level or type of 
schooling, people often marry homogamously because they can meet the desired mate most 
easily within their own group. The degree of absolute level or type homogamy is in that 
situation high. If on the other hand the supply of potential mates is low, people may refrain 
from marriage or they make a second-best choice. In the latter case, the degree of absolute 
homogamy is low. 
The question how and to what extent supply factors and specifically gender differences in 
college participation determine partner choices is central in sex-segregation theory. The theory 
holds that higher education - often unintentionally - functions as a local marriage market 
(Kalmijn 1991a): a place where students, during an important phase in their life, frequently 
interact with each other and do no so often meet people from other social groups. A strong 
version of sex-segregation theory states that each discipline forms a separate marriage market. 
If in these isolated markets men and women are equally represented, people marry within their 
type of schooling and the degree of absolute type homogamy is high. If on the other hand sex-
segregation prevails, some men or women may refrain from marriage or search their partner 
elsewhere. The degree of absolute homogamy will be lower in the latter case. 
A weaker version of sex-segregation theory assumes that marriage markets of various 
disciplines overlap and form one academic market. The concentration of various faculties in 
large buildings within small areas, or the existence of student associations that are open to 
various disciplines, are phenomena that indicate such overlap. If in certain disciplines of the 
academic marriage market shortages in available men or women arise, persons from these 
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disciplines will relatively more often marry a person from another discipline than I assumed 
under the strong version of sex-segregation theory. 
6.4.2 Patterns of Absolute Homogamy 
How do the marriage patterns of university educated look like? The figures in Table 6.2 show 
the extent to which university educated men (Panel A) and women (Panel B) marry within or 
across disciplines (absolute type homogamy), and the extent to which these persons marry 
people of equal or lower educational level (absolute level homogamy). 
Table 6.2 Percentage of marriages within or across type and level of schooling for married 
and unmarried cohabitating men and women with university education: the Dutch 
educational elite 
AMEN 
Humanities 
Social sciences 
Natural sciences 
Economic-legal 
Medicine 
All men 
В WOMEN 
Humanities 
Social sciences 
Natural sciences 
Economic-legal 
Medicine 
All women 
Within 
Within 
discipline 
13.5 
16.5 
7.6 
6.5 
12.6 
10.8 
26.6 
21.3 
55.1 
36.0 
35.1 
30.6 
university 
Across 
discipline 
8.6 
12.0 
11.8 
16.3 
14.2 
12.1 
33.4 
39.1 
24.5 
32.0 
38.1 
34.5 
With lower 
education 
78.0 
71.5 
80.6 
77.3 
73.1 
77.1 
40.0 
39.6 
20.4 
32.0 
26.9 
34.9 
N 
631 
291 
712 
418 
372 
2424 
320 
225 
98 
75 
134 
852 
The third column of Table 6.2 shows that university educated men generally marry more often 
'below' their level of education (77%) than women (35%). Partly, this difference can be 
accounted for by sex-segregation within the university system. Table 6.2 shows that there are 
2424 university educated men but only 852 university educated women in the sample. Many of 
the high educated men will - provided they want to marry - select a partner outside the 
educational elite. For university educated women on the other hand, the oversupply of men 
creates ample opportunities to marry an equally educated partner. Women will therefore - in 
absolute terms - marry more often educationally homogamous than men. 
Do the disciplines differ in the extent to which persons from these disciplines marry with 
lower educated? In Table 6.2 one can see that men with a degree in the applied and natural 
sciences marry most often with a lower educated wife (81%), while men educated in the 
humanities marry 'below' their level least (72%). This finding can well be explained by 
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differences in sex-segregation: the applied and natural sciences have much more male than 
female students while within humanities gender distribution is fairly equal. For women, the 
differences in absolute level homogamy between disciplines show the opposite pattern: women 
with an education in humanities marry most often outside the educational elite (40%) while 
women with an education in the applied and natural sciences do so least (20%). These findings 
also square with sex-segregation theory: women with a degree in the applied and natural 
sciences can most easily find a partner within the academic world. 
Although the observed marriage patterns correspond to what may have been expected on 
the basis of the supply of marriageable men and women, the position of male medicine 
students and male students in humanities forms an exception. Male medical students marry 
relatively often within the educational elite (27%), despite a large surplus of men. Male 
students in humanities (12%), on the other hand, do not often marry within their educational 
level despite a much more equal distribution of the two genders in this discipline. These two 
findings demonstrate that marriage patterns are not solely determined by differences in supply 
of marriage candidates, but also by certain marriage preferences: for (male) persons with a 
degree in medicine preferences for marriage within the educational elite seem to be much 
higher than for (male) persons with a degree in humanities. 
When people marry within the educational elite, how often do they marry within their 
discipline? Table 6.2 shows that for men and women the general tendency to marry within 
one's discipline is as large as the general tendency to marry outside one's discipline (for men 
respectively 11% and 12%; for women respectively 31% an 35%). Between disciplines there 
are differences, however. Within the applied and natural sciences and within the economic-
legal sciences, for example, male persons marry more often outside than within their discipline. 
Furthermore, for women some disciplines show large differences in absolute type homogamy. 
While 55% of the females in the applied and natural sciences marries a male person with the 
same type of education (and 25% marries outside their type), 21% of female students in social 
sciences does so (and 40% marries outside their type). 
Like the findings on absolute level homogamy, the differences in absolute type homogamy 
may be attributed to sex-segregation. If a discipline functions as a local marriage market, 
women with a degree in the applied and natural sciences will probably find a partner within 
their own social circle, while men with a degree in the social sciences will have to look much 
harder for a like partner. On the other hand, the differences in type homogamy may reflect 
preferences for homogamy or heterogamy that are independent of the supply of men and 
women. Within the medical sciences, for example, sex-segregation is much higher than within 
social sciences, but men with a degree in medicine marry (almost) as often a woman of their 
type than male social scientists. In this respect too, persons with a background in medicine 
form a more closed group than persons with other academic backgrounds. 
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Figure 6.1 Sex-ratios in university education by academic discipline 
(CBS 1993) 
6.4.3 Trends in Absolute Homogamy 
What trends can be expected in the degree of absolute level and type homogamy? To what 
extent can changes in sex-segregation within the university system account for trends in these 
forms of homogamy? To answer these question, Figure 6.1 presents developments in college 
attendance of men and women. The figures refer to the number of registered men and women 
with university education by discipline for the years 1962/1963 to 1992/1993 (CBS 1993). In 
the 1962-1993 period the figures show a strong decrease in the traditionally weak 
participation of women in university education: whereas in 1962/1963 there were 500 
university educated men to 100 women, in 1992/1993 this sex-ratio is practically equal. It 
seems likely that such changes affected partner choices of the educational elite. While in the 
past there was a shortage of female marriage candidates for men and women had 'choice of 
plenty', nowadays higher educated men can much easier find a partner at their level and 
women will less often marry up. This leads me to expect that the general degree of absolute 
level homogamy increased for men and decreased for women. 
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Developments in sex-specific college attendance have not been equally strong for academic 
disciplines. Figure 6.1 shows that the largest changes have occurred with respect to the 
economic elite: the applied-natural, economic-legal and medical sciences. While in the 
academic year 1962/1963 the ratio of men to women was 1400:100, in 1992/1993 this ratio 
has become three times as small: 400 men to 100 women. Within social sciences and 
humanities (the cultural elite), the distribution of men and women was already fairly equal in 
the sixties and has since that period not undergone much change. In the nineties women even 
outnumbered men. Given these developments, I expect that the degree of absolute level and 
type homogamy increases stronger for disciplines of the economic elite than for disciplines of 
the cultural elite. 
To test the trend predictions of absolute level and type homogamy, I compare birth 
cohorts.3 The relatively small sample of university educated enables me to distinguish only two 
such cohorts: one cohort in which wives are born before 1950, and one cohort in which wives 
are born in 1950 or after. If I assume wife's age at first marriage to be around 23 - averaged 
for non-academic and academic women (Kalmijn 1994b) -, these cohorts refer to couples 
married before 1973 or later. Table 6.3 shows the percentages of absolute homogamy for men 
and Table 6.4 shows these percentages for women 
In general, the percentage of university educated men marrying a lower educated wife 
declined among the two birth cohorts from 84% to 72% (Table 6.3). This increase in absolute 
level homogamy is accompanied by an increase in the percentage of men marrying within their 
discipline (from 7% to 13%), and by an increase of men marrying outside their discipline but 
within the educational elite (from 8% to 15%). Higher educated men increasingly marry a 
university educated woman, but when they do so they marry as frequently within as across 
their discipline. Hence, absolute level homogamy increased for men, but not the degree of 
absolute type homogamy. For women (Table 6.4) changes in absolute level and type 
homogamy are non-significant. If anything alters, the changes suggest an increase in the 
percentage of academic women marrying lower educated men (from 30% to 37%). 
The trends noted above also apply to the various academic disciplines. With respect to each 
of the five disciplines, higher educated men increasingly marry with higher educated women, 
although the increase for social sciences is non-significant. The developments in absolute type 
homogamy are less uniform: men with an education in humanities, social sciences or applied-
natural sciences marry as often within their discipline as before. For men with an education in 
economic-legal or medical sciences this does not apply: the former group increasingly marries 
within their discipline, while the latter group more and more enter wedlock with persons from 
other disciplines. 
3
 I used year of birth instead of year of marriage because year of marriage is missing in the largest of the four 
surveys, the Labor Force Survey 1991. Although some people may marry later than others, a comparison of birth 
cohorts will probably not differ much from a comparison of marriage cohorts (see also Chapter 7). In the twentieth 
century namely, mean age at (first) marriage has remained fairly stable, and invariably men's age of first marriage 
has been two years higher than the corresponding age for women (Kalmijn 1994b). 
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Table 6.3 Percentage of men married within or across their type and level of schooling by 
birth cohort: the Dutch educational elite 
Men 1900-1949 1950-1976 ¿% Chiz 
HUMANITIES 
Within discipline 10.7 15.7 +5.0 11.4** 
Across discipline 
With lower 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Within discipline 13.8 18.1 +4.3 2.73 
Across discipline 
With lower 
NATURAL SCIENCES 
Within discipline 3.2 11.0 +7.8 29.0* 
Across discipline 
With lower 
ECONOMIC-LEGAl 
Within discipline 1.3 9.4 +8.1 10.6** 
Across discipline 
With lower 
MEDICINE 
Within discipline 10.9 14.1 +3.2 14.5* 
Across discipline 
With lower 
All men 
Within discipline 7.4 13.3 +5.9 52.9** 
Across discipline 
With lower 
As I stated above, for women no significant changes in absolute homogamy took place and 
this conclusion also holds for specific disciplines. However, there is an unexpected change for 
women with a degree in the applied and natural sciences. Although many female students 
entered this discipline and competition among women for higher educated men increased, 
technically educated women increasingly wind up marrying a university educated man, 
whether from their own discipline or from another academic discipline. 
On the whole, I conclude that absolute level homogamy increased for men while it 
decreased slightly for women. The trends generally confirm sex-segregation theory. However, 
since the degree of absolute type homogamy did not increase for men, sex-segregation cannot 
be the sole determinant of the observed trends. The findings suggest that the various 
disciplines are not isolated marriage markets but overlap. This overlap cannot well be 
10.7 
5.3 
84.0 
9.2 
77.1 
7.3 
89.5 
15.9 
82.8 
7.5 
81.6 
8.3 
84.3 
15.7 
11.1 
73.1 
13.7 
68.1 
15.3 
73.7 
16.5 
74.2 
20.2 
65.7 
15.0 
71.8 
+5.0 
+5.8 
-10.9 
+4.5 
-9.0 
+8.0 
-15.8 
+0.6 
-8.6 
+12.7 
-15.9 
+6.7 
-12.5 
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accounted for by a theory that centers around differential availability of potential mates. It may 
rather be explained by theories that assume certain preferences for marriage. The next 
paragraph (6.4) addresses these preferences and studies patterns of relative homogamy using 
notions of two existing theories of mate selection. 
Table 6.4 Percentage of women married within or across their type and level of schooling by 
birth cohort: the Dutch educational elite 
Women 1900-1954 1955-1976 Δ Chi2 
HUMANITIES 
Within discipline 30.9 24.7 -6.2 4.8 
Across discipline 
With lower 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Within discipline 25.9 19.8 -6.1 1.2 
Across discipline 
With lower 
NATURAL SCIENCES 
Within discipline 41.7 59.5 +17.8 2.4 
Across discipline 
With lower 
MEDICINE 
Within discipline 44.2 30.8 -13.4 3.1 
Across discipline 
With lower 
All women 
Within discipline 33.2 29.7 -3.5 3.7 
Across discipline 
With lower 
Note: Because there are only few women with a degree in economic-legal sciences in the oldest birth 
cohort, I did not compute percentages for this category. 
6.5 Relative Homogamy: Distinction and Competition 
6.5.1 Theoretical Considerations 
People do not only marry within their discipline because they coincidentaJly meet there, but 
also enter wedlock because they have a desire to spend their life with someone of the same 
discipline. One reason for this could be that one's type of schooling, like educational level, 
indicates the social group to which one belongs. Just as the question what one does for a living 
is an introductory question at parties or other social events of the working part of a society, 
30.9 
38.1 
30.9 
34.5 
39.7 
33.3 
25.0 
37.2 
18.6 
37.1 
29.7 
24.7 
31.4 
43.9 
40.7 
39.5 
21.6 
18.9 
38.5 
30.8 
33.5 
36.8 
-6.2 
-6.7 
+13.0 
+6.2 
-.2 
-11.7 
-6.1 
+1.3 
+12.2 
 
-3.6 
+7.1 
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the question what one studies is frequently used to place a yet unknown student. Another 
reason to prefer marriage within one's discipline is that in later life one's discipline could be 
important in social interaction with higher educated. People from similar disciplines would, for 
example, have common topics to talk about. Finally, preferences for marriage within one's 
discipline could depend on other similarities that are important in marital selection, for 
example a similar occupation or a corresponding taste and life style. 
Based on these theoretical considerations, I expect to find social distances among the 
various disciplines. These social distances are expressed by a certain degree of relative type 
homogamy. In Figure 6.2 this pattern is visualized in Model A. The dotted line in this chart 
indicates a two-dimensional representation of a three-dimensional space. The five disciplines 
are placed on a horizontally drawn circle. The disciplines are at a large span to indicate social 
distances among the groups. Because the disciplines are placed on a horizontally drawn circle, 
they have identical distances to lower education. This indicates that relative level homogamy is 
equally strong for the five disciplines. 
Although the pattern in Model A clearly demonstrates differentiation among the disciplines, 
it does not specify which disciplines are closer to one another than others. Bourdieu's theory 
of compensatory strategies (1979; see also Chapter 5) provides a specification. Within the 
educational elite, the theory distinguishes two co-existing status groups, a cultural and 
economic elite. The cultural elite consists of persons that can appeal to a broad general 
knowledge and great competence in the high arts. The economic elite, however, consists of 
people with high financial rewards and relatively modest cultural capital. Bourdieu observed 
such a distinction within the academic world (Bourdieu 1988). Professors in the medical and 
economic-legal sciences had relatively high economic capital and low cultural capital, while 
professors in humanities and social sciences may be reckoned to the cultural instead of 
economic elite. The two elites try to distinguish themselves from one other by adopting a 
certain style of life. Such a desire for distinction may also be expressed in the selection of a 
mate. Persons with a high culturally oriented education (the humanities and social sciences) 
would infrequently marry persons from the economic elite (the applied-natural, medical and 
economic-legal sciences). Likewise, persons from the economic elite would marry within 
rather than across elites. Bourdieu's theory further assumes the economic elite to be more 
open than the cultural elite. The reason for this is that persons of the economic elite are - due 
to their greater amount of economic capital - less dependent on marriage strategies than 
persons from the cultural elite. 
The marital patterns that can be expected from Bourdieu's theory of compensatory 
strategies are visualized in Model В (Figure 6.2). The five disciplines are not placed on a 
single circle, but on two circles that each represent one of the two elites. Between the circles, 
the distance is larger than within the circles to indicate a preference to marry within one's elite. 
In addition, the circle of the cultural elite is smaller than the circle of the economic elite which 
indicates shorter social distances within the cultural than the economic elite. Finally, Model В 
shows that the two elites have equal distance to lower education. This reflects the idea that the 
two elites have an identical position in the hierarchical structure. 
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Model A Model В 
med 
bum 
Model С Model D 
med med 
hom 
Figure 6.2 Theoretical models for distances among academic disciplines and 
distances among university and lower educated 
Another way to portray the marriage patterns of the various social groups can be found in the 
economic competition theory (Becker 1981). According to this theory, people wish to marry 
persons that have attractive financial resources. Because persons with high economic capital 
have greater chances to attract persons with attractive financial resources, this competition 
leads to homogamy with respect to financial and economic position. A similar argument holds 
for the various disciplines: I expect that persons from disciplines with good financial prospects 
have grater distance to lower educated than persons from disciplines with worse prospects. In 
other words, the economic competition theory assumes a hierarchical structuring of the 
matching of persons of the various disciplines. Kalmijn's study on the economic and cultural 
statuses of jobs (Kalmijn 1994a) provides an indication for a hierarchical pattern. In the United 
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States the best-paid jobs, lawyers and medical doctors, are closest to one another on the 
'intermarriage dimension'. 
Model С of Figure 6.2 represents the pattern that I expect on the basis of economic 
competition theory. In the chart, the horizontally placed circle of Model A is flattened at its 
side to indicate that some disciplines are further away from lower educated than others. In 
doing so, I assumed a differentiation in earning capacities of the five disciplines. Persons from 
medical sciences earn most, then persons from economic-legal sciences, applied-natural 
sciences, social sciences, and finally humanities (cf. Kalmijn and Van der Lippe 1996). In 
Model С the disciplines are placed in this order: persons from medical sciences favor marriage 
to lower educated least (the longest line), people from humanities most (the shortest line). 
The economic competition theory can also be combined with the theory of compensatory 
strategies. This is visualized in the last chart of Figure 6.2: Model D. In this model the two 
circles of Model В - the two elites - are flattened to indicate that the economic and cultural 
elite do not only differ nominally but also hierarchically. 
6.5.2 Patterns of Relative Homogamy 
I make use of loglinear models to test which of the four theoretical patterns fits the data best. 
These models have frequently been applied in studies on homogamy and make it possible to 
take into account the distributions of levels and types of schooling and also the differences in 
these distributions among men and women (Hout 1982; see also Chapter 1). Loglinear models 
assume that the chance of a certain type of marriage - for example, a marriage between a male 
student in medicine and a female psychology student - is a multiplicative function of the 
fraction medical students constitute among men, the fraction psychology students constitute 
among women, and a third factor that indicates the degree to which medical and psychology 
students marry independently of the influence of availability of potential mates. In this manner, 
loglinear models disentangle supply factors (the first two factors) from relative homogamy 
(the third factor). 
There are different ways to describe relative homogamy, dependent on the loglinear model 
one applies. I choose loglinear models that are known as 'topological' models. Topological 
models define interactions in tables in terms of quasi-independent subsets of cells ('levels'), 
and offer an interpretation in terms of log odds ratios (Hout 1983: 37-51). An odds ratio is the 
ratio between two chance ratios or 'odds'. In the example addressed above, two odds may be 
computed: (a) the chance a male student in medicine marries a female colleague divided by the 
chance he marries a female psychology student, and (b) the chance a male psychology student 
marries a female student in medicine divided by the chance he marries a female colleague 
psychologist. If the log odds ratio ln[(a)/(b)] is greater than 0, medical students marry 
relatively more often with colleagues than psychology students marry with medical students, 
and the two groups have a tendency to marry homogamously. The higher the log odds ratio, 
the greater the distance among the two groups. The loglinear topological models make it 
possible to compute a log odds ratio for each pair of disciplines. Log odds ratios can also be 
The Role of Level and Type of Education Dutch Graduates 121 
computed for distances among the five disciplines on the one hand and lower educated on the 
other In the sequel, I test the theoretical models of Figure 6 2 by applying various restrictions 
to distances among the social groups 4 
Table 6 5 Distances between types and levels of schooling, log odds ratios of selected 
loghnear models the Dutch educational elite 
Distances (log odds ratios) Model A Model В Model С Model D 
BETWEEN COLLEGE DISCIPLINES 
All disciplines 
Within cultural elite 
Within economic elite 
Between cultural and economic elite 
2 63** 
2 20** 
251** 
2 77** 
2 80** 
187** 
3 02** 
2 98** 
BETWEEN DISCIPLINES AND LOWER 
EDUCATION 
All disciplines 
Humanities 
Social sciences 
Natural sciences 
Economic-legal sciences 
Medicine 
Likelihood ratio Chi2 
Df 
p- value 
4 37* 
56 5 
23 
000 
4 37** 
Notes Df is Degrees of freedom, * * p < 0 01, * ρ < 0 05 
52 3 
21 
000 
3 87** 
4 48** 
4 55** 
481** 
5 00** 
27 8 
19 
0 09 
3 81** 
4 38** 
4 68** 
4 93** 
5 08** 
184 
17 
0 36 
Model A of Figure 6 2 assumes equal distances among the five disciplines and equal distances 
of the disciplines to lower education The model consequently has one general parameter for 
relative type homogamy and one general parameter for relative level homogamy The last line 
in Table 6 5 shows that Model A does not fit the data well (p<0 01) This either means that 
social distances among disciplines differ or that the distances of the disciplines to lower 
education differ. Model В tests whether the distances between the disciplines can be 
4
 The parameterization of the topological models in Figure 6 2 is as follows 
Model A 
011111 
102222 
120222 
1 22022 
122202 
1 22220 
Model В 
044444 
401333 
410333 
433022 
433202 
433220 
ModelC 
023456 
201111 
310111 
411011 
5 11101 
6 11110 
Model D 
045678 
401333 
5 10333 
633022 
733202 
833220 
where the order of the categories of education is (1) non university education, (2) humanities, (3) social sciences, 
(4) natural sciences, (5) economic-legal sciences, and (6) medicine 
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summarized in a distinction between a cultural and economic elite. This model does not fit the 
data well (p<0.01), and also does not improve upon Model A (Chi2=4.2; Df=2 p>0.05). Model 
С assumes the distances of the five disciplines to lower educated to vary, while maintaining the 
assumption of equal distances among the five disciplines. Model С fits the data well (p=0.09) 
and also improves upon the baseline model, Model A. Apparently, the five disciplines can be 
ordered hierarchically without assuming distances between these disciplines. Model D 
combines the assumptions of Models В and C. The model fits the data well (p=0.36) and 
improves significantly upon the fit of previous loglinear models. The marriage patterns of the 
educational elite can hence be described accurately by both assuming a horizontal and 
hierarchical boundary within the educational elite (Model D, Figure 6.2). 
To discuss the patterns in greater detail, Table 6.5 presents the log odds ratios of the 
distances from the various models. I confine the discussion to the parameters of the least 
refined model (Model A) - the baseline model - and the parameters of the most refined model 
(Model D). From the parameters of Model A, I observe that university educated persons have 
a tendency to marry within rather than across their level of education. The log odds ratio for 
relative level homogamy is 4.37, and positively significant. Furthermore, university educated 
persons have a tendency to many within their discipline, but the parameter value of 2.63 
shows this tendency to be considerably weaker than relative level homogamy. The type of 
schooling seems to be less important in mate selection of professionals than the level. 
To determine the strength of the observed patterns of relative homogamy, I compare the 
observed distances to other social boundaries that are important in Dutch society. For 
example, for marriages contracted shortly after World War II, the log odds ratio between 
Catholics and Reformed was 5.0 (Hendrickx, Lammers and Ultee 1991). Relative level 
homogamy is nowadays as strong as religious homogamy during the high tide of pillarization. 
Relative type homogamy, though weaker than level homogamy, can also be seen as a strong 
form of social similarity between mates. For example, the degree of relative type homogamy is 
comparable to the distance in marriage patterns between manual and agricultural workers on 
the one hand and employees and professionals on the other. For two-earner couples in 1986-
1987 the log odds ratio for this distance was 2.1 (Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits 1995). 
The parameters of the more refined model (Model D) show the distances in the marital 
patterns among the cultural and economic elite. As was expected from the theory of 
compensatory strategies, university educated persons generally prefer marriage within their 
elite rather than across elites. It can also be seen that distances among disciplines of the 
cultural elite (social sciences and humanities) are smaller than distances among disciplines of 
the economic elite (applied-natural, economic-legal and medical sciences). In this respect, the 
cultural elite is more closed than the economic elite. 
Next to a horizontal structuring of the various disciplines within the educational elite, I also 
find a hierarchical structuring. Persons with a degree in medicine prefer marriage to lower 
educated least, persons with a degree in humanities most. The order in the observed distance 
to lower education - humanities, social sciences, applied-natural sciences, economic-legal 
sciences, and medicine - is more or less in conformity with the earning capacities of the five 
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disciplines (Kalmijn and Van der Lippe 1996). Hence, the observed marital patterns are in line 
with what I expected from the economic competition theory. 
6.5.3 Trends in Relative Level and Type Homogamy 
To what extent have the observed patterns of relative homogamy changed in the Netherlands 
after World War Π? From Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies I expect that relative 
level homogamy declined between the two birth cohorts. In the seventies and eighties higher 
education expanded enormously which caused inflation of college certificates and diminished 
the distance among low and high education (Bourdieu 1979: 133). In addition, due to more 
equal distribution of lower and higher social classes at the highest levels of the educational 
system (De Graaf and Ganzeboom 1993), the social distance among these status groups 
decreased and distinction by a high level of education paid off less (see also Chapters 5). If so, 
people that were bom before 1950 (and married before the mid seventies), must show more 
relative level homogamy than people born after 1950 (and married after the mid seventies). 
While relative level homogamy would decrease with educational expansion and stronger 
participation of lower social strata in higher education, relative type homogamy could - as a 
reaction to the decrease in level homogamy - increase. According to the theory of 
compensatory strategies, people try to distinguish themselves from others anew when 
traditional social boundaries in society fade. One new way or reproduction strategy could be a 
stronger preference for a mate with a similar type of education: for if level of schooling does 
not pay off, type of schooling may. Above all, such a compensatory strategy would be used by 
persons from the cultural elite. Since these persons heavily depend on cultural resources for 
social distinction, they suffer most from educational expansion. Persons from the economic 
elite suffer less from educational expansion because they can rely on their material resources 
and their high social origin. 
What are the trends in relative level and type homogamy? Table 6.6 presents results of the 
baseline model (Model A) and the more refined model for homogamy (Model D) by birth 
cohort. According to the baseline model, the general tendency to marry within one's 
educational level decreased significantly between the two birth cohorts. This decrease supports 
the idea from the theory of compensatory strategies that during inflation of higher school 
diplomas, higher educated recruit their partners less often among their group and more often 
among lower educated. According to Model A, however, this decrease in relative level 
homogamy was not compensated by increasing preferences for marriage within one's 
discipline. Relative type homogamy did not significantly change in the post-war period. The 
latter finding indicates that marriage with persons with a similar type of academic education is 
not a compensatory strategy, as I had expected from Bourdieu's theory. 
The more refined model, Model D in Table 6.6, shows developments in educational 
homogamy assuming two elites and variable distances to lower educated among the five 
academic disciplines. The parameters of this model do not show significant changes in relative 
type homogamy of the cultural and economic elite. The cultural elite did not take distance 
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from the economic elite. Rather, the two elites seem to have approached considering the 
decreased social distance among the economic and cultural elite. This finding is not in line with 
Bourdieu's idea of cultural isolation. However, valued because of the distances within the 
elites, the theory of compensatory strategies deserves credit: the distances among disciplines 
of the cultural elite decreased, and the distances among disciplines of the economic elite 
increased. Apparently, the cultural elite has become more open to others, but within its own 
ranks it has become more homogeneous. It is to be noted that these changes are still 
statistically non-significant 
Table 6.6 Changes in distances between types and levels of schooling: women born in 1900-
1949 versus women bom in 1950-1976 
Distances (log odds ratios) 
BETWEEN DISCIPLINES 
All disciplines 
Within cultural elite 
Within economic elite 
Cultural vs. economic 
BETWEEN DISCIPLINES AND LOWER 
EDUCATION 
All disciplines 
Humanities 
Social sciences 
Natural sciences 
Economic-legal 
Medicine 
Likelihood ratio Chi2 
Df 
p-value 
1900-
1949 
2.56 
— 
— 
... 
4.65 
... 
— 
— 
— 
— 
Model A 
1950-
1976 
2.64 
... 
— 
... 
4.23 
... 
— 
— 
— 
... 
Δ 
+.08 
— 
— 
... 
-.42** 
— 
— 
— 
— 
... 
83.1 
46 
0.00 
1900-
1949 
— 
1.99 
2.61 
3.14 
... 
4.25 
4.76 
4.50 
5.93 
5.39 
Model D 
1950-
1976 
... 
1.79 
3.20 
2.93 
... 
3.60 
4.15 
4.77 
4.54 
5.02 
Δ 
... 
-.19 
+.60 
-.21 
... 
-.65** 
-.60 
+.27 
_] 39** 
-.36 
36.6 
34 
0.35 
Notes: Df is Degrees of freedom; ** ρ < 0.01; * ρ < 0.05. 
Model D of Table 6.6, finally, shows that the previously observed decrease in relative level 
homogamy applies to only two of five disciplines: the humanities and economic-legal sciences. 
The remaining disciplines either do not show a significant decrease (social sciences, medicine), 
or show an (insignificant) increase (the natural sciences). The increase in relative level 
homogamy for the applied and natural sciences was earlier observed in my analyses of absolute 
homogamy. It may be due to female students of this discipline who, despite stronger 
competition, increasingly married within the educational elite (Table 6.4). 
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6.6 Conclusions and Discussion 
This chapter's first question was to what extent university educated marry within their 
discipline and to what extent this tendency for type homogamy differs among various 
disciplines. My loglinear analyses have shown that the tendency to marry within one's 
discipline is stronger than the tendency to marry across one's discipline. The strength of this 
type of relative homogamy is comparable to the distance in marriage patterns between manual 
workers and farmers on the one hand, and employees and professionals on the other. My 
analyses have also shown that some disciplines are closer to one another on the 'intermarriage 
dimension' than others. These patterns can well be summarized by distinguishing a cultural 
and economic elite. Persons with a cultural education at university level (social sciences and 
humanities) prefer marriage with a like person more than with a person from the economic 
elite (applied and natural sciences, economic-legal sciences and medicine), and vice versa. 
The second question was to what extent university educated marry persons with a lower 
education and to what extent this tendency of level homogamy differs among the various 
disciplines. My loglinear analyses have shown that university educated prefer marriage among 
each other rather than marriage with lower educated. This tendency of relative level 
homogamy is stronger than the tendency of relative type homogamy, and is comparable to the 
social distance among Reformed and Catholics in the Netherlands shortly after World War II. 
The tendency of relative level homogamy also differs among the five academic disciplines and 
shows that the distance to lower educated is greater for the economic than the cultural elite. 
Persons with a degree in social sciences or humanities marry relatively more often with lower 
educated than persons with a degree in the applied and natural sciences, economic-legal 
sciences or with a degree in medicine. The latter discipline appeared to be least open with 
respect to marriage with lower educated. 
The third question of this chapter addressed trends in level and type homogamy. When 
absolute level homogamy was studied, that is the percentage of persons marrying at university 
level, a clear trend towards more homogamy for male persons was observed. University 
educated men increasingly married a university educated partner. If looked at in more detail, 
this increase in absolute level homogamy affects marriages within and without disciplines 
equally. Hence, absolute type homogamy did not increase in the post-war period. When 
relative homogamy was studied, that is the social distances between disciplines taking into 
account the availability of potential mates, my analyses showed a decrease instead of an 
increase in relative in homogamy. Net of availability of potential mates then, the educational 
elite has become more open. This decrease in relative level homogamy was not accompanied 
by an increase of relative type homogamy. Between birth cohorts married before or after 1973, 
the tendency to marry within one's discipline did not change significantly. 
What implications do my findings have for the three theories I discussed? First, sex-
segregation seems to play an important role in mate selection. University educated (men), for 
example, increasingly married homogamously in absolute terms, but in relative terms they did 
so to a weaker extent. This contradictory finding can be explained by the increased 
126 Chapter 6 
participation of women in university education: for university educated men it became 
relatively easier to find a woman with a similar level of education. The trends in absolute type 
homogamy correspond less to predictions from sex-segregation theory. These predictions hold 
that due to the greater participation of women in disciplines that have traditionally been 
dominated by men, men and women increasingly marry within their discipline. That this trends 
did not take place suggests that disciplines do not function directly as local marriage markets, 
but indicates that the various marriage markets overlap. 
Second, the observed marriage patterns correspond fairly well to ideas derived from 
Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies. As the theory predicted, a cultural and 
economic elite could be distinguished. By analyzing marriage patterns, the existence of these 
elites has been demonstrated anew. I have to note, however, that the economic elite is less 
homogeneous than expected: the distances within the economic elite are almost equal to the 
distances between the economic and cultural elite. Also in conformity with Bourdieu's theory 
is the finding of decreased relative level homogamy. Expansion and external democratization 
of higher education have made university diplomas a less useful source of distinction. 
Alternative explanations may, however, also apply. One explanation of a weaker boundary 
among university educated and lower educated points to structural changes within the 
educational system. Due to increasing numbers of non-university students that enroll in 
university education, due to cooperation among universities and non-university educations, 
and due to a general increase in educational standards in non-university education, the 
opportunities for university and non-university educated persons to meet have increased and 
social barriers for interaction diminished. A finding against Bourdieu's theory of compensatory 
strategies is that one's type of schooling has not become a more important factor in mate 
selection, but appeared to be stable. Apparently, homogamy with respect to type of schooling 
did not function as a compensatory strategy. 
Third and finally, the marriage patterns of the various disciplines do not only point to a 
horizontal structuring of the educational elite, but also to a hierarchical structuring. Valued 
because of their marriage patterns, disciplines of the economic elite occupy a higher place in 
the social hierarchy than disciplines of the cultural elite. These findings confirm the economic 
competition theory of mate selection. The theory holds that people strife for a partner with 
good financial-economic prospects. Although this theory seems to contradict Bourdieu's 
theory of compensatory strategies, it does not necessarily have to. The competition theory 
shows, in Bourdieu's terminology, that one 'principle of domination' - cultural capital - is 
dominated by another - economic capital (Bourdieu 1979: 125). 
Alternatively, the differences in the hierarchical positions of the various disciplines can be 
explained by structural characteristics of 'cultural' and 'economic occupations'. Because 
occupations of culturally educated persons are much more heterogeneous with regard to 
educational level than economic occupations, it seems likely that persons from the cultural 
elite more often meet and prefer marriage to non-university educated persons than persons 
from the economic elite. To test such an alternative explanation it must be studied at what age 
and in what context people meet their current partner: does it happen at school or at the work-
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place? More generally, research on homogamy may advance by not only addressing questions 
about the type of marriage, but also by addressing questions about the timing of marriage. 
Recent examples are Mare's (1991) analysis of the timing of educational mixed or 
homogamous marriages in the United States, and Stier and Shavit's (1994) analysis of age at 
marriage and patterns of ethnic homogamy in Israel. To gain more insight into who marries 
whom why and when, similar analyses have to be undertaken for other traits of spouses. 

7 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
As many studies on mate selection have shown, people marry more often with likes than with 
dislikes. This phenomenon is known as homogamy or endogamy and the opposite - a coupling 
of persons with dissimilar characteristics - as heterogamy or exogamy. My study took up the 
lead of stratification researchers and studied patterns and trends in status homogamy. In 
particular, I studied homogamy of social origin, educational homogamy, and homogamy with 
respect to the degree to which (high) culture features in a person's life style. These three 
different forms of status homogamy are believed to vary in strength in various societies and 
time periods of the twentieth century. Presumably, in agrarian pre-industrial societies 
homogamy of social origin was the strongest form of status homogamy, in industrial societies 
educational homogamy was expected to dominate, and in post-industrial societies cultural 
homogamy might have the upper hand. My study provides a test of these presumed changes in 
mate selection. In general, I tried to live up to three aims and answer five research questions. 
Paragraph 7.2 reviews these aims and questions and summarizes the findings. Paragraph 7.3 
discusses the implications of the findings for the theories and methods I have used throughout 
this book, and addresses questions for future research on mate selection. 
7.2 Summary 
7.2.1 The By-Product Explanation: Origin and Education 
My study's first aim is to compare parameters of status homogamy of so-called single trait 
models with parameters of more refined dual trait models. In traditional single trait models, 
spouses' similarity with respect to one trait is determined. For example, the degree of 
educational homogamy is assessed by the zero-order correlation between spouses' educational 
levels. In recently applied dual trait models, not one but various types of homogamy are 
estimated simultaneously. Educational homogamy, for example, is computed net of people's 
tendency to match on social origin and the associations between social origin and education. 
The net or dual trait measure of educational homogamy provides an indication of people's 
tendency to match on education independent of their tendency to match on social origin. 
Likewise, in dual trait models net measures of homogamy of social origin and cultural 
homogamy can be computed by taking into account spouses' educational similarity. 
I argue that for several reasons comparison of single trait parameters with dual trait 
parameters of status homogamy is important. To begin with, such a comparison can show that 
single trait parameters of status homogamy are biased estimates and conceal people's 'real' 
tendency for homogamy. For example, when in dual trait analysis people's tendency of 
educational homogamy is assessed net of spouses' social origins, this tendency can be 
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substantially lower than a single trait analysis of spouses' educations would indicate. In that 
instance, the initial zero-order association between spouses' educational levels overestimates 
the tendency towards educational similarity in mate selection. The single trait measure of 
educational homogamy may partly be spurious and a 'by-product' (Blau and Duncan 1967: 
358) of people's tendency to match on social origin, a related status characteristic. For 
example, two lower educated may have married not because they preferred educational 
similarity, but because they were attracted because of their farm origin and because a farm 
background and low education often coincide. 
Second and in relation to the first point, a comparison of single and dual trait parameters of 
status homogamy can show that conclusions on trends in status homogamy obtained from 
single trait analyses are misleading. In particular, dual trait analyses may show that the 
observed world-wide trend towards decreased educational homogamy is spurious. The trend 
finding was obtained from single trait analyses in which only spouses' educational levels were 
compared (Ultee and Luijkx 1990). Given the intertwined role of education and social origin 
in mate selection and the presumably decreased role of social origin in mate selection of 
industrial societies, the global finding of a decreased association between spouses' educational 
levels may not so much indicate a diminished preference to match on education, but it may 
indicate a diminished preference for similarity in social class of origin. That is, the trend 
towards decreasing educational homogamy can be a by-product of decreased homogamy of 
social origin. Once in dual trait analyses spouses' social origins are taken into account, the 
observed trend towards less educational homogamy can tum out to be insignificant, or it may 
even show an increase. Compared with single trait analysis then, dual trait analysis can lead to 
quite different conclusions on trends in status homogamy. 
A comparison of results from single and dual trait analyses is not merely a statistical, 
technical exercise but can also place existing theories and predictions on status homogamy in a 
new light. If after dual trait analysis preferences for educational homogamy increase, 
traditional theses on the role of education in mate selection would have to be rejected instead 
of confirmed. Stronger educational homogamy would contradict the classical thesis of 
stratification research that status boundaries decline and societal openness increases in 
societies that industrialize (Lipset and Bendix 1959). In addition, stronger educational 
homogamy would reject the view that has been common in sociology of the family that 
romantic love is thriving in modem industrial societies, and that mate selection is decreasingly 
guided by social factors (Goode 1964, Shorter 1976). 
On the other hand, stable and in particular stronger preferences for educational similarity 
would confirm predictions that rival traditional notions of mobility research and sociology of 
the family. According to modernization theory (Kerr et al 1960), in modem industrial societies 
'achievement' values (among which educational attainment) replace 'ascriptive' values (among 
which social origin) both for selection of persons for jobs within labor markets and for 
selection of persons within marriage markets. According to another stratification theory, 
Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies (1979; see also Chapter 5), with the shift from 
pre-industriai to industrial societies educational homogamy also increases because it functions 
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as a new and effective strategy of higher status groups to distinguish themselves from others. 
Next to predictions from stratification theories, a finding of increased educational homogamy 
is in line with a more informative theory on mate selection. This theory views people as 
rational actors that try to make the 'best' choice at the marriage market given the constraints 
they face. In the past, when social pressure of parents was high, when men had much more 
educational and occupational success than women and when opportunities for friendships that 
last after school were low, educational homogamy was weak. Nowadays, however, with less 
social pressure, more equal gender relations and longer school careers, the best choice is to 
marry someone of similar or near-similar educational level and educational homogamy can 
assumed to be stronger than in the past. 
My first general research question pertains to the tenability of the by-product explanation 
and of the traditional and rival predictions from stratification and mate selection theories. The 
question addresses differences - both in time and space - in parameters of status homogamy 
from single and dual trait models, and specifically asks whether the previously (within single 
trait analysis) observed world-wide trend towards decreased educational homogamy conceals 
stable or stronger preferences for educational similarity in mate selection. 
HUNGARY BETWEEN 1930-1979 
In Chapter 2 I answered the 'by-product-question' for marriage cohorts in Hungary between 
1930-1979. For this country, Ultee and Luijkx' (1990) single trait analysis of existing 
marriages between 1960 and 1980 demonstrated a slight, but non-significant change towards 
less educational homogamy. My dual trait models and investigation of a longer period (1930-
1979) can show that the observed slightly downward trend hides another trend in preferences 
for educational similarity. If anywhere, processes that affect educational homogamy may have 
changed in Hungary. Due to the rapid industrialization of Hungary, the tendency of parents to 
interfere in marital decisions of their offspring and of the offspring to take a spouse of equal 
social origin may have diminished. If homogamy of social origin decreased and if social origin 
and education are (positively) related characteristics on the marriage market, dual trait 
analyses can show that the observed slightly downward trend in the single trait measure of 
educational homogamy is a by-product, and hides a trend towards increased preferences for 
educational homogamy. Another reason to study Hungary is that it has - as one of the few 
countries - ample data to rerun the loglinear single trait models Ultee and Luijkx applied, and 
to extend the single trait models to dual trait models that incorporate spouses' educations and 
social origin. 
To estimate the single and dual trait models within loglinear models, I used cohort-based 
data on spouses' educations and social origins from three large-scale representative Hungarian 
household surveys. The single trait analyses showed that in Hungary between 1930 and 1979 
the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin decreased in size with about a half, 
although the last marriage cohort studied (1970-1979) demonstrated a slight increase. The 
single trait measure of educational homogamy decreased until the 1960s with one sixth, while 
after the 1960s it increased in size with about a third. Because the single trait measure of 
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educational homogamy ended up higher than it started, the single trait measure of educational 
homogamy increased over the full 1930-1979 period. 
Comparison of the single and dual trait parameters showed that at each point in time dual 
trait parameters of homogamy were lower than single trait parameters: the dual trait 
parameters of educational homogamy were between one tenth and two tenths lower than the 
corresponding single trait parameters; the dual trait parameters of homogamy of social 
origin were between three tenths and four tenths lower than the corresponding single trait 
parameters. This finding shows that single trait models overestimate spouses' tendency for 
educational homogamy and homogamy of social origin. Furthermore, it shows that in Hungary 
education is a more important factor in mate selection than social origin. 
Contrary to the by-product explanation, the trend findings from single trait analyses did not 
reverse after dual trait analyses. Both the trend in homogamy of social origin and educational 
homogamy have a similar form in dual trait analyses as in single trait analyses. A relatively 
minor exception to these results is the 1940-1959 period. In this period the single trait 
measure of educational homogamy slightly decreased, but the dual trait measure showed a 
slight increase. On the whole, the findings of my analyses refute the explanation according to 
which trends in status homogamy obtained from single trait models are by-products: there are 
no reversals of general trends. 
THE NETHERLANDS BETWEEN 1947-1992 
In Chapter 3 I tested the by-product explanation for another country, the Netherlands in the 
period 1947-1992.1 chose the Netherlands as an example because previous single trait studies 
demonstrated a substantial decrease in educational homogamy for this country after World 
War II (Sixma and Ultee 1984, Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits 1995). Such a decrease is 
unexpected in the light of theories on mate selection and arises the question to what extent the 
observed decrease hides stable or increased preferences for educational similarity. Another 
reason that I chose the Netherlands is that it has rich data on spouses for each of the three 
traits - social origin, education and cultural life style -1 analyze in this study. In contrast to the 
loglinear analyses of Hungarian marriage patterns in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 I used (residual) 
correlation models to test the by-product explanation. These models are more parsimonious 
than the loglinear models and can be applied to smaller data sets, such as the Dutch data. 
Analyses with single trait models of post-war marriage cohorts showed that in the 
Netherlands between 1947 and 1992, the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin 
decreased steadily. Homogamy of social origin in the nineties was more than half the size it 
was in the fifties. Just as in Hungary, the role of social origin in mate selection diminished 
considerably in the Netherlands after World War II. The single trait measure of educational 
homogamy fluctuated in a trendless way: until the marriage cohort ¡968-1972 the single trait 
measure of educational homogamy increased more than two times, but between 1973 and 
1983 it decreased with one third, whereas in the last marriage cohort (1988-1992) it 
increased again with one third. Taken over all cohorts, however, the single trait measure of 
educational homogamy showed a slight increase. 
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Analyses with dual trait models of the two forms of status homogamy broadly demonstrated 
similar results: a stronger role of education and a weaker role of social origin in mate selection 
in the Netherlands after World War II. Closer examination of successive marriage cohorts also 
demonstrated differences between single and dual trait analyses, however. First, over the 
entire post-war period the dual trait parameter of educational homogamy was almost half the 
size of the single trait parameter; for homogamy of social origin the overestimation is 
slightly stronger. This finding indicates that in the Netherlands education generally is a 
somewhat more important factor in mate selection than social origin. Second, in some periods 
trends in single and dual trait parameters of status homogamy did not coincide: for example, 
while the single trait measure of educational homogamy increased strongly in the 1963-1972 
period, the dual trait measure of educational homogamy remained stable. In addition, in single 
trait models the decrease in homogamy of social origin proved to be linear while in dual trait 
models it showed a sharp fall in the beginning of the seventies. 
15 INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
In Chapter 4 I tested the by-product explanation for 15 industrial countries during the 
twentieth century. Among the countries are industrialized countries of the West and countries 
that were formerly ruled by a left government or communist party. Ultee and Luijkx (1990) 
analyzed a similar data set when they came to their (single trait) finding of generally decreased 
educational homogamy. A straightforward reanalysis of Ultee and Luijkx' data on educational 
homogamy in 23 industrial countries could not be undertaken since most of their data sets did 
not contain information on spouses' social origins. 
To estimate the single and dual trait models for the 15 countries I had data on, I used the 
(residual) correlation models I earlier applied in Chapter 3. Analyses with single trait models 
generally showed large cross-national differences and only small historical differences in the 
single trait measures of homogamy of social origin and education: of the total variation in the 
single trait measure of homogamy of social origin two thirds could be attributed to cross-
national variation, while six percent was due to cohort differences; of the total variation in 
the single trait measure of educational homogamy four fifths could be attributed to cross-
national variation, while three percent was due to cohort differences. Finland, Hungary and 
Italy appeared to be least open with respect to homogamy of education and social origin, 
while the Netherlands and the former Soviet Union were most open. The small historical 
differences point to a steady decrease (of about one fifth) in the single trait measure of 
homogamy of social origin in industrial countries of the twentieth century; the single trait 
measure of educational homogamy appeared to be pretty stable and only showed a slight 
increase (about one tenth) in the birth period 1900-1919 and a slight decrease (about one 
sixth) in the birth period 1940-1959. 
Dual trait analyses broadly showed the same results as in single trait analyses. In general, 
the explanation according to which trends in status homogamy from single trait analyses are 
by-products did not hold. More detailed inspection showed differences between the two types 
of analyses to have occurred, however. First, in each country and cohort dual trait parameters 
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were considerably lower than single trait parameters: the general dual trait parameter of 
homogamy of social origin was half the size of the single trait parameter; the dual trait 
parameter of educational homogamy was one third lower than the corresponding single trait 
parameter. This finding again indicated that in modem industrial societies education is a more 
important factor in mate selection than social origin. Second, cross-national differences in 
status homogamy were weaker in dual than in single trait analyses: in dual trait analyses 
country differences could account for less than half of the variation in educational 
homogamy and about two thirds of the variation in homogamy of social origin, compared 
with more than half and four fifths in single trait analysis; in dual trait analyses cohort 
differences could account for variations in both forms of homogamy equally strong. Third 
and more importantly, between some birth cohorts trends in the single and dual trait 
measures of status homogamy differed. For example, while the single trait measure of 
homogamy of social origin decreased as of the second birth cohort (1920-1929), the dual trait 
measure decreased as of the one-but-last birth cohort (1950-1959). Fourth, within some 
countries general trends in status homogamy reversed after dual trait analysis. In Italy, for 
example, a trend towards decreased homogamy of social origin appeared to be stable after 
dual trait analysis. 
CONCLUSIONS 
To sum up, my comparison of single and dual trait parameters of homogamy of social origin 
and education in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 yielded some important findings. First, parameters from 
single trait models overestimate preferences for homogamy with regard to social origin and 
education. Preferences for status similarity appear to be much smaller after dual trait analyses. 
Because this overestimation is stronger for homogamy of social origin than for educational 
homogamy and because the dual trait parameters of the latter type of homogamy are generally 
higher than the parameters of the former type of homogamy, education is a more important 
factor in mate selection than social origin in industrial countries of the twentieth century. 
Second, although general trends in status homogamy were not often distorted, in particular 
time periods and countries single and dual trait analyses yielded different findings. Third and 
finally, while in the past homogamy of social origin was stronger than educational homogamy, 
nowadays the roles have reversed. This suggests a shift from ascriptive to achievement values 
in mate selection: preferences for similar parents decreased, while preferences for similar 
educations increased. Despite these findings that favor dual trait analyses, my findings 
generally did not confirm the by-product explanation according to which trends in status 
homogamy reverse after dual trait analysis. Why the by-production did not apply 
unequivocally will be discussed in paragraph 7.3.2. 
7.2.2 Explaining Patterns of Status Homogamy 
My study's second aim is to account for the observed patterns in the single and dual trait 
measures of status homogamy. So far, only patterns in the single trait measure of educational 
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homogamy have been accounted for. Following Grusky and Hauser in mobility research 
(1984), Ultee and Luijkx (1990) tested hypotheses on cross-national and cross-temporal 
differences in educational homogamy in 23 industrial countries. Because intergenerational 
mobility and educational homogamy are believed to be identical indicators of general societal 
openness, the hypotheses hold that factors that account for patterns of intergenerational social 
mobility also must account for patterns of educational homogamy. More specifically, the 
notions state that industrialization, social-democracy and state-socialism make for less 
educational homogamy on marriage markets, just as these factors made for weaker 
intergenerational transfer of status on labor markets. Ultee and Luijkx' single trait analysis 
generally confirmed the notions of mobility research. Although state-socialism leads to more 
instead of less educational homogamy, industrialization and social-democracy diminish 
educational homogamy as was to be expected. 
TRADITIONAL INDICATORS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND POLITICS 
My second general research question of my study is whether and to what extent these 
traditional notions of mobility research hold with respect to the dual trait parameters of 
educational homogamy. In addition, I investigate whether and to what extent industrialization 
and left politics make for less homogamy of social origin. Patterns of origin homogamy - either 
single or dual trait parameters - have not been accounted for yet. 
In my international comparative chapter. Chapter 4, I answered the second general 
research question. Using a design in which I regressed the modeled patterns of status 
homogamy for 15 industrial countries and 6 birth cohorts on macro-indicators, I showed the 
notions from mobility research generally not to hold in these data. Although industrialization, 
a period of social-democracy and state-socialism diminish the single trait measure of 
homogamy of social origin, these factors have insignificant effects on the dual trait measure 
of homogamy of social origin. Patterns in the single and dual trait measures of educational 
homogamy cannot well be explained: industrialization, social-democracy and state-socialism 
neither have significant effects on the single, nor on the dual trait measures of educational 
homogamy. Findings of dual trait analyses do suggest, however, that the role of education in 
mate selection is somewhat stronger in socialist than in non-socialist societies. 
MORE SPECIFIC INDICATORS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND POLITICS 
In explaining patterns of status homogamy, I also went beyond a simple application of notions 
from mobility research. In Chapter 4 I provided a more refined explanation as to why 
industrialization, social-democracy and state-socialism might affect patterns of status 
homogamy. In doing so, I made use of an 'individual-level' framework. In this framework the 
matching of persons is not seen as an abstract macro-process that echoes other macro-
processes such as intergenerational social mobility, but it is seen as an outcome of individual 
decisions based on preferences of marriageable persons, social pressure of 'significant others', 
and constraints at the marriage market. To derive hypotheses on the effects of industrialization 
and politics on status homogamy, I examined what the possible effects of industrialization and 
136 Chapter 7 
left politics are on people's preferences, social barriers and marriage market constraints, and 
how these preferences and constraints in turn influence the various types of status homogamy. 
In doing so, I ended up with five new, what I called 'extended' macro-hypotheses. Four of 
these macro-hypotheses relate to processes of industrialization and their impact on status 
homogamy: (a) the shift from 'ascription' to 'achievement' values for selection of jobs within 
labor markets, (b) urbanization, (c) educational expansion, and (d) decreased gender-
inequality. The fifth hypothesis relates to the effect of left politics on status homogamy and 
points to (e) selection of students for secondary education at an early or late age as a decisive 
constraint on the strength of status homogamy. My study's third general research question 
was how and to what extent these more specific indicators of industrialization and left politics 
can account for cross-national and cross-temporal differences in single and dual trait measures 
of status homogamy, and to what extent these more specific indicators fare better than 
traditional indicators such as the number of telephones (industrialization) and the years of 
state-socialism or social-democracy (left politics). 
I answered the third general research question in my international comparative chapter. 
Chapter 4. Explanatory analyses showed that the five more refined indicators of 
industrialization and political regime can account for the observed patterns in status 
homogamy better than the traditional notions of mobility research: while the traditional 
indicators of industrialization and left politics can account for the variations satisfactory 
only with regard to the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin (the adjusted 
explained variance was about one fifth), the more refined macro-factors account for the 
marriage patterns much better, both with respect to the single trait measure of educational 
homogamy (two fifths explained variance), the dual trait measure of homogamy of social 
origin (one quarter explained variance) and the dual trait measure of educational homogamy 
(one quarter explained variance). 
Despite the greater explanatory power, the effects of the extended macro-factors were not 
always as predicted. First, although the shift from ascription to achievement within labor 
markets led people to change their preferences towards educational similarity in mate 
selection, it did not lead to weaker homogamy of social origin. Second, urbanization 
diminished the tendency of status homogamy as was to be expected, but this effect was non-
significant both for homogamy of social origin and education. Third, longer school careers 
did not affect patterns of status homogamy significantly. Contrary to my hypotheses and to 
Mare's finding for the United States (Mare 1991), the decreased time gap between leaving 
school and entering wedlock did not lead to stronger educational homogamy and weaker 
homogamy of social origin. Fourth, the effects of comprehensive schooling and the 
accompanying later age of school-selection appeared to be non-significant. This refuted the 
school-selection hypothesis which holds that late selection creates opportunities for interaction 
between people of dissimilar status. 
In contrast to the other extended macro-hypotheses, the gender-equality hypothesis 
deserves more credit. The decreased gender-gap in educational attainment made partner 
selection more symmetric by increasing the tendency to marry someone of similar education. 
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Furthermore, greater gender-equality reduced spouses' tendency to match on social origin. 
An ad-hoc explanation for the latter finding is that as women's economic independence 
increased, parents have had less motivation to help their daughters in finding Mr. Right. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Taken together, my explanatory analyses in Chapter 4 have shown two important results. 
First, the observed patterns of status homogamy reject a mechanical application of notions 
from mobility research. Although industrialization, a period of social-democracy and state-
socialism diminish the single trait measure of homogamy of social origin, these factors have 
insignificant effects on the single trait measure of educational homogamy and on the two dual 
trait measures of status homogamy. Second, the observed patterns in the single and dual trait 
measures can better be accounted for by more informative hypotheses on the effects of 
industrialization and left politics. Of these hypotheses, the hypothesis of decreased gender 
differences in educational attainment fared best. The smaller gender gap in educational 
credentials increased people's tendency to marry someone of similar educational level and 
diminished their tendency to marry someone of similar social background. The other 'more 
specific' indicators of industrialization and left politics were less successful and were either 
partly (the shift from ascription to achievement; urbanization) or fully rejected (longer school 
careers; selection of students for further education at a late age). In paragraph 7.3.1 I answer 
the question why some of the more informative hypotheses were rejected. 
7.2.3 Compensatory Strategies: Education and High Culture 
My study's third aim was to examine educational homogamy in combination with another trait 
that is commonly believed to influence mate selection of contemporary societies: the extent to 
which high culture features in people's life styles. As some theories hold, with the shift from 
industrial to post-industrial societies the degree to which high culture prevails in life styles 
becomes more important and replaces education as a dominant factor in mate selection. 
Young people may increasingly prefer marriage to someone who has a similar cultural life 
style. The fourth general research question in this study is to what extent partners, net of 
educational homogamy, match on a similar cultural life style. The fifth general research 
question addresses trends in educational and cultural homogamy. 
EDUCATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THE HIGH ARTS 
In Chapter 5 of my study I answered the fourth and fifth research question by investigating the 
degree to which partners - around the time they met - are similar with respect to frequency of 
participation in the high arts. In particular, I studied the strength of educational and cultural 
homogamy in the Netherlands throughout the 1948-1992 period. Using the same Dutch data 
set as in Chapter 3, the analyses in Chapter 5 showed that the single trait measure of cultural 
homogamy had a reversed U-shaped trend: between 1948 and 1972 the single trait measure of 
cultural homogamy increased with one third, thereafter it decreased with one third. The 
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single trait parameter of educational homogamy showed the same trend as in the analysis of 
the data in Chapter 3: first (between 1948 and 1972) the single trait measure of educational 
homogamy increased with nearly one third, then (between 1973 and 1982) it decreased with 
two fifths, and finally it increased again with one sixth (between 1983 and 1992). Although a 
statistical test of trends showed stability in the single trait measures of homogamy of social 
origin and education, the form of the parameters suggests that in the eighties and nineties 
education has become a more important factor in mate selection in the Netherlands than one's 
cultural life style. 
Analyses with dual trait models generally led to the same conclusions as analyses with 
single trait models, but at closer examination differences occurred. First, comparison of results 
from single and dual trait models showed that about half of the zero-order association 
between spouses' educations can be attributed to cultural homogamy and the association 
between cultural participation and educational attainment. Vice versa, about half of the 
single trait measure of cultural homogamy is due to educational similarity. These findings 
suggest that single trait analyses overestimate the degree to which persons prefer similarity on 
one trait. Furthermore, the findings suggest that on the whole the weights of cultural 
participation and education in mate selection are equally strong. Second, comparison of the 
single and dual trait models showed that while the single trait measure of educational 
homogamy fluctuates somewhat, there appears to be a much more stable trend towards 
increasing educational homogamy in dual trait analysis: throughout the 1948-1992 period 
the dual trait measure of educational homogamy increased in a linear fashion with nearly 
one third. Likewise, while the single trait measure of cultural homogamy decreased as of the 
sixties, in dual trait analysis it decreased as of the seventies. Although both trends are again 
non-significant, they indicate - like single trait analysis - that in recent decades the role of 
education in marriage selection has become somewhat stronger than the role of one's cultural 
life style. Another conclusion is that like the analyses of homogamy of social origin and 
education (Chapters 2,3,4), dual trait analyses of educational and cultural homogamy produce 
findings that are sometimes unlike those from single trait analyses. 
To assess the net weight of high culture and education in mate selection, I did not only 
examine patterns in educational and cultural homogamy in Chapter 5 but also examined 'trade-
offs' between culture and education on marriage markets. These trade-offs involve an 
exchange of cultural and educational resources in mate selection and refer to the association 
between one's cultural participation and spouse's education over and above the tendency 
towards status homogamy. The idea is that in the past women used their 'good taste' (cultural 
participation) to attract economically attractive (highly educated) spouses. Due to the fact that 
women have caught up educationally with men, however, the gender-differences in exchange 
of cultural and educational resources must nowadays have converged. Men are believed to 
prefer highly educated women, as women nowadays also prefer culturally active men. 
Analyses with dual trait models for spouses' educations and cultural participation showed that 
in the postwar-period in the Netherlands the importance of cultural participation in marrying 
a highly educated partner is significantly positive for women but insignificant for men: the 
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first effect is almost three times as large as the latter effect. Over time, the gender-differences 
in exchange of cultural and educational resources have converged. In the eighties, however, 
the exchange effects increased in strength for women. 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND TYPE OF SCHOOLING 
In Chapter 6 I answered the research questions about the role of education and cultural life 
style (questions 4 and 5) in yet another way. Whereas in the previous chapter (Chapter 5) I 
examined cultural homogamy directly via preferences for similarity with respect to 
participation in the high arts, in Chapter 6 I studied spouses' cultural homogamy indirectly by 
the degree to which persons are similar with respect to their type of education. Although the 
strength of homogamy with respect to type of education is only an indirect test of the 
relevance of high culture in mate selection, it is potentially more informative than a direct test 
because the choice of a certain type of school involves a certain style of life. This choice may 
have consequences that go beyond those from occasional visits to performances of the high 
arts. Chapter 6 specifically concentrated on (educational) level homogamy and (educational) 
type homogamy of Dutch university graduates ( 'the educational elite ') after World War II. 
The educational elite is chosen as an example because differentiation according to type of 
schooling is stronger at university level than at lower levels of education. 
The loglinear dual trait analyses showed that the tendency to marry within one's academic 
discipline is stronger than the tendency to marry a person from another academic discipline. 
The strength of this form of homogamy is comparable to the distance in marriage patterns 
between manual and agricultural workers on the one hand, and employees and professionals at 
the other (Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits 1995). My analyses have also shown that some 
academic disciplines are closer to one other in their marriage patterns than other disciplines. 
These patterns can well be summarized by a distinction in a so-called 'cultural' and 
'economic elite'. Persons with a culturally oriented education at university level (social 
sciences and humanities) more often favor a like than persons from the economic elite (applied 
and natural sciences, economic-legal sciences and medical sciences). 
Analyses of the strength of homogamy with respect to level of education showed that 
university educated persons prefer marriage among each other rather than marriage with 
lower educated. This tendency for level homogamy is two thirds stronger than the tendency 
for type homogamy. To date, the strength of level homogamy is comparable to the social 
distance between Reformed and Catholics in the Netherlands shortly after World War II 
(Hendrickx, Lammers and Ultee 1991). The tendency for level homogamy also differs among 
academic disciplines and shows that the distance to lower educated is about one quarter 
greater for the economic than for the cultural elite. Persons with a degree in social sciences 
or humanities marry relatively more often with lower educated than persons with a degree in 
the applied and natural sciences, economic-legal sciences or medical sciences. Persons with a 
medical background favor marriage to lower educated least. 
Analyses of trends in homogamy with respect to level and type of education showed that 
the percentage of men marrying within university level or within non-university level 
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increased in the post-war period with about one eighth, while the same percentage remained 
stable for women. If looked at in more detail, the increase in absolute level homogamy for 
men affected marriages within and across academic disciplines equally. Hence, 'absolute' 
type homogamy did not increase in the post-war period. If trends in relative homogamy are 
studied - that is, the social distances among disciplines once the availability of potential 
mates is taken into account - a decrease in level homogamy of one tenth is observed. This 
decrease means that - in contrast to the absolute patterns - preferences of university educated 
persons to marry within their educational level have become weaker. The decrease in relative 
level homogamy is not accompanied by an increase of relative type homogamy. Between 
cohorts bom before or after 1950, the tendency to marry within one's academic discipline 
did not change significantly. Also, distances between disciplines of the cultural and economic 
elite appeared to be stable. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In general, my analyses of homogamy with respect to level of education, type of education and 
participation in the high arts in the Netherlands after World War II have shown three 
important findings. First, persons have a tendency towards cultural similarity in mate selection 
and this also holds once spouses' educational levels are taken into account. Second, the net 
weight of the cultural factor in mate selection did not increase vis-a-vis one's level of 
education. In the late eighties and the beginning of the nineties the role of high culture rather 
decreased. Third, the university educated showed an opposite trend. Among academics, the 
tendency to match on a similar type of education remained stable, while the tendency towards 
similarity with respect to university education decreased. On the whole, the results underline 
the importance of high culture in mate selection: there exists a true desire to share cultural 
knowledge and to participate in high culture equally with one's spouse. Trend predictions 
could, however, not be confirmed unequivocally. In the sequel, I discuss why. 
7.3 Discussion 
In this paragraph I discuss the implications of the aforementioned findings for the hypotheses I 
have used throughout this study (paragraph 7.3.1), and review some methodological issues 
regarding the research designs and statistical models for status homogamy (paragraph 7.3.2). I 
end my study with some suggestions and questions for new research (paragraph 7.3.3). 
7.3.1 The Tenability of Hypotheses on Status Homogamy 
To account for patterns of status homogamy I tested various hypotheses. In the sequel I 
discuss the tenability of these hypotheses and suggest possible amendments. First, I discuss the 
tenability of 'traditional' macro-hypotheses on status homogamy. These traditional hypotheses 
are generalizations of findings from mobility research. Second, I discuss the tenability of 'more 
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informative' macro-hypotheses on status homogamy. The more informative hypotheses are not 
merely generalizations of earlier findings, but were derived from existing theories on social 
stratification. Third, and finally, I discuss the tenability of macro-hypotheses that were derived 
from the application of an 'individual-level framework'. In this framework, spouses' choice 
behavior and marriage market constraints are made explicit and related to developments in 
society at large. 
TRADITIONAL MACRO-HYPOTHESES 
In this study I used notions of mobility research to explain patterns of various types of status 
homogamy. Following the lead of Lipset and Zetterberg (1956) and Heath (1981) who stated 
that status homogamy and mobility are identical indicators of the openness of a society's 
stratification system, I formulated 'traditional' macro-hypotheses on status homogamy. The 
first hypothesis holds that industrialization makes for less status homogamy on marriage 
markets, just as it makes for weaker intergenerational transfer of social status on labor 
markets. In the international comparison of status homogamy in Chapter 4, I termed this 
hypothesis the industrialization hypothesis. A corresponding hypothesis from sociology of the 
family that I used in Chapter 3 is the hypothesis of romantic love (Goode 1964, Shorter 
1976). It holds that in traditional agrarian societies the selection of a spouse was influenced by 
parents and the church, while in modern industrial societies marriages are arranged on the 
basis of love. If so, both homogamy of social origin and educational homogamy decrease in 
strength as societies become more industrialized. 
My findings - both from single and dual trait analyses - confirm the first part of the 
industrialization and romantic love hypothesis: as well in Hungary in the 1930-1979 period 
(Chapter 2), in the Netherlands after World War II (Chapter 3), as in the bulk of 13 other 
industrial countries of the twentieth century (Chapter 4), the association between spouses' 
social origins generally showed a strong decrease. In addition, a direct test of the influence of 
a country's or period's level of industrialization on homogamy of social origin in Chapter 4 
yielded a negative effect, although non-significant after dual trait analyses. Whatever the exact 
causes may be, I found that marriages in industrial societies are less and less contracted within 
one's social class of origin. 
However, in another respect love has not become more socially blind. Contrary to Ultee 
and Luijkx' (1990) finding of a world-wide decrease in the single trait measure of educational 
homogamy, I found - with more appropriate dual-trait models and a design in which I 
compared cohorts instead of existing marriages (see also paragraph 7.3.2) -, that educational 
homogamy was stable in most of the industrial countries I investigated. If there were any 
changes in educational homogamy, they pointed to a slight increase in recent decades. The 
latter finding holds for Hungary (Chapter 2), the Netherlands (Chapters 3, 5), and many other 
industrial countries (Chapter 4: Bulgaria, England, Japan, Malaysia, Sweden and the United 
States). Given the accompanying trend towards less homogamy of social origin it must be 
concluded that status homogamy changed in its nature, not so much in its degree. While in the 
past people were selected for marriage on basis of their social origin, nowadays education has 
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replaced origin as an important status factor in mate selection. Kalmijn (1991a) observed a 
similar shift from homogamy of social origin to educational homogamy in the United States 
between 1962 and 1973. In general then, the second part of the romantic love and 
industrialization hypothesis must be rejected. Although marriage markets have become more 
open with respect to social origin, industrialization did not foster openness with respect to 
spouses' educations. Apparently, societal openness comes in different varieties. 
Nevertheless, the evidence in the form of an increased role of education in mate selection 
and against increased openness on marriage markets is not universal. First, in some countries 
(Czechoslovakia and Italy) educational homogamy demonstrated a decrease. Second, in a 
direct test of the effect of industrialization on educational homogamy in Chapter 4,1 did not 
find a significant effect, neither in single nor in dual trait analysis (although the parameter 
estimate was positive). Third, in my investigation of a specific educational group, the Dutch 
educational elite (Chapter 6), I found a tendency towards less educational homogamy. Persons 
with an academic degree bom after 1950 prefer marriage with a person of similar educational 
level to a stronger degree than professionals bom before 1950. 
Next to statements on effects of industrialization on status homogamy, I also examined the 
tenability of other generalizations from findings of mobility research. Following the 
aforementioned lead of stratification researchers, I formulated in Chapter 4 the macro-
hypothesis that a period of social-democratic government or state-socialism makes for less 
status homogamy within marriage markets, just as it makes for weaker intergenerational 
transfer of social status within labor markets. These hypotheses to which I refer as the social-
democracy and state-socialism hypotheses, were earlier tested by Ultee and Luijkx (1990) in 
their large-scale single trait analysis of educational homogamy in 23 industrial countries. They 
found that social-democracy makes for less educational homogamy. However, state-socialism 
unexpectedly enhanced educational homogamy. 
My international comparative analyses in Chapter 4 re-examined the effects of left politics 
on status homogamy within single and dual trait models. I found that a period of social-
democracy or state-socialism made for less homogamy of social origin, both in single or in 
dual trait models (although in the latter case non-significant). This confirms the notions from 
mobility research. Educational homogamy, however, increases as governments are left-wing. 
The latter finding challenges notions from mobility research. To sum up: patterns and trends in 
homogamy of social origin can to some degree be accounted for by traditional notions as 
industrialization and a nation's left politics, but the rather stable trend in educational 
homogamy puzzles and is not in line with the expected decrease. 
MORE INFORMATIVE MACRO-HYPOTHESES 
The generalization of hypotheses of mobility research to status homogamy met with little 
success. Lacking are good theoretical arguments as to why status homogamy varies over time 
and space. In order to give a better answer to this question, I made use of existing sociological 
theories that could easily be applied to problems concerning mate selection. Oddly enough, 
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two of four such theories stem - like the traditional notions - from stratification research. In 
the sequel I discuss the tenability of hypotheses that have this stronger theoretical foundation. 
First, I discuss the modernization theory and the accompanying achievement hypothesis. 
Modernization theory (Kerr et al 1960) holds that within labor markets selection of people 
into jobs becomes increasingly based on one's own achievement and less so on one's social 
origin. The reason for this shift from ascriptive to achievement values are the increased 
demands of efficiency and knowledge of a technological society. For marriage markets, a 
similar prediction can be made: given that education is an increasingly important determinant 
for achieving high status, one may expect prospective spouses to pay more weight to 
education and less weight to social origin. My findings generally support the achievement 
hypothesis. In most of the countries I studied, education replaces social origin as the main 
status factor in mate selection. In younger birth or marriage cohorts educational homogamy is 
in almost any country stronger than homogamy of social origin. This finding even holds if in a 
country the trend in educational homogamy appeared to be slightly decreasing: homogamy of 
social origin simply decreased to a much greater extent. 
Second, I review the tenability of the reproduction hypothesis which I derived from 
Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies (Bourdieu 1979; for a detailed discussion see 
also Chapter 5). The theory of compensatory strategies holds that higher status groups in 
society use certain strategies to maintain or reproduce their status. If these strategies become 
less effective, higher status groups replace these strategies by more effective strategies. One 
such strategy may be a greater tendency to marry a highly educated person. Eventually, this 
marriage strategy will lead to more educational homogamy since higher status groups - that on 
average have attained higher levels of education than lower status groups - marry among each 
other, and lower status groups are constrained to do the same. 
In Chapters 5 and 6 on educational and cultural homogamy in the Netherlands, I predicted 
that a marriage strategy of educational homogamy will be applied when economic strategies 
for reproduction become less successful (for example, estate duties are raised) and education 
becomes a more effective way to distinguish oneself from others. However, as with the shift 
from industrial to post-industrial societies increasing numbers of lower status persons 
participate in higher education, educational homogamy might also become a less effective 
reproduction strategy. To distinguish from others anew, higher status groups can use an 
alternative matrimonial strategy: they can pay more attention to the cultural knowledge and 
skills of the future spouse (cultural homogamy). 
In Chapter 6,1 derived from Bourdieu's theory of compensatory strategies a conditioning 
of the hypothesis that cultural homogamy increases. It holds that with the expansion and 
democratization of the system of higher education in the Netherlands, persons with an 
academic degree in a 'cultural' discipline (social sciences and humanities) will distinguish 
themselves to a stronger degree by (cultural) homogamy than persons with a degree in an 
'economic' discipline (applied and natural sciences, economic-legal sciences, and medical 
sciences). That is, cultural homogamy would increase faster for the cultural than for the 
economic elite. This stronger tendency towards cultural closure may be explained by the lack 
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of material resources persons of culturally oriented disciplines have. While persons of the 
economic elite may fall back on their income, possessions and/or high social standing, persons 
from the cultural elite only have their cultural knowledge and skills to rely on. 
The findings of Chapters 5 and 6 did not provide solid ground for my trend predictions 
from the theory of compensatory strategies. First, the dual trait analyses of Chapter 5 showed 
that educational and cultural homogamy did not function as compensatory strategies. Until the 
late seventies both forms of homogamy increased in the Netherlands. Thereafter, with the 
expansion and democratization of higher education, educational homogamy remained stable 
and cultural homogamy diminished. Second, the analyses in Chapter 6 on marriage patterns of 
the Dutch educational elite showed that although recent cohorts of university educated 
favored marriage to non-university educated more than older cohorts, this decrease in 
educational level homogamy was not compensated by an increase in the tendency to marry 
within one's type of education. Third, Chapter 6 showed that despite a clustering of cultural 
studies (social sciences, and humanities) and economic studies (applied and natural sciences, 
economic-legal sciences, and medical school) in marriage patterns, the cultural elite did not 
distinguish itself (significantly) faster from others than the economic elite. These findings 
contradict the idea of cultural closure. 
Next to hypotheses derived from modernization theory and the theory of compensatory 
strategies, I discussed De Singly's by-product hypothesis (De Singly 1987, 1993). This 
hypothesis challenges the reproduction hypothesis. It states that in the theory of compensatory 
strategies the assumption of explicit marriage strategies is too strong. Perhaps some decades 
ago parents used explicit strategies to arrange an attractive spouse for their son or daughter, 
nowadays people are free to choose. According to De Singly the new demands of marriage are 
best met when spouses have similar cultural preferences. Marriages that are homogamous with 
respect to education are, according to De Singly, to a great degree a by-product of spouses' 
similarity in cultural preferences. 
The findings of Chapter 5 on educational and cultural homogamy in the Netherlands do not 
confirm De Singly's by-product hypothesis. First, education and cultural life style seem to be 
of equal importance in mate selection after World War II. Both forms of homogamy explain 
the other form for about one half. Second, cultural homogamy did not increase linearly in the 
Netherlands in the post-war period, but showed a decrease as of the mid-seventies. Third and 
finally, the degree to which educational homogamy is a by-product of cultural homogamy did 
not show a general increase. 
The final hypothesis I discussed is the post-materialism hypothesis that I derived from 
Inglehart's theory of post-materialism (Inglehart 1977). The theory of post-materialism holds 
that if people are confronted with material deprivation before they reach adulthood, they 
adhere to conservative values later in life. If, on the other hand, people experience material 
affluence during adolescence, they will have values that are non-material or 'post-materialist', 
such as personal freedom and self-development. By assuming that frequent participation in the 
high arts is a post-materialist values, I expected that persons who grew up in cohorts that 
experienced material affluence pay attention to marrying a spouse with a 'good taste' to a 
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greater extent than persons who grew up in cohorts that experienced material deprivation. The 
results in Chapter 5 showed that the post-materialism hypothesis could explain the observed 
trends rather well. Cultural homogamy increased slightly for cohorts that grew up in increasing 
prosperity, and it decreased in a period that economic growth leveled off. However, that the 
association between spouses' cultural participation ended up lower (in the late eighties/early 
nineties) than it started off (the fifties and sixties) was not expected. Although material 
circumstances have become worse, in the eighties these circumstances are still at a higher level 
than they were in the fifties or sixties. 
MICRO-DERIVED MACRO-HYPOTHESES 
Among the more informative macro-hypotheses mentioned above, the achievement hypothesis 
from modernization theory fared best. It states that during industrialization marriage markets 
shift from selection on the basis of ascribed characteristics (social origin) to selection based on 
achieved characteristics (education). The increased importance of education on labor markets 
is seen as the main vehicle by which this shift occurs. However, as I have stated in Chapter 4, 
other mechanisms of industrialization may also have influenced status homogamy. In fact, 
industrialization is a catch-all term. It hides several processes that each may have had a unique 
effect on the degree to which people select each other as social equals. 
To address the consequences that industrialization and also left politics have for status 
homogamy in an informative way, I went beyond a simple generalization of earlier research 
findings or application of existing macro-theories, and used an individual-level framework. As 
my summary has already alluded to (paragraph 7.2.2), in this framework partner selection is 
assumed to be the outcome of individual decisions based on preferences, social barriers and 
constraints at the marriage market. Based on this individual-level framework, I derived 
testable hypotheses on the consequences of industrialization and left politics on status 
homogamy. These hypotheses were formulated in Chapter 4. The first micro-derived macro-
hypothesis is the aforementioned achievement hypothesis and needs no further introduction. 
The second hypothesis is the urbanization hypothesis. It holds that urbanization, which 
accompanied the process of industrialization, increases opportunities for social mixing and 
lowers social barriers for status homogamy. The third hypothesis is the schooling hypothesis 
and holds that educational expansion - which also accompanied industrialization - decreases 
social barriers for mixed marriage, but on the other hand creates opportunities for educational 
homogamy. The fourth hypothesis is the gender-equality hypothesis: it holds that increased 
educational equality among men and women - a process that occurred in most industrial 
countries of the twentieth century - enhances preferences for educational homogamy because 
preferences for educational similarity have become more symmetric between men and women. 
The fifth and final hypothesis is the late school-selection hypothesis. It is formulated to 
account for the effect of a nation's left politics on status homogamy. In short, it holds that 
state-socialist or social-democratic governments introduced comprehensive school systems in 
which opportunities for social mixing were created since students were selected for ability at a 
later age than in regular school systems. 
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My summary of the findings of Chapter 4 (paragraph 7.2.2) has shown that in general the five 
more specific indicators of industrialization and politics can account for the observed patterns 
of status homogamy better than the traditional notions of mobility research. Nevertheless, the 
effects of the micro-derived macro-factors were not always as predicted. The findings of my 
explanatory analyses unexpectedly refuted some of the systematically derived hypotheses. 
To comment on the refutations of the micro-derived macro-hypotheses, I review the 
schooling hypothesis as an example. My findings showed that longer school careers decrease 
homogamy of social origin as was to be expected (though non-significant). Quite 
unexpectedly, however, the findings also showed that longer school careers do not make for 
more, but less educational homogamy (though, also non-significant). A potentially false 
assumption can explain this refutation. In deriving the schooling hypothesis, I stated that 
longer school careers would decrease the time gap between leaving school and entering 
wedlock, which would in turn create opportunities for educationally homogamous friendships 
to evolve into marriage. Implicitly, I assumed the age at marriage to increase less than the age 
of leaving school so that indeed the time gap would narrow. This need not be true. Higher 
educated often refrain from marriage and in some countries this may have led to a 
disproportional increase in age at marriage. The time interval between leaving school and 
entering wedlock would widen instead of narrow. Following Mare's argumentation (Mare 
1991), longer school careers would - under these revised assumptions - make for less 
educational homogamy instead of more. To test the schooling-hypothesis anew and in a more 
systematic fashion, I would have to compare the ages at which people leave school and enter 
wedlock for a lot of countries and periods. Unfortunately, in my data I do not have a way to 
test this and I consider such a comparison and test of the schooling-hypothesis as a question 
that is open to research (also see Mare 1991). 
Like the example above, other macro-hypotheses that were derived from the individual-
level framework may have been refuted because of inappropriate assumptions. In the final 
paragraph of my study (paragraph 7.3.3) I suggest an approach in which several assumptions 
can be tested explicitly and in which a more direct and systematic test of the consequences of 
macro-factors on the selection of a mate is possible. For the time being, I consider the macro-
hypotheses derived from the individual-level framework as more successful in accounting for 
the observed patterns in status homogamy than either the traditional notions of mobility 
research or the more informative predictions derived from existing theories of social 
stratification. 
7.3.2 Methodological Issues 
In this study I have applied research designs and statistical models for status homogamy that 
were sometimes quite different from designs and models applied in earlier studies. This 
paragraph discusses some methodological issues regarding the designs and models. 
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EXISTING MARRIAGES VERSUS MARRIAGE OR BIRTH COHORTS 
To begin with, I discuss research designs to assess trends in homogamy. Ultee and Luijkx' 
(1990) large-scale analysis of educational homogamy and Sixma and Ultee's (1984) and 
Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits' (1995) studies for the Netherlands, used a 'survey design' to 
describe trends in homogamy. They compared the strength of educational homogamy for 
existing marriages in different survey years. For the Netherlands a decrease was observed 
between 1959 and 1971 and fairly stable homogamy in later surveys years 1977, 1985 and 
1991. In my study I used another research design. I compared marriage cohorts (Chapters 2, 3 
and 5) and birth cohorts (Chapters 4 and 6) to describe trends in various kinds of status 
homogamy. Marriage cohorts are groups of people that married in the same period. Birth 
cohorts are groups of people that were bom in the same period. In contrast to the 
aforementioned research findings from survey comparison, I found in a comparison of 
marriage cohorts in the Netherlands (Chapters 3 and 5) much more fluctuation in educational 
homogamy and also noticed a strong increase in the last marriage cohort (1988-1992). Which 
of the findings is to be believed? To what extent have the research designs led to different 
trend findings? 
Table 7.1 Cohort-specific parameters of educational homogamy by survey-year (fictive data) 
Marriage cohort 
1960 
Survey 
1970 1980 1990 
Mean 
1910-1920 
1920-1930 
1930-1940 
1940-1950 
1950-1960 
1960-1970 
1970-1980 
1980-1990 
.50 
.45 
.40 
.35 
.25 
— 
— 
-
— 
.45 
.40 
.35 
.30 
.25 
— 
— 
.40 
.35 
.30 
.25 
.30 
— 
— 
— 
— 
.35 
.30 
.25 
.30 
.35 
.50 
.45 
.40 
.35 
.30 
.25 
.30 
.35 
Mean .39 .35 .32 .31 .34 
Table 7.1 provides a tentative answer to these questions. In this table I present fictive 
parameters of educational homogamy both by marriage cohort and survey year. The data are 
ordered in such a way that each survey year contains marriages from five marriage cohorts of 
each 10 years long. Survey year 1970, for example, comprises marriages that were contracted 
between 1920 and 1970. Older marriages are not considered because they do not frequently 
occur and because they might have suffered from selective attrition (see below). Educational 
homogamy for survey year 1970 can be computed from the cohort-wise data as the mean of 
the parameters of educational homogamy for the five marriage cohorts 1920-1970: this equals 
0.35. Similarly, the mean degree of educational homogamy for the other three survey-years 
can be computed. 
Inspection of the fictive parameters of educational homogamy by marriage cohort shows a 
steady decrease between 1910 and 1970 (with steps of 0.05) and an increase after this period 
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(with a similar step of 0.05). Comparison of the fictive parameters between the four survey 
years shows a different picture: educational homogamy decreased from 1960 to 1970, and also 
decreased thereafter from 1970 to 1990. The latter decrease between survey-years 1970-1990 
contradicts the observed increase in educational homogamy between marriage cohorts 1970-
1990. Why do the results (partly) contradict? Why can newly wed be more homogamous while 
between recent survey years homogamy declines? The answer lies in the composition of 
existing marriages in the various survey years. If one compares homogamy among survey 
years, trends may have occurred because of the entry of newly wed, but also because of the 
dropout of couples that have been married for a long time. In recent years the latter 
composition effect may have caused the contradictory results: the exit of the oldest married 
that were strongly homogamous outweighed the entry of the newest married (who appeared to 
be more homogamous than a previous cohort). For example, between survey years 1970 and 
1980 the dropout of the 1920-1930 cohort that was strongly homogamous (0.45) outweighed 
the entry of a new cohort (1970-1980), a cohort that appeared to be more homogamous 
(0.30) than its predecessor (025). Consequently, the average level of homogamy in 1980 
(0.32) ends up lower than in 1970 (0.35). Between survey years 1980 and 1990 a similar 
composition effect takes place: educational homogamy declines between the two survey years 
because of the exit of older married while among corresponding marriage cohorts homogamy 
continues to increase. 
Composition effects of exit and entry of certain marriages may also have occurred in earlier 
studies that made use of a survey-design. The trend towards less educational homogamy that 
was observed in the Netherlands between survey years 1959 and 1971 may not so much reflect 
a decreased tendency of people to match on education, but may simply have been caused by 
dropout of older marriages that were characterized by a strong degree of homogamy. 
Likewise, the leveling of the decrease in educational homogamy in later survey years 1977, 
1985 and 1991 may not point to a less strong decreased tendency to match on a similar 
education, but it may - like the example in Table 7.1 - have hidden a substantial increase in the 
tendency to match on education. I observed such an increased tendency in my comparison of 
marriage cohorts in the Netherlands (Chapters 3 and 5): the youngest marriage cohort (1988-
1992) had a much stronger degree of educational homogamy - both with regard to the single 
and dual trait measure - than the one-but-last marriage cohort (1983-1987). Unfortunately, I 
cannot test for composition effects directly. My data are from one rather small survey that 
does not contain enough older marriages to construct a test such as in Table 7.1. Nevertheless, 
given the abovementioned arguments and the structure of the 'survey-' and 'cohort-trends' in 
educational homogamy, it seems likely that the contradictory findings of the two trend designs 
are paradoxical. At a closer look they are much more alike, and they seem to indicate a recent 
increase in the tendency to match on education. 
However, which of the trend designs is to be preferred is not a methodological but a 
theoretical question. Given existing theories on mate selection that stress the effects of social 
restrictions on matching, it seems more appropriate to distinguish cohorts of persons that 
married in different periods than to summarize homogamy for all existing marriages. A 
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comparison of different marriage cohorts may show to what extent various constraints - for 
example, material affluence or educational expansion - shape the matching of persons on 
marriage markets. Instead, a comparison of existing marriages gives an indication of 
homogamy for persons that married under possibly quite different circumstances. If any 
changes occur in a survey design, they are likely due to exit of old or entry of newly wed. 
Given the state of the art of theories then, a comparison of cohorts is generally to be preferred. 
Of course, a cohort of ten years may be too long. A new proposal (paragraph 7.3.3) will use 
cohorts of a much smaller time interval. 
In relation to the abovementioned theoretical arguments, it seems more appropriate to 
compare marriage cohorts than to compare birth cohorts. Nevertheless, since many data sets 
lack information on year of marriage, birth cohorts often have to be used as a proxy for 
marriage cohorts. In my study such a proxy was used in the large-scale crossnational analyses 
in Chapter 4 and in the analysis of marriage patterns of the Dutch educational elite in Chapter 
6. The use of year of birth as proxy for year of marriage may introduce bias if subsequent birth 
cohorts marry later or increasingly across different ages. In my analyses in Chapter 6 this did 
not appear to be a great problem since in the Netherlands the mean and standard deviation of 
age at marriage has remained fairly stable throughout the twentieth century (Kalmijn 1994b). 
In the large-scale analyses of Chapter 4 trends in age at marriage were not checked upon. 
However, for surveys that did contain information on both year of marriage and year of birth, I 
found high correlations among these years. Although this finding does not exclude any 
distortion, it indicates that birth cohorts can function as a proxy for marriage cohorts. 
A final issue regarding comparison of marriage cohorts is 'selective attrition'. By this term 
I refer to the phenomenon that when cohorts age, heterogamous couples dropout faster from 
cohorts than homogamous couples (Bumpass and Sweet 1972). If data from just one survey 
are used to compare ('synthetic') marriage cohorts, selective attrition can cause an artificial 
trend towards more homogamy. Older marriage cohorts may be more homogamous than 
younger cohorts simply because these cohorts have been exposed to the risk of selective 
attrition longer. Kalmijn (1991a) showed this to occur for educational homogamy in the 
United States between 1962 and 1973. In later work, Kalmijn (1991b) tested effects of 
duration of marriage within loglinear models of educational and religious homogamy. In 
contrast to the earlier analysis, the later, statistically more sophisticated analyses did not show 
significant effects of selective attrition on homogamy. In this study I also tested for selective 
attrition in Chapter 2. In that chapter I had data from three Hungarian household surveys 
which enabled me to follow marriage cohorts through different survey years. My loglinear 
analyses did not provide any evidence for selective attrition. Educational heterogamous or 
(social) class mixed marriages stood firm equally long as homogamous marriages. 
To get around the difficulty of selective attrition, another research design would be -
instead of comparing 'synthetic cohorts' from one survey - a comparison of 'real' marriage 
cohorts that were obtained from different surveys. Kalmijn (1991a) used this solution in his 
analysis of educational homogamy in the United States. He compared a cohort of couples that 
were married for 10 years from the 1962 Occupational Change in a Generation (OCG) survey 
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with a similar cohort from the 1973 OCG survey. The short marriage period of 10 years 
minimizes the risk of selective attrition. 
LOGLINEAR MODELS VERSUS CORRELATION MODELS 
A second methodological issue regards the statistical models for association. In this study I 
applied two different types of association models to estimate status homogamy: in Chapters 2 
and 6 I used loglinear models and in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I used correlation models. Loglinear 
models have been applied in recent third generation studies on status homogamy (see also 
Chapter 1). Generally, these models are considered to be an improvement over older 
association models for homogamy. Loglinear models take into account the marginal 
frequencies of different marriage tables by specifying for each marginal frequency a separate 
parameter. Furthermore, loglinear models allow a researcher to specify the association in a 
marriage table into multiple parameters. This makes more complex hypotheses on status 
boundaries testable and improves the fit of the association model to the data. 
Despite the advantages, the application of loglinear models to status homogamy has a 
serious drawback. To estimate more than one type of homogamy within loglinear models, 
marriage tables have to be expanded to more than two dimensions and consequently large data 
sets are required. Since such data sets are only available for a few countries - England, 
Hungary, and the United States -, loglinear analyses of more than one trait of spouses is 
restricted. As a solution one could collapse categories of traits, but this would mean a loss of 
valuable information. 
Given the restrictions of loglinear dual trait analyses and my aim to reassess the observed 
world-wide trend towards less educational homogamy, I choose statistical models that had 
already been used by researchers of the second generation: Pearson correlation models. 
Pearson correlation models require less extensive data sets than loglinear models because they 
only use information on the mean and standard deviation of characteristics. 
As Pearson correlation models utilize the mean and standard deviation of characteristics to 
compute associations, they also take into account the marginal frequencies of characteristics of 
men and women. Compared to loglinear models, however, the adjustment for marginal 
frequencies may be somewhat less effective. While Pearson correlation models use only two 
parameters - the mean and the standard deviation - to compute a measure of attraction or 
'relative' homogamy, loglinear models allow specification of a separate parameter of each 
category of a characteristic. For traits that show unequal and skew distributions between men 
and women, the adjustment for availability may become a problem. In correlation models the 
association parameter may either over- or underestimate the association net of marginal 
frequencies. In a worst-case-scenario, trends in status homogamy can reverse. Given these 
arguments, the current question is to what extent the findings of my correlation analyses in 
Chapters 3,4 and 5 are biased: does a loglinear analysis of my data lead to other parameters of 
status homogamy than a (Pearson) correlation analysis? 
I used the Dutch data from Chapter 3 to give an answer to the question. In that chapter I 
applied Pearson correlation models to compute homogamy of social origin and education in 
Summary and Discussion 151 
the Netherlands between 1947 and 1992. In order to estimate loglinear models for the Dutch 
data, I restricted the analysis to single trait models because these models require simple two-
dimensional marriage tables and do not require large data sets. Another restriction is that I 
recoded the educational scales for husbands and wives from originally ten into three categories 
(low, middle, high). I based this decision on observed marriage frequencies and application of 
a loglinear model that yielded scale values on an 'intermarriage dimension' (the scaled uniform 
association model; see also Chapter 2). 
In general, reanalysis with loglinear models demonstrated that loglinear models of uniform 
association models fit the Dutch data well (for a table cross-classifying spouses' social origins 
by cohort Chi2=25.8; Df=27, p=0.53; for a table cross-classifying spouses' educations by 
cohorts Chi2=38.2; Df=27; p=0.07). This is an important finding because the loglinear models 
of uniform association have a natural correspondence to (Pearson) correlation models 
(Duncan 1979, Hout 1983). Like correlation models, the (scaled) uniform association model 
only uses one parameter to characterize the association in a marriage table. 
Table 7.2 Pearson (zero-order) correlations and loglinear parameters of a model of uniform 
association for (a) the association between spouses ' social origins, and (b) the association 
between spouses' educations: the Netherlands 1947-1992 (data from Chapter 3) 
Parameter 
A SPOUSES' ORIGINS 
Pearson correlation 
Loglinear parameter 
В SPOUSES' EDUCATION 
Pearson correlation 
Loglinear parameter 
47-62 
0.61* 
2.03* 
0.31* 
0.49* 
63-67 
0.57* 
1.11* 
0.43* 
0.90* 
Marriage cohort 
68-72 
0.45* 
0.61* 
0.64* 
1.12* 
73-77 
0.36* 
0.64* 
0.40* 
0.70* 
78-82 
0.36* 
0.58* 
0.51* 
0.85* 
83-87 
0.28* 
0.36* 
0.40* 
0.77* 
88-92 
0.33* 
0.83* 
0.57* 
0.82* 
Note: * significant, p<0.05 
Table 7.2 presents the parameter estimates of the correlation and loglinear reanalysis. In panel 
A of the table the Pearson and loglinear parameters of the single trait measure of homogamy 
of social origin are shown, and in panel В the corresponding parameters of the single trait 
measure of educational homogamy. In general, the two association parameters show large 
similarities, both with respect to spouses' social origins and educations: although the metric of 
the measures is quite different, an in- or decrease in the correlation measure from one cohort 
to the next is accompanied by a similar in- or decrease in the loglinear parameter of that type 
of homogamy. This similarity indicates that my correlation analyses in Chapter 3 yielded trend 
findings that were not substantially disturbed by differences in marginal frequencies. The 
finding also indicates that the earlier observed differences in trend findings between my 
correlation analyses and Sixma and Ultee's (1984) and Hendrickx, Uunk and Smits' (1995) 
loglinear analyses for the Netherlands is not due to differences in the type of association 
model. As my discussion of methodological issues has shown, the observed differences in 
trend findings may better be accounted for by differences in research design. To what extent 
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results of the other correlation analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 are distorted by differences in 
marginal frequencies cannot be assessed with the data at hand because the data are too small 
in size for a reanalysis with loglinear models, and because the data could not uniformly be 
coded without a great loss of information. 
SINGLE VERSUS DUAL TRAIT MODELS 
A third methodological issue is whether dual trait models were successful and whether in 
future research these models are to be preferred over single trait models of status homogamy. 
As I have shown in my summary of findings, dual trait analyses have in some respects been 
successful, but in other respects not. Although parameters of various kinds of status 
homogamy proved to be substantially lower in dual than in single trait analysis, trends in the 
various kinds of status homogamy were generally not distorted. Why were the differences in 
trend parameters so small? Under what conditions do dual trait models lead to other trend 
findings than single trait models? 
To answer these questions, I have to bring back in mind the residual correlation model of 
Chapter 3. In Figure 3.2 I illustrated with fictive parameters that between two marriage 
cohorts the single trait measure of educational homogamy can remain stable, while the dual 
trait measure increases. To obtain this result, I assumed homogamy of social origin to decrease 
and the associations between social origin and education (the reproduction and exchange-
effects) to be invariant. Likewise, I could have assumed the associations between social origin 
and education to decrease and homogamy of social origin to be stable, or I could have 
assumed all these associations to decline in strength. In all these instances, the factors that 
influence a match on education lead to an expected decrease in educational homogamy. Since I 
further assumed a stable zero-order association between spouses' educations in my example, 
the net preference for educational homogamy must have increased to compensate the 
expected decrease. Hence, a stable single trait measure of educational homogamy does not 
necessarily indicate invariant preferences, but it may hide an increased tendency to marry 
someone of similar educational level. 
While the example may be illustrative, my data in Chapter 3 (but also in Chapters 2, 4 and 
5) showed that the factors that distort educational homogamy (homogamy of social origin and 
the associations between social origin and education) did not behave so nicely so as to 
produce different trends in the single and dual trait parameters. Between cohorts, homogamy 
of social origin indeed decreased but the associations between social origin and education 
often went in different directions. For example, in Chapter 3 I found that in the period 1978-
1987, homogamy of social origin decreased from 0.36 to 0.28. However, the association 
between husband's social origin and husband's education increased from 0.34 to 0.46, the 
association between wife's social origin and wife's education decreased strongly from 0.43 to 
0.10, the association between wife's social origin and husband's education increased from 
0.14 to 0.23, and the association between husband's social origin and wife's education 
increased from 0.14 to 0.21. Taken together, these widely differing changes in the factors that 
influence a match on education cancel out each other and do not produce other trend findings: 
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the dual trait measure of educational homogamy showed a decrease (from 0.35 to 0.25) that 
was as strong as the decrease in the single trait measure (from 0.51 to 0.40). 
Like my example of the 1978-1987 period in the Netherlands, in many other time periods 
and countries factors that could make for dissimilar trends in single and dual trait parameters 
of status homogamy had countervailing effects or no effect at all (see also Chapter 4). When, 
however, the possibly distorting factors de- or increase unequivocally, the trend findings from 
two types of analysis can be different. Since such changes are always plausible, dual trait 
models should be preferred over single trait models of status homogamy. 
DUAL TRAIT VERSUS THREE TRAIT MODELS 
In my study I have examined the role of social origin, education and high culture in mate 
selection by analyzing dual trait models, first for social origin and education (Chapters 2, 3 and 
4), and then for education and cultural life style (Chapters 5 and 6). The idea behind this 
subdivision was theoretical: while in traditional, agrarian societies the role of social origin was 
large and in modern industrial societies education is believed to replace origin as the most 
important status factor, with the shift from industrial to post-industrial societies high culture 
would replace education as the main status factor by which adolescents choose their partners. 
What would, however, have happened to the patterns and trends in status homogamy if I had 
applied a model in which all three factors were modeled simultaneously? To what extent do 
single trait parameters further decrease in size when not one but two status factors are taken 
into account? Do trends in the single trait measures of status homogamy differ from trends 
observed in three trait models? 
To answer these questions, I suggest one possible three trait model in Figure 7.1. Using the 
logic of my earlier residual correlation models, the model in this Figure assumes cultural 
homogamy to be influenced by spouses' educations and by spouses' social origin. Another 
possible three trait model would be to make educational homogamy or homogamy of social 
origin as the association to be accounted for. 
Table 7.3 presents results of analyses with single, dual and three trait models of status 
homogamy using the Dutch data of Chapter 5 as an example. The figures in the table show 
that compared to the dual trait parameters, the three trait parameters are generally lower but 
still significant. This means that the dual trait parameters of homogamy - both for social origin, 
education and cultural life style - can further be accounted for by a third form of status 
homogamy. However, preferences for similarity on each of the three traits still exist. Of these 
preferences, the tendency towards cultural and educational homogamy are equally strong 
(around 0.20), whereas the tendency towards homogamy of social origin is one third weaker 
(0.12). If trends in the parameters of three trait models are examined, the conclusions of 
earlier dual trait analyses stand firm. In the Netherlands during the post-war period homogamy 
of social origin decreased, educational homogamy increased slightly and cultural homogamy 
declined as of the mid-seventies. Overall then, three trait analyses do not lead to other trend 
conclusions than the previous dual trait analyses. However, since three trait models lead to 
lower and more precise estimates of the net weights of the various kinds of status homogamy, 
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these models deserve follow-up. If possible, models for (status) homogamy must be extended 
to more than two traits. 
Figure 7.1 Three trait model for cultural homogamy 
7.3.3 New Questions: a Fourth Generation? 
My examination of the role of social origin, education and cultural life style in mate selection 
started with an overview of three generations of research on status homogamy (see also 
Chapter 1). I have tried to make significant contributions to this line of research. By 
comparing parameters of single and dual trait models for status homogamy, by explaining 
cross-national and cross-temporal differences in these parameters, and by examining the role 
of (high) culture in mate selection, I tried to live up to three aims and to answer five research 
questions. In this paragraph I want to end my study by discussing some new questions, 
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theories and methods for research. These questions, theories and research methods may very 
well constitute a framework for a fourth generation of studies on status homogamy. 
Table 7.3 Single trait, dual trait and three trait parameters for the association between (a) 
spouses' social origins, (b) spouses' educations, and (c) spouses' cultural participation: the 
Netherlands 1948-1992 (data from Chapter 5) 
Parameter 
A SPOUSES' ORIGINS 
single trait parameter 
dual trait: control education 
dual trait: control culture 
three trait parameter 
В SPOUSES' EDUCATIONS 
single trait parameter 
dual trait: control origin 
dual trait: control education 
three trait parameter 
С SPOUSES' CULTURAL PARTICIPATION 
single trait parameter 
dual trait: control origin 
dual trait: control education 
three trait parameter 
48-62 
0.62* 
0.42* 
0.42* 
0.35* 
0.39* 
0.23* 
0.17 
0.13 
0.34* 
0.32* 
0.15 
0.19* 
63-72 
0.37* 
0.16* 
0.17* 
0.13 
0.57* 
0.31* 
0.22* 
0.18* 
0.53* 
0.28* 
0.19* 
0.16* 
Marriage cohort 
73-82 
0.37* 
0.16* 
0.20* 
0.13 
0.45* 
0.22* 
0.24* 
0.18* 
0.47* 
0.328 
0.26* 
0.25* 
83-92 
0.19* 
0.03 
0.10 
0.03 
0.52* 
0.31* 
0.24* 
0.18* 
0.35* 
0.24* 
0.12* 
0.12 
all 
0.37* 
0.14* 
0.22* 
0.12* 
0.52* 
0.27* 
0.28* 
0.19* 
0.43* 
0.30* 
0.22* 
0.21* 
Note: * significant, p<0.05. 
First, I sketch research questions for future research that emerge from limitations of my 
analyses. My study of status homogamy was confined to the role of social origin, education, 
and high culture in mate selection. To assess a possible shift from ascribed to achieved 
characteristics in mate selection more rigorously, one can also investigate other traits of 
spouses. The extent to which ascribed characteristics play a role in mate selection may be 
studied in a more meaningful way as next to social class of origin one examines the degree to 
which persons of different religious denominations intermarry (religious heterogamy), the 
degree to which blacks and whites wed (racial heterogamy), and the degree to which persons 
of different ethnic groups marry (ethnic heterogamy). In societies in which religion, race 
and/or ethnicity emerge as cardinal factors of social unrest and unequal distribution of scarce 
resources, these characteristics can be seen as alternative and possibly more informative 
indicators of discrimination than social class only. Homogamy with respect to these traits also 
indicates status homogamy because some religious groups, races and ethnic groups have lower 
social status than others. Religious and educational homogamy have earlier been analyzed in 
dual trait analyses for the Netherlands (Hendrickx 1994) and the United States (Kalmijn 
1991b). Racial and educational homogamy have been investigated in a study of the role of 
spouses' educations for black/white intermarriage in the United States (Kalmijn 1993). Ethnic 
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intermarriages and status homogamy were examined in dual trait analyses for Taiwan (Tsai 
1994). A simultaneous analysis of these origin characteristics is lacking, however. 
Achieved characteristics of mate selection can also be studied more extensively. For the 
United States, Hout (1982) studied occupational homogamy for two-earner couples. Kalmijn 
(1994a) studied occupational homogamy in the United States by inferring from detailed 
occupational titles the cultural and economic statuses of occupations. This analysis made a 
further assessment of Bourdieu's (1979) theory of compensatory strategies possible and also 
sheds light on the question whether people prefer (cultural) similarity in mate selection or 
whether they prefer (economic) hypergamy. Smits, Ultee and Lammers (1993) analyzed 
occupational homogamy within single trait models for eight countries of the European 
Community. An obvious extension of their research is to include spouses' educations since 
educational homogamy at the time of marriage may have caused occupational similarity 
between spouses later in life. 
Likewise, the role of cultural life styles in mate selection may be studied in a more 
elaborate way. I confined my analysis to homogamy with respect to participation high culture 
(Chapter 5) and homogamy with respect to one's type of schooling (Chapter 6). Of course, 
there are many more characteristics which define a person's cultural style of life. These 
characteristics vary from political preferences to participation in sports. In as far as cultural 
characteristics enhance boundaries between status groups, they are worthwhile to study for 
stratification analysts. Together with characteristics of social origin and destination, cultural 
traits provide better insight into patterns of status homogamy in agrarian, industrial societies 
and post-industrial societies. 
A second way to proceed with research on status homogamy is not to elaborate on the 
same theme, but to address more refined, 'higher quality' questions. So far, analyses of status 
homogamy - including my study - have chiefly been done at macro-societal level. Trends in 
homogamy were assessed for separate countries and patterns of status homogamy were 
accounted for by macro-societal factors such as a country's level of industrialization or its type 
of political regime. As I have pointed out above, however, the matching of partners is not 
some vague macro-societal process but an outcome of complicated choices of individuals 
influenced by preferences, social pressure and opportunities to meet. To gain more insight into 
what specifically makes the partner choices of persons change, research questions should shift 
from questions for whole populations and cohorts covering five or ten years to questions 
pertaining to marriages of individuals that are characterized by individual and contextual 
factors for all marriages concluded in one year. For example, instead of determining whether a 
country's level of urbanization diminishes that country's level of educational homogamy (a 
'pure' macro-question), it should be asked whether the odds of educationally homogamous 
marriage are lower for persons who live in urbanized than for persons who live in de-
urbanized areas (a macro-micro question). This shift from macro-questions to micro-questions 
does not only provide more insight into the factors that guide mate selection, but can also 
demonstrate that whereas at the macro-level a relationship between urbanization and status 
homogamy exists, at micro-level such relationship may be absent (or vice versa). 
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As questions about status homogamy shift from pure macro-questions to micro-questions in 
which the role of macro factors has to be assessed as a contextual variable, other research 
problems may be answered in a more appropriate way as well. As a third improvement, age-, 
duration- and cohort-effects on status homogamy may be disentangled. In older macro-
analyses of status homogamy it could not be assessed whether a trend towards more 
educational homogamy is due to cohort-succession or due to a tendency to marry later in life. 
Micro-analyses may provide an answer to this question because in these analyses not only the 
odds of a certain type of marriage can be modeled, but also the timing of a certain type of 
marriage. Mare's (1991) analysis of educational homogamy in the United States during the 
period 1940-1987 is a good example. By estimating the odds of educational homogamous 
marriage for different ages of people of different birth cohorts, Mare was able to demonstrate 
that the increased tendency towards educational homogamy was both due to the changed 
timing of first marriage (age-effect) and the increased level of education of successive 
marriage cohorts (cohort-effect). 
A fourth improvement in research on mate selection would be to assess more precisely how 
and to what extent the structure of the marriage market influences the when and whom of 
marriage. As people have a tendency to postpone marriage, marriage markets are believed to 
shift from neighborhoods to schools and the work place. This has consequences for the 
opportunities to meet the desired person, as well as for the social barriers partners face and the 
marriage preferences persons have. Status homogamy may shift from homogamy of social 
origin to educational and occupational homogamy. An indirect way to test this shift of the 
structure of the marriage market is to examine effects of age at marriage on status homogamy. 
A more direct way to test the effects of structural factors on status homogamy is to assess the 
extent to which availability of marriageable persons on different 'local marriage markets' 
shape people's odds of status homogamy. Stier and Shavit (1994), for example, tested effects 
of national sex-ratio's on the timing of ethnically mixed marriages in Israel. The most direct 
way to test what the opportunity structure does for mate selection, however, is to map 
'relationship histories'. In these histories data on dating practices and meeting arrangements 
may give more precise information on the place and context in which spouses have first met 
and dated: was it in the neighborhood, the school or workplace, or have they met elsewhere? 
In order to answer the more refined micro-questions, theories must be developed further 
too. The theories should in a more systematic way than I have done, incorporate general 
propositions and assumptions on processes of mate selection. These propositions should 
center around the preferences individuals have and the constraints they face when they are 
available on the marriage market. Becker's (1981) theory of marriage can function as an 
example. His theory contains formal equations of marriage timing and marriage choices of 
individuals. Although Becker mainly considers time and money constraints, his theory may 
also include status arguments and opportunity constraints. 
A test of hypotheses from an individual-level framework also requires a new approach in 
data, research designs and statistical models. To analyze the when and whom of marriage, an 
event-history design is appropriate (Mare 1991, Stier and Shavit 1994). In this design, events 
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(first marriage) are modeled as a function of the time persons were 'at risk.' to marry. The data 
units are not persons but time periods, for example years or months. The event-history design 
enables the researcher to disentangle age from period and cohort effects, and also allows the 
researcher to do causal inferences because it can be determined whether an explanatory factor 
preceded the event or not. The statistical models in the event-history design must preferably be 
multi-nomial logit models since the marriage decision is twofold: when and whom? 
Furthermore, to estimate contextual effects on marriage decisions properly, the dynamic logit 
models may be incorporated in a multi-level design. A multi-level design takes into account 
the error structure at each level of aggregation and gives unbiased estimates of explanatory 
factors. In addition, it can also in an appropriate way disentangle contextual effects (for 
example, the mean level of education in a certain cohort) from individual effects (for example, 
one's educational attainment). A recent application of dynamic logit analysis within a multi-
level design is South and Lloyd's (1995) analysis of the influence of spousal alternatives on 
marital dissolution. Research on status homogamy awaits similar analyses. A fourth generation 
in research on status homogamy is ready for take-off. 
APPENDIX A 
D A T A S O U R C E S : C O R R E L A T I O N M A T R I C E S 
Table A.l Zero-order correlations between spouses' educations and spouses' fathers' 
educations by marriage cohort: the Netherlands 1947-1992 (data Chapter 3) 
All cohorts 
education man 
education woman 
education man's father 
education woman's father 0 395 0 466 0 420 1000 
COHORT 1 1947-1963 
education man 
education woman 
education man's father 
education woman's father 0 255 0412 0612 1000 
COHORT2 1963-1967 
education man 
education woman 
education man's father 
education woman's father 0 276 0 484 0 568 1000 
СонсжтЗ 1968-1972 
education man 
education woman 
education man's father 
education woman s father 0 528 0 596 0 445 1 000 
COHORT4 1973-1977 
education man 
education woman 
education man's father 
education woman's father 0 378 0 512 0 362 1000 
COHORT 5 1978-1982 
education man 
education woman 
education man's father 
education woman's father 0 259 0 483 0 360 1 000 
COHORT 6 19783-1987 
education man 
education woman 
education man's father 
education woman's father 0 353 0 160 0 278 1 000 
COHORT 7 1988-1992 
education man 
education woman 
education man's father 
education woman's father 0 434 0 366 0 334 1 000 
N=774 
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1000 
0 306 
0 251 
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1O00 
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0 297 
 
1 000 
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1000 
0 346 
 
1000 
  
1000 
2 
1 000 
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1000 
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Table A 2 Zero-order correlations between spouses' educations and cultural participation by 
marriage cohort the Netherlands 1948-1992 (data Chapter 5) 
All cohorts 
education husband 
education wife 
cultural participation husband 
cultural participation wife 
mean 
COHORT 1 1948-1962 
education husband 
education wife 
cultural participation husband 
cultural participation wife 
mean 
COHORT 2 1963-1972 
education husband 
education wife 
cultural participation husband 
cultural participation wife 
mean 
COHORT 3 1973-1982 
education husband 
education wife 
cultural participation husband 
cultural participation wife 
mean 
COHORT 4 1983-1992 
education husband 
education wife 
cultural participation husband 
cultural participation wife 
mean 
N=547 
1000 
0515 
0 495 
0 383 
4 833 
N=89 
1000 
0 393 
0 370 
0 398 
4148 
N=153 
1000 
0 569 
0 590 
0 472 
4 614 
N=176 
1000 
0445 
0 542 
0 336 
4 937 
N=129 
1000 
0519 
0474 
0 389 
5419 
1000 
0 303 
0 551 
4 434 
1000 
0 239 
0510 
3 214 
1000 
0 454 
0 622 
4 085 
1000 
0 290 
0 599 
4 754 
1000 
0316 
0 630 
5256 
1 000 
0 434 
1 442 
1000 
0 339 
¡416 
1000 
0 526 
1497 
1000 
0469 
1453 
1000 
0 348 
1386 
1000 
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1 000 
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1000 
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1 513 
1000 
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SAMENVATTING 
Hoewel populaire opvattingen over het huwelijk anders doen vermoeden, kiezen mensen hun 
partners op een vrij systematische manier: meestal kiest men een levensgezel die op één of 
meerdere kenmerken sterk met de eigen kenmerken overeenkomt. Dit wordt ook wel 
homogamie genoemd. In mijn onderzoek sluit ik aan bij een onderzoekstraditie binnen de 
sociologie die homogamie bestudeert wat betreft statuskenmerken. Meer specifiek richt ik 
mijn aandacht op de mate waarin partners in voor-industriële, industriële en post-industriële 
samenlevingen van de twintigste eeuw overeenkomen wat betreft hun sociale herkomst, hun 
opleidingsniveau en de mate waarin ze deelnemen aan de schone kunsten. 
Mijn onderzoeksvragen borduren voort op drie generaties onderzoek naar 
statushomogamie. Daarin zijn verschillende probleemstellingen, hypothesen, analyse- en 
dataverzamelingsmethoden aan de orde gekomen, en is er op die gebieden vooruitgang 
geboekt. In studies van de eerste generatie werden beschrijvingsvragen gesteld over de aard en 
mate van statushomogamie in verschillende landen en tijdstippen. De vragen werden 
beantwoord met relatief eenvoudige analysemethoden (kruistabelanalyse met behulp van 
percentagerekening) en dataverzamelingsmethoden (weinig gestandaardiseerde indelingen van 
opleiding en beroep). In studies van de tweede generatie werden preciezere vragen gesteld: 
men wilde niet alleen weten in hoeverre echtgenoten overeenkomen wat betreft hun sociale 
herkomst, maar ook in hoeverre dat zo zou zijn wanneer rekening wordt gehouden met de 
opleidingen van beide partners. De beantwoording van deze vragen werd mogelijk gemaakt 
door de introductie van lineaire regressie modellen in stratificatieonderzoek. Studies van de 
derde generatie boekten vooral vooruitgang op het gebied van methoden, dataverzameling en 
classificaties: ze pasten loglineaire modellen toe om de moeilijkheid te ondervangen dat 
rand verdelingen in kruistabellen de percentages homogamie artificieel beïnvloeden; ze 
gebruikten grote databestanden van zoveel mogelijk landen en tijdstippen; en ze maakten 
gebruik van gestandaardiseerde opleidings- en beroepsindelingen. De studies van de derde 
generatie vergaten echter een belangrijke vraagstelling die in de tweede generatie wel aan de 
orde kwam. Ze vroegen zich niet af in hoeverre overeenkomsten in opleidingsniveau tussen 
partners bestaan wanneer rekening wordt gehouden met overeenkomsten tussen partners op 
andere gebieden. Een recente ontwikkeling binnen onderzoek naar statushomogamie heeft dit 
probleem opgelost door multivariate (loglineaire) modellen toe te passen op kruistabellen voor 
meer dan één kenmerk van beide partners. 
Mijn onderzoek sluit zich aan bij de recente ontwikkeling van multivariate analyse binnen 
studies naar statushomogamie. Ze heeft als uitdrukkelijke doelstelling op drie punten 
vooruitgang te boeken. De eerste en belangrijkste vooruitgang schuilt in het expliciet 
vergelijken van de resultaten van de door de eerste en derde generatie toegepaste bivariate 
analyse van statushomogamie met resultaten van nieuwere multivariate analyse. Deze 
vergelijking kan laten zien dat eerder geconstateerde wereldwijde trend naar minder 
opleidingshomogamie, een schijntrend is. De trend kan zijn veroorzaakt doordat mensen het 
minder belangrijk zijn gaan vinden overeen te komen wat betreft hun herkomstkenmerken -
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een aan opleiding gerelateerd kenmerk - en niet zozeer doordat mensen bij het kiezen van een 
partner minder zijn gaan letten op een persoon met een gelijk opleidingsniveau. Het kan zelfs 
zo zijn dat onafhankelijk van de herkomstkenmerken van beide partners, de neiging om 
homogaam te trouwen wat betreft opleidingsniveau is toegenomen in plaats van afgenomen. 
Een systematische afleiding van voorspellingen uit partnerkeuze- en stratificatietheorieën geeft 
daartoe ook aanleiding. Mijn eerste centrale onderzoeksvraagstelling heeft betrekking op de 
houdbaarheid van de veronderstelling dat de trend naar minder opleidingshomogamie een 
schijntrend is en op de houdbaarheid van verschillende voorspellingen omtrent ontwikkelingen 
in opleidings- en herkomsthomogamie. 
De tweede vooruitgang is dat ik multivariate modellen voor herkomst- en 
opleidingshomogamie voor een groot aantal landen en tijdstippen tegelijkertijd schat. Eerdere 
multivariate analyses hadden betrekking op steeds één land en op een gering aantal tijdstippen. 
Hierdoor konden hypothesen over veranderingen in statushomogamie minder scherp worden 
getoetst. Belangrijker is dat door een grootschalige analyse met multivariate modellen een 
heranalyse mogelijk wordt van bevindingen van gelijksoortige bivariate analyses. De bevinding 
dat industrialisatie en linkse politiek tot minder opleidingshomogamie leiden, zou na 
multivariate analyse in een ander daglicht kunnen komen te staan. De nieuwe analyse kan 
uitwijzen dat in industriële landen niet minder vaak, maar vaker op een gelijk opleidingsniveau 
van huwelijkskandidaten wordt gelet. Mijn derde centrale onderzoeksvraag heeft hierop 
betrekking. Ze luidt in hoeverre de effecten van industrialisatie en linkse politiek op herkomst-
en opleidingshomogamie veranderen wanneer de herkomst- en opleidingshomogamie 
tegelijkertijd worden geanalyseerd. Mijn subvraag is waarom en hoe precies de mate van 
industrialisatie en de aard van de politiek in een land de keuze van een partner beïnvloeden. 
De derde en laatste vooruitgang in mijn studie is dat ik onderzoek in hoeverre partners - in 
de periode dat ze elkaar leerden kennen en als huwelijkspartner uitkozen -, overeenkomen wat 
betreft hun culturele leefstijl. Eerdere studies naar homogamie wat betreft culturele kenmerken 
hadden steeds op een later tijdstip betrekking. Theoretisch is het onderzoeken van 
cultuurhomogamie interessant omdat volgens bepaalde theorieën de culturele leefstijl in 
moderne samenlevingen voor allerlei levenskansen sterk aan belang toeneemt. In tijden waarin 
de gezamenlijke vrije tijd voor partners groeit en onderwijsdiploma's aan inflatie onderhevig 
zijn, zouden culturele kenmerken ook belangrijker worden voor de partnerkeuze. Mensen 
vinden elkaar steeds vaker via culturele activiteiten en overeenkomsten in smaak zijn daarbij 
van belang. Verder kan cultuurhomogamie voor leden van hogere statusgroepen een bewuste 
strategie zijn om sociale daling te compenseren. Mijn derde centrale onderzoeksvraag heeft 
betrekking op de houdbaarheid van deze voorspellingen omtrent cultuurhomogamie. Ze luidt 
in hoeverre personen - ook onafhankelijk van hun opleidingsniveau - overeenkomen wat 
betreft hun culturele leefstijl, in het bijzonder wat betreft hun deelname aan de schone kunsten 
en de studierichting die ze tijdens hun opleiding hebben gekozen. In het onderstaande vat ik de 
antwoorden op de drie centrale onderzoeksvragen samen en bespreek ik in het kort de 
hypothesen, analysemethoden en onderzoeksgegevens. 
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DE BIJPRODUKT VERKLARING: SOCIALE HERKOMST EN OPLEIDING 
De eerste toets van de stelling dat bivariate analyse van statushomogamie schijnbevindingen 
oplevert - ook wel de 'bijprodukt verklaring' genoemd - heeft betrekking op een studie van 
homogamie wat betreft sociale herkomst en opleidingsniveau in Hongarije tussen 1930-1979. 
De keuze voor Hongarije is ingegeven door empirische en theoretische gronden. Empirisch 
maakt dit land analyses mogelijk met loglineaire modellen omdat voor Hongarije drie grote, 
representatieve steekproeven met informatie over de opleidingen en sociale herkomst van 
partners beschikbaar zijn. Theoretisch is Hongarije interessant omdat het land in de laatste 
helft van deze eeuw snelle en grondige ontwikkelingen in de politieke (van staatssocialisme 
naar meer liberaal) en sociale structuur (snelle industrialisatie en sterke afname van het 
percentage boeren) heeft doorgemaakt. Met deze ontwikkelingen kunnen ook veranderingen 
worden verwacht in de mate en aard van statushomogamie. Bivariate, loglineaire analyses van 
kruistabellen van de herkomst van partners laten zien dat het verband tussen de herkomst van 
partners tussen 1930 en 1979 halveert. Gelijksoortige analyses voor kruistabellen van de 
opleidingen van partners laten zien dat de opleidingshomogamie tot de jaren zestig afneemt en 
daarna een sterke stijging vertoont. Multivariate, loglineaire analyses met modellen die de 
verwevenheid van beide statuskenmerken van partners onderkennen, laten zien dat de 
schattingen voor herkomst- en opleidingshomogamie lager liggen dan de schattingen uit 
bivariate analyse. Deze bevinding suggereert dat in eerdere (bivariate) analyses de neiging tot 
statushomogamie werd overschat. Trendbevindingen tussen de twee soorten analyses lopen 
evenwel niet uiteen. De ontwikkelingen in statushomogamie laten een afname van 
herkomsthomogamie en een toename van opleidingshomogamie zien. Er is in Hongarije dus 
geen sprake van schijntrends in statushomogamie. 
De tweede toets van de bijprodukt verklaring heeft betrekking op homogamie wat betreft 
sociale herkomst en opleidingsniveau in Nederland tussen 1947 en 1992. Ik toets de 
bijprodukt verklaring apart voor Nederland omdat eerdere studies met bivariate modellen een 
substantiële afname van de opleidingshomogamie hebben laten zien. In het licht van mijn 
theoretische overwegingen bevreemdt deze afname. Ik verwacht dat door de grotere nadruk 
op opleidingsniveau voor de verdeling van banen op arbeidsmarkten, de geringere sekse-
ongelijkheid, stijgende inkomens, en de hogere leeftijd van het eerste huwelijk, de voorkeuren 
van partners en hun ouders dusdanig veranderen dat aan herkomst minder en aan opleiding 
juist meer aandacht wordt geschonken. Om deze veronderstellingen te toetsen gebruik ik 
gegevens over sociale herkomst en opleidingen van partners uit een representatieve steekproef 
van de Nederlands bevolking. Door de relatief geringe grootte van de steekproef pas ik geen 
loglineaire modellen toe, maar (residuele) correlatie modellen. De laatste modellen stonden 
eerder centraal in studies van de tweede generatie. Bivariate analyses met nulde-orde 
correlatie modellen laten zien dat in het naoorlogse Nederland de samenhang tussen de sociale 
herkomst van partners sterk afneemt, terwijl de opleidingshomogamie fluctueert zonder een 
duidelijke trend. Analyses met multivariate modellen laten globaal dezelfde resultaten zien, 
maar bij nadere beschouwing zijn er ook belangrijke verschillen tussen de twee soorten 
analyses: de bivariate homogamie parameters overschatten de mate van statushomogamie, en 
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tussen sommige huwelijkscohorten lopen de trendbevindingen van beide soort analyses wel 
uiteen. De afname in de herkomsthomogamie blijkt bijvoorbeeld niet lineair te zijn, maar te 
berusten op een snelle daling aan het begin van dejaren zeventig. 
De derde toets van de bijprodukt verklaring is de meest uitgebreide en behelst een analyse 
van homogamie wat betreft sociale herkomst en opleidingsniveau in 15 industriële landen 
gedurende de twintigste eeuw. Een eerdere grootschalige studie met bivariate modellen liet een 
wereldwijde afname van opleidingshomogamie zien. Het is de vraag in hoeverre deze trend 
een schijntrend is. Mijn analyses van bestanden die zowel informatie bevatten over de sociale 
herkomst als opleidingen van partners, laten in het bivariate geval grotere landenverschillen 
dan historische verschillen in statushomogamie zien. De kleine historische veranderingen 
duiden op een afname van herkomsthomogamie en een stabiele opleidingshomogamie. 
Multivariate analyses met residuele correlatiemodellen laten dezelfde resultaten zien. In het 
algemeen is er dus geen sprake van schijntrends. Toch zijn er ook hier weer interessante 
verschillen tussen de twee soorten analyses: (1) de multivariate parameters zijn aanmerkelijk 
kleiner dan de bivariate, (2) de verschillen tussen landen zijn geringer in multivariate dan in 
bivariate analyse, (3) tussen sommige cohorten lopen trendbevindingen van beide soort 
analyses uiteen, en (4) binnen sommige landen is er sprake van een trendommekkeer na 
multivariate analyse. Een ander interessant resultaat van mijn analyses is dat in alle 
onderzochte landen - ook in landen waar de opleidingshomogamie is afgenomen - de 
opleidingshomogamie in recente geboortecohorten sterker is geworden dan de 
herkomsthomogamie. Dit resultaat beschouw ik als een meer informatief resultaat dan de 
bevinding uit vorig, bivariaat onderzoek dat wereldwijd het verband tussen de opleidingen van 
partners is gedaald. 
DE VERKLARING VAN PATRONEN VAN STATUSHOMOGAMIE 
Verschillen in opleidingshomogamie tussen landen en tijdstippen zijn in eerdere studies 
verklaard door de mate van industrialisatie en de kleur van regeringen. Het idee om deze twee 
factoren als verklarende variabelen te gebruiken stamt uit literatuur van sociale stratificatie. In 
deze literatuur wordt gesteld dat overdracht van status van de ene op de andere generatie 
(intergenerationele reproduktie) en statushomogamie, twee alternatieve indicatoren zijn voor 
de openheid van samenlevingen. Factoren die bijdragen aan een verminderde overdracht van 
status tussen generaties, zoals industrialisatie en het bestaan van staatssocialisme of sociaal-
democratie, zouden in deze gedachtengang ook tot een vermindering van statushomogamie 
moeten leiden. Mijn derde centrale vraagstelling heeft betrekking op de houdbaarheid van deze 
hypothesen uit mobiliteitsonderzoek. Ze luidt in hoeverre industrialisatie en linkse politiek van 
een land ook na multivariate analyse van de opleidingen en herkomst van partners, de 
opleidingshomogamie vermindert. Mijn eerdere theoretische afleidingen en bevindingen 
zouden doen verwachten dat industrialisatie juist tot sterkere opleidingshomogamie leidt. 
De derde onderzoeksvraag heb ik beantwoord in de analyse van statushomogamie voor 15 
industriële landen. In een regressie-analyse heb ik de geobserveerde historische en cross-
nationale verschillen in de bivariate en multivariate parameters voor statushomogamie 
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gerelateerd aan indicatoren voor industrialisatie (het aantal telefoons) en de aard van het 
politieke regime (aantal jaren staatssocialisme/sociaal-democratie). Deze globale indicatoren 
werden eerder gebruikt in derde generatie onderzoek naar opleidingshomogamie, en toen werd 
gevonden dat deze indicatoren tot geringere homogamie leiden. Mijn analyses laten zien dat de 
noties van mobiliteitsonderzoek in het algemeen niet houdbaar zijn: hoewel industrialisatie en 
een periode van staatssocialisme of sociaal-democratie een negatief effect hebben op de mate 
van herkomsthomogamie uit bivariate analyse, hebben deze macro-factoren geen significante 
invloed op de mate van herkomsthomogamie zoals vastgesteld met multivariate modellen. 
Cross-nationale en historische verschillen in opleidingshomogamie - zowel die uit bivariate als 
multivariate analyse - kunnen evenmin goed worden toegeschreven aan de globale indicatoren 
voor industrialisatie en de politieke kleur van regeringen. 
De bevindingen van mijn verklarende analyses doen de vraag rijzen waarom en hoe 
industrialisatie en linkse politiek überhaupt een effect kunnen hebben op de keuze van een 
partner. Op deze nieuwe vraag heb ik in mijn verklarende analyses een antwoord proberen te 
geven. Uitgaande van assumpties over hoe partnerkeuzes op individueel niveau tot stand 
komen, laat ik zien dat industrialisatie en linkse politiek op verschillende en vaak ook 
tegengestelde wijze statushomogamie beïnvloeden. Industrialisatie vat ik daarbij op als een 
proces dat bestaat uit tenminste vier ontwikkelingen die van belang kunnen zijn voor 
veranderingen in de partnerkeuze: (1) de verschuiving van selectie van personen voor banen 
op basis van toegeschreven waarden (herkomst) naar verworven waarden (opleiding), (2) het 
proces van urbanisatie, (3) opleidingsexpansie, en (4) afnemende sekse-ongelijkheid. Linkse 
politiek beïnvloedt statushomogamie op een andere manier doordat socialistische en sociaal-
democratische regeringen kinderen op latere leeftijd voor verdere scholing selecteren dan in 
andere samenlevingen het geval is. Deze latere selectie zou mogelijkheden scheppen voor 
vriendschappen en huwelijken russen personen die in hun verdere leven geheel verschillende 
onderwijsniveaus behalen. 
In een regressie analyse van de bivariate en multivariate homogamie parameters blijkt dat 
de geobserveerd trouwpatronen in sterkere mate kunnen worden toegeschreven aan de vijf 
meer informatieve indicatoren voor industrialisatie en politiek dan aan de eerder genoemde 
globale indicatoren. De belangrijkste factoren die de opleidingshomogamie versterken zijn de 
sterkere nadruk op opleiding voor de selectie van banen, en de afnemende ongelijkheid in 
gemiddeld onderwijsniveau tussen mannen en vrouwen. De trend naar geringere 
herkomsthomogamie kan het best worden toegeschreven aan de afnemende sekse-
ongelijkheid: deze ontwikkeling heeft vrouwen financieel onafhankelijk gemaakt van mannen 
en heeft daarnaast de motivatie van zowel vrouwen als (schoon-)ouders vermindert een 
echtgenoot te zoeken van hoge komaf. De overige kenmerken - urbanisatie, 
opleidingsexpansie en selectie van leerlingen voor verdere scholing op late leeftijd - kunnen de 
bestaande landen en tijdsverschillen in statushomogamie niet goed verklaren. 
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COMPENSERENDE STRATEGIEËN: OPLEIDINGS- EN CULTUURHOMOGAMEE 
Mijn studie heeft laten zien dat met de verschuiving van voor-industriële naar industriële 
samenlevingen, de opleidingshomogamie sterker wordt dan de herkomsthomogamie. Met de 
verschuiving van industriële naar post-industriële samenlevingen is volgens bepaalde theorieën 
een verdere toename van de rol van opleidingsniveau twijfelachtig. In samenlevingen waarin 
mensen meer vrije tijd hebben gekregen, is het volgens een uitwerking van een idee van De 
Singly (1987, 1993) te verwachten dat niet het opleidingsniveau maar de culturele leefstijl van 
partners aan belang wint. Volgens een uitwerking van Bourdieu's theorie van compenserende 
strategieën (Bourdieu 1972, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1989) is dit ook het geval, maar wel om een 
andere reden: mensen letten steeds meer op culture leefstijl van huwelijkskandidaten omdat dit 
het gevolg is van een bewuste strategie. De strategie wordt toegepast door leden van hogere 
statusgroepen in tijden waarin sociaal onderscheid door middel van opleidingsniveau - als 
gevolg van onderwijsexpansie en democratisering van het hoger onderwijs - minder effectief is 
geworden. Mijn derde centrale vraagstelling betreft de houdbaarheid van deze voorspellingen. 
De eerste toets van bovenstaande voorspellingen behelst een analyse van homogamie wat 
betreft opleidingsniveau en participatie aan cultuur in Nederland tussen 1948 en 1992. 
Daartoe gebruik ik gegevens van partners over de deelname aan zes vormen van legitieme 
cultuur (de schone kunsten) op het tijdstip dat ze 20 jaar waren. Correlatie analyses laten zien 
dat het verband tussen de cultuurdeelname van partners tot de jaren zeventig stijgt en 
vervolgens daalt. Multivariate analyses laten dezelfde trend zien, hoewel de cultuurhomogamie 
een decennia later stijgt dan in bivariate analyse. Gegeven het stabiele verband tussen de 
opleidingsniveaus van partners in het naoorlogse Nederland, kan geconcludeerd worden dat 
cultuurdeelname in de laatste decennia aan belang heeft ingeboet. Deze bevinding verwerpt 
voorspellingen van De Singly en Bourdieu's theorie van compenserende strategieën. 
Desalniettemin komen partners onafhankelijk van hun opleidingsniveaus ook in grote mate 
overeen wat betreft hun deelname aan de schone kunsten. Cultuurhomogamie is een belangrijk 
verschijnsel en kan voor hogere statusgroepen een middel tot sociaal onderscheid zijn. 
De tweede toets van de voorspelling dat cultuur in belangrijkheid toeneemt wordt gevormd 
door een analyse van de partnerkeuzes van wetenschappelijk opgeleiden in Nederland wat 
betreft hun opleidingsniveau en studierichting. Volgens mijn uitwerking van Bourdieu's 
theorie van compenserende strategieën zou de partnerkeuze in recente decennia minder 
gekenmerkt worden door keuze naar niveau dan door keuze naar studierichting. De 
studierichting geeft daarbij - misschien nog in sterkere mate dan cultuurdeelname - een keuze 
voor een bepaalde culturele leefstijl aan. Om de hypothese over de toename van homogamie 
naar studierichting te toetsen beperk ik me tot de partnerkeuzes van academisch opgeleiden 
omdat op dit niveau de differentiatie naar richting het duidelijkst en sterkst is. Loglineaire 
analyses van gegevens over de studierichtingen en opleidingsniveaus van wetenschappelijk 
opgeleiden uit vier representatieve steekproeven voor Nederland, hebben laten zien dat 
academici liever binnen dan buiten hun studierichting trouwen. Deze neiging bestaat ook 
onafhankelijk van de neiging om binnen het eigen opleidingsniveau te trouwen, maar ze is wel 
kleiner. Een andere bevinding is dat niet alle studierichtingen even ver van elkaar staan wat 
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betreft hun partnerkeuze: personen uit studierichtingen van de zogenaamde 'culturele elite' 
(letteren, sociale wetenschappen) trouwen eerder met elkaar dan met personen van de 
zogenaamde 'economische elite' (economisch-juridisch, natuurwetenschappen, medicijnen). 
Deze tendens geldt ook voor personen uit de economische elite, hoewel in geringere mate dan 
voor personen uit de culturele elite. De verschillende afstanden in trouwpatronen bevestigen 
voorspellingen uit Bourdieu's theorie van compenserende strategieën. De afstanden nemen 
echter over de tijd niet toe: in de jaren zeventig en tachtig is de neiging om binnen de eigen 
studierichting te trouwen even groot als in de jaren vijftig of zestig, en de afstanden tussen de 
verschillende elites nemen evenmin toe. In tegenspraak tot de voorspellingen uit Bourdieu's 
theorie bevinden personen uit de culturele elite zich ook niet op een grotere, maar op een 
kleinere sociale afstand van niet-universitaire opgeleiden vergeleken met personen uit de 
economische elite: mensen met een opleiding letteren geven bijvoorbeeld relatief vaker de 
voorkeur aan een huwelijk met een niet-academicus dan mensen met een opleiding medicijnen. 
Een alternatieve verklaring voor deze bevinding is de economische competitietheoric. Ze stelt 
dat er tussen huwelijkskandidaten een competitie gaande is om partners met de meest 
aantrekkelijke financieel-economische vooruitzichten. Deze competitie zorgt ervoor dat 
personen met de meest aantrekkelijke vooruitzichten met elkaar trouwen, en personen met 
minder aantrekkelijke vooruitzichten op elkaar zijn aangewezen. 
Al met al kan ik concluderen dat met de verschuiving van voor-industriële naar industriële 
samenlevingen het belang van opleiding ten opzichte van herkomst bij de partnerkeuze is 
toegenomen. Steeds minder wordt er gelet op een partner met een gelijk sociaal milieu en 
steeds vaker op een partner met een gelijk opleidingsniveau. Met de verschuiving van 
industriële naar post-industriële samenlevingen blijft de neiging om binnen het eigen 
opleidingsniveau even sterk, en wordt ze - in tegenstelling tot mijn voorspellingen - niet 
vervangen door homogamie wat betreft culturele leefstijl. Partners komen tegenwoordig wel 
vaak overeen wat betreft hun culturele kenmerken, maar de overeenkomsten in 
opleidingsniveau zijn nog steeds groter. 
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